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Abstract
In Canada, Crown prosecutors and the Attorney General are not always as fair as we
expect when making charging decisions, and therefore victims could be personally
aggrieved by unfair and unjust decisions not to prosecute. When this happens, victims
have limited remedy to redress the unfairness and unjustness in order to uphold their
interests in a criminal proceeding. Conversely, the European Union, United Kingdom,
and the United State have taken steps to let victims challenge decisions not to prosecute
to some extent. Drawing on experiences of the abovementioned jurisdictions, I propose a
two-level process of review for decisions not to prosecute----Internal Review and Judicial
Review----in Canada in order to provide victims a way to have problematic decisions
reversed. This proposal can provide a direction or framework for future reform in this
area in Canada.
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CHAPTER I
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a significant international trend towards increasing victims‘
participatory roles in the criminal justice process. Canada should place a greater degree of
emphasis on the recognition and the protection of victims‘ interests in its criminal justice
process in order to catch up to or comply with international standards.1 After conducting a
thorough pre-1999 literature review on the victims‘ role in criminal justice, Young
concluded that, after intense debates about victims‘ proper roles and functions during that
period, authors in the 1970s and 1980s had generally agreed that increasing victims‘
participatory roles in the criminal process is a part of state policies.2 At that time, many
articles suggested legislative reforms in Canada in order to guarantee victims‘ interests in
criminal proceedings that have been recognized domestically or internationally. 3 This
later became a global movement in the late 1980s. Legislators worldwide started
recognizing the fact that victims‘ interests should be at least taken into account in
decision-making.4 Later, it was generally agreed that victims have significant interests in
criminal proceedings, and the focal point was moved to how to protect these interests
effectively. 5 Therefore, much literature post-1990 suggested legislative and procedural
reforms with the intention of incorporating victims‘ participatory roles into criminal
proceedings. In particular, many studies have been done on perfecting the use of victim
1

Department of Justice Canada, “The Canadian Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of
Crime”, Online: Department of Justice Canada: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cjjp/victim/guide/secn.html> [Basic Principles for Victims].
2
Department of Justice Canada, The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Process: A literature Review-1989
to 1999 by Alan N Young (Ottawa: Policy Centre for Victims Issues, Canada Department of Justice, 2001) at
18.
3
Victims’ interests will be discussed in Chapter 3.
4
Young, supra note 2 at 18.
5
Ibid.
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impact statements in criminal proceedings.6 As Professor Tobolowsky wrote:
Unlike the situation existing prior to the Task Force Work (pre-1982), the
relevant inquiry is no longer whether victims should have participatory
rights in the criminal justice process. The incredibly rapid adoption of
constitutional and legislative victims‘ rights provisions over the last fifteen
years ensures that victims will have a participatory role in the criminal
justice process. The relevant current focus therefore must be to ensure that
these victim participatory rights are appropriate and meaningful in the
context of the varied individual and societal interests involved in criminal
prosecutions.7
As a positive result, Canada has taken significant steps to make sure that victims are
formally granted participation in the sentencing and parole process through using victim
impact statements.8 However, while improving victims‘ participatory roles at later stages
of a prosecution has been a dominant focus for years, the entry stage of whether a
prosecution will be instituted, and all that entails for victims, still falls short of systemic
study and attention. Other than being informed of the status of a prosecution, victims are
generally excluded from charging decisions in Canada.
The Crown prosecutor will make a decision based on his or her discretion after the police
lodge a charge against a suspect. Such a decision includes whether or not to continue a
prosecution against an accused and on what charges. For the purpose of this thesis,
―charging decisions‖ refers only to decisions to decide whether to continue a criminal
prosecution, either public or private, against an accused person. This thesis focuses only
6

Ibid.
Peggy M Tobolowsky, “Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years after the
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime” (1999) 25 New Eng J on Crim & Civ Confinement 21 at 103.
8
“Use of Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing and Parole” (10 April 2013), online: National Victims of
Crime Awareness Week <http://www.victimsweek.gc.ca/res/r58.html> [Use of Victim Impact Statements].
7
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on decisions not to prosecute made by the Crown prosecutor and Attorney General. The
reason behind this will be further explained in Chapter 2 when discussing the Canadian
charging process. To be more specific, the phrase ―decisions not to prosecute‖ refers to
the Crown prosecutor‘s decisions to withdraw charges after the laying of charges or stay a
prosecution permanently. In practice, the Crown prosecutor makes these decisions on
behalf of the Attorney General.
In the past half century, noticing that the rights of the accused in the criminal process
might be violated by arbitrary prosecution or abuse of process by Crown prosecutors, the
Canadian system has developed a series of doctrines and processes to deal with improper
decisions to lodge charges, such as judicial reviews for flagrant impropriety of a decision
to prosecute, abuse of process doctrine, and tort proceedings against a Crown prosecutor.
However, more recently, influenced by the increasing concerns about victims‘ rights and
interests in the criminal justice process, a few authors have been struck by the following
thoughts: what if a Crown prosecutor improperly uses his or her discretionary power to
discontinue a prosecution? Should a victim just accept such a decision?
In a sense, decisions to prosecute are more likely to attract judicial scrutiny than decisions
not to prosecute.9 The former will be followed by a whole trial process, through which
judges can re-examine the legitimacy and accuracy of charges against the accused and
therefore minimize the effect of prosecutorial misconduct in charging decisions. 10
Moreover, as a part of the accused‘s procedural rights and Charter rights in a criminal
9

See R v DPP, Ex parte Manning and another, [2001] QB 330 at para 23 [Manning]; Ian Dobinson, “The
Decision not to Prosecute” (paper delivered at the 15th International Conference of the International
Society for the Reform of Criminal Law held at Canberra, Australia, 26 - 30 August 2001), [unpublished] at
2.
10
Dobinson, supra note 9 at 2.
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proceeding, the accused is able to file motions to move to dismiss the charges or stay the
proceeding by attacking the prosecutor‘s alleged mistakes in charging decision-making.
In contrast, after a charge has been pressed, the decision not to prosecute lies solely on the
prosecutorial charging discretion made by Crown prosecutors, any defects of which are
difficult to trace. It is possible that public prosecutors make unjust and unfair decisions
not to prosecute in certain circumstances. Because of this, victims may well be affected in a most profound and personal manner - by such Crown prosecutor‘s discretionary
power to prosecute a suspect or not. Indeed, most victims‘ recognized interests only
appear in post-trial stages when the accused has been convicted. However, post-trial
stages should not be singled out from the criminal process when dealing with victims‘
participation in criminal proceedings. Any criminal prosecution runs like a chain from the
charging stage to the sentencing stage. Each stage in the criminal process is closely linked
to whether or not victims can get to the post-trial stage where most of their interests lie.
Only once every stage is conducted in a correct manner can victims be guaranteed that
their recognized interests will be respected. As argued by Sarah N. Welling, victims
exercise their rights in criminal proceedings on the premise that a genuine prosecution is
taking place.11 In other words, if the termination of a prosecution is improper, victims
could be unfairly deprived of exercising interests and rights that would otherwise have
been recognized at a later stage in the process. Therefore, methods to protect victims‘
interests in criminal proceedings should be started from the very beginning of a criminal
process.

11

Sarah N Welling, “Victims in the Criminal Process: a Utilitarian Analysis of Victim Participation in the
Charging Decision” (1988) 30 Ariz L Rev 85 at 85.
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When unjust and unfair decisions not to prosecute occur, victims can only count on
themselves to seek redress for the issue. Victims might start a private prosecution if the
police refuse to investigate an alleged event or decline to press charges against a suspect.
However, when it comes down to Crown prosecutors deciding to stop a prosecution, such
a decision is rarely touchable by victims, and victims can do nothing unless Crown
prosecutors change their minds. It is very rare that the accused ever wants to challenge a
decision not to prosecute that is in his or her favor.12
Unfortunately, in the Canadian criminal justice system, victims only have the right to
notification and a limited right to information in the charging stage, and have the
comparative lack of effective methods to overturn unjust and unfair decisions not to
prosecute. Even though victims can seek remedies through a tort proceeding, on some
occasions, civil remedies are typically not sufficient to comfort victims. The decision not
to prosecute is one of the major turning points in the criminal process for victims. For
victims who prefer a criminal proceeding and have reasonable grounds to believe that the
prosecution is improperly stopped, the logical remedy they want is the re-institution of the
criminal prosecution. The only way to do so is to have the decision not to prosecute
reversed.
Victims‘ review of decisions not to prosecute made by public prosecutors is not new. The
review can be either internal, judicial, or both. This has been exercised in civil law
countries such as the Netherlands, Poland, France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg,

12

In cases where jurisdictional issues are involved, the accused might challenge the decision not to
prosecute in one jurisdiction in order to avoid the prosecution on the same ground in another jurisdiction
for better or favored treatment.

6

Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey for years. 13 In the late 1980s, accompanied with the
popularity of victims‘ rights in criminal justice systems around Europe, such a review of
decisions not to prosecute gradually has become victims‘ legally recognized right in
European regional practices.14
By contrast, judicial review of decisions on whether to prosecute made by public
prosecutors has traditionally been extremely limited in common law jurisdictions.
Charging decision-making falls into the discretionary power of the Crown prosecutor,
which is a branch of government, and therefore reviewing prosecutorial discretion by
judges may raise the issue of separation of powers. 15 However, in recent decades,
influenced by civil law traditions and the European Union (EU)‘s recent practice, the
United Kingdom (UK) has adopted a review system in its domestic system. 16 In the
United States (US), some states have provided private challenges to prosecutorial
decisions on whether to prosecute in certain circumstances and qualified challengers are
not limited to accused persons. This is because of increased concerns about the victims‘
interests in criminal proceedings and the danger of public prosecutor‘s unfettered
discretionary power.
Judicial review of a decision not to prosecute is theoretically available for victims in
13

Matti Joutsen, “Listening to the Victim: The Victims’ Role in European Criminal Justice System” (19871988) 34 Wayne L Rev 95 at 109 -112; Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima, Project Victims in Europe,
Implementation of the EU Framework Decision on the standing of victims in the criminal proceedings in the
Member States of the European Union (Portugal: Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima 2009) at 44
[Implementation of the EU Framework Decision]
14
Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R(85)11 (1985), art B7 [Victim’s Rights
Recommendation]; EU, Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and
replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, [2012] OJ, L 315/57 at 69 [Victims’ Rights Directive].
15
Robert J Frater, Prosecutorial Misconduct (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2009) at 20.
16
“Victims' Right to Review Scheme” (Jun 2013), online: The Crown Prosecution Service
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_right_to_review/index.html> [Review Scheme]
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Canada, but its use as a remedy to overturn unjust and unfair decisions not to prosecute is
very limited and ineffective. Only in extremely rare circumstances could victims succeed
in judicial review applications. In fact, such applications have never succeeded in
Canada.17 This is in part because the Canadian judiciary is extremely reluctant to question
the exercise of discretion by Crown prosecutors and the Attorney General, and therefore
Canada‘s courts have been employing a relatively high standard of review.18
The lack of effective remedies to overturn unjust and unfair decisions not to prosecute
establishes a point that victims cannot effectively protect their recognized interests from
unjustifiable violations by the Crown prosecutor. Hence, I believe that a reform to help
victims review the decision not to prosecute is necessary.
It should be noted that such a reform does not intend to give victims veto rights. Canadian
legislators have emphasized a point that the promotion of victims‘ participatory roles aims
at giving victims voices in criminal proceedings, not veto power. 19 To provide an
effective remedy for victims to question decisions not to prosecute does not necessitate
giving them a veto in charging decision-making. Even in the judicial review or internal
review process, victims should have no power to veto a decision not to prosecute. Victims
can only convince competent authorities to exercise their power to reverse a decision not
to prosecute through presenting legal arguments, together with solid evidence, in a formal
proceeding.

17

Frater, supra note 15 at 41.
Frater, supra note 15 at 20-24.
19
The House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Victims’ Rights - A Voice, not
a Veto (October 1998) (Shaughnessy Cohen, MP) (Victims ask for a voice at each stage of the criminal
justice process, not a veto power).
18
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1.1 Use of the term “victim”
Some people might prefer the term ―alleged victims‖ because calling a complainant
―victim‖ might insinuate the guilt of an alleged offender to a judge, jury and the public,
which seems to be a violation of offender‘s right to be presumed innocent. However, in
my opinion, it is important to treat complainants with respect, and it is very offensive to
refer a complainant as an ―alleged victim‖. In addition, the use of the term ―victim‖ in the
charging stage where the guilt of the accused has not yet been proven has been generally
accepted. In the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power (UN Declaration), a complainant may be considered a ―victim‖ in the
charging stage:
A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of
whether the perpetrator is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or
convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the
perpetrator and the victim.20
In accordance with the Declaration, the Canadian government also adopted the Canadian
Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime (the Canadian Statement)21
requiring governments and ministers at all levels to guarantee fair treatment of victims in
the criminal justice process. At that time, no definition of the term ―victims‖ was written
down in the Basic Principles. It can be assumed that Canada implicitly follows the
definition used in the UN Declaration.
For the purpose of victim impact statements in sentencing, section 722 (4) of the Criminal

20

Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, GA Res 40/34,
UNGAOR, 40th Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/40/34, (1985), annex A, art 2 [emphasis added].
21
Basic Principles for Victims, supra note 1.
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Code of Canada formally defined victims as ―a person to whom harm was done or who
suffered physical or emotional loss as a result of the commission of the offence‖. 22
According to the plain meaning of this definition, the existence of ―victims‖ and the real
commission of a crime seem inseparable. Perhaps, realizing the limitation of this
definition on providing rights to complainants in the pre-conviction phase, the definition
of ―victim‖ in the Criminal Code have started including the ―victim‖ of an alleged offence
since 1999.23
It is true that the definition in section 722 (4) remains in use, in spite of the different
wordings, in most documents about victims‘ rights adopted prior to 1999 such as
legislation relating to victims' rights in most provinces and territories and the Corrections
and Conditional Release Act.24 However, even without declaring the inclusion of alleged
victims, in the legislation and the Basic Principles for Victims, some principles and rights
are nevertheless extended to pre-conviction stages, such as the right to notification, the
right to information, and the right to protection. 25 For example, some information is
meaningful only if it is provided in early stages of the criminal justice process, such as the
status of the investigation, the scheduling, progress, and final outcome of the proceeding.
22

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 722 (4) [Criminal Code].
Ibid, s 2; Bill C-79, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (victims of crime) and another Act in consequence,
1st Sess, 36th Parl, 1999, cl 1.
24
An Act Respecting Assistance for Victims of Crime, RSQ, c A-13.2, art 1 [Quebec, An Act Respecting
Assistance for Victims of Crime]; The Victims' Bill of Rights, CCSM c V55, s 1 (1) [Manitoba, The Victims’ Bill
of Rights]; Victims of Crime Act, RSNWT (Nu) 1988, c 9 (Supp), s 1 [Nunavut, Victims of Crime Act]; Victims
of Crime Act, RSNWT 1988, c 9 (Supp), s 1 [Northwest Territory, Victims of Crime Act]. The term “victim” is
written down in the relevant legislations to include alleged victims only in Manitoba, Nunavut, Northwest
Territory and Quebec.
25
Victims of Crime Act, RSA 2000, c V-3, s 2, 4; Victims of Crime Act, RSBC 1996, c 478, ss 2-4, 6 [British
Columbia, Victims of Crime Act]; The Victims of Crime Act, 1995, SS 1995, c V-6.011, s 2.1; Victims Services
Act, SNB 1987, c V-2.1, s 2-7; Victims of Crime Services Act, RSNL 1990, c V-5, ss 5-7; Nunavut, Victims of
Crime Act, supra note 25, s 5; Victims' Bill of Rights, 1995, SO 1995, c 6, s 2 [Ontario, Victims’ Bill of Right];
Victims of Crime Act, RSPEI 1988, c V-3.1, s 2; Quebec, An Act Respecting Assistance for Victims of Crime,
supra note 25, arts 4-6; Manitoba, The Victims’ Bill of Rights, supra 25, ss 3-5, 7, 11-14; Northwest
Territory, Victims of Crime Act, supra note 25, s 5.
23
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If there is no victim until the guilt of an accused is proven, so-called ―victims‘ rights‖
should not appear in pre-conviction stages given that the subject of such rights does not
exist at all in these stages. These legislatures nevertheless indiscriminately describe the
holder of these rights as the ―victim‖. If applying the ―non-victim‖ theory, the existence
of these rights as ―victims‘ rights‖ and their implementation will sound absurd. For these
reasons, it seems that, in practice, Canada is inclined to treat ―alleged victims‖ as
―victims‖ in order to ensure their exercise of rights in the criminal justice system.

1.2 Structure of the thesis
This thesis will be constructed as follows. In Chapter 2, I will start with demonstrating the
charging process in the Canadian criminal justice system and show why decisions not to
prosecute made by Crown prosecutors and the Attorney General are of particular interest
to me. Then I will continue to reveal several current problems in the Canadian legal
system concerning victims receiving effective remedies for improper decisions not to
prosecute. I will firstly demonstrate the potential misconduct of Crown prosecutors during
the charging decision-making process. Because of the comparative lack of studies about
prosecutorial behaviours of Crown prosecutors in Canada, the conclusion largely relies on
American resources and several Canadian resources concerning other related areas, such
as juries‘ judgements on cases and racial profiling occurring in police operation. Then, I
will show victims‘ lack of sufficient effective remedies to protect their interests in four
aspects: (1) in charging stages, in most situations, victims are no more than information
receivers and have no procedural rights; (2) civil proceedings are not always sufficient to
satisfy victims‘ psychological needs; (3) complaining about decisions not to prosecute
through informal channels seems less effective than formal channels such as internal

11

review and judicial review; and (4) judicial review is not easily accessible to victims for
challenging decisions not to prosecute.
In Chapter 3, I will justify my proposal of providing victims opportunities to challenge
decisions not to prosecute with two reasons. First, victims are personally affected by
decisions not to prosecute. The decision not to prosecute is one of the important links for
victims to enjoy their interests and rights at the trial and post-trial stage. Therefore, a state
should recognize these interests in the charging stage. Moreover, in Canada, victims enjoy
equal protection in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.26 Second,
victims can obtain satisfaction and closure through challenging a decision not to
prosecute. Because victims‘ participation in the charging stage is not commonly
discussed, there is a dearth of resources directly linked to victims‘ interests and rights in
the stage. Some conclusions drawn in this chapter are inferred from the resources that are
not directly linked to this topic.
In Chapter 4, I will draw attention to foreign examples of victims‘ challenges to decisions
not to prosecute made by public prosecutors. This will include the practices in the EU, the
UK and the US. The practices in these areas are important for forming the proposed
reform in the next chapter. The research in this section is mainly doctrinal.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will explain the proposed reform in detail based on the research I
explored in previous chapters. I propose a two level review process, internal review and
judicial review, for victims to complain about improper decisions not to prosecute. A
special unit should be set up for the internal review process in the Crown prosecutor‘s

26

Charter of human rights and freedoms, RSQ c C-12 s 15 [Charter].
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office in each city. Victims could receive full explanations of decisions not to prosecute in
writing after the request for a reversal of the original decision is denied. In this case,
Crown prosecutor‘s re-institution of a prosecution resulting from an internal review
should not be considered an abuse of process challengeable by the accused. The proposed
review process only reviews the decision not to prosecute if a prosecution is stopped
completely and permanently. Termination of a prosecution resulting from a deal made
between the Crown prosecutor and the accused would not be reviewable in this system.
Then, judicial review would remain available to victims, but only after the complaint fails
in the internal review. Victims should start a review proceeding within a limited period of
time after they are notified of the decisions not to prosecute. In order to provide victims
more opportunities to make successful challenges to decisions not to prosecute, the
originally limited standard of review should be extended to include all ―flagrant
impropriety‖, ―reasonableness‖, and ―correctness‖ standards. In addition, Crown
prosecutor‘s discretionary power to terminate a prosecution should be set out in a statute.
A reviewing court could compel a prosecution, direct a reconsideration or quash a
decision not to prosecute based on different standards of review. Finally, considering the
possible negative impact on the accused caused by this proposed reform, certain remedies
to reduce the impact are also suggested at the end of Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER II
2 Problems in the Current System
2.1 Charging process and Charging Decision
In Canada, Crown prosecutions start at the laying of charges. The document listing the
charges is known as an ―Information‖ which is a written document sworn by an informant
before a Justice. According to section 504 of the Criminal Code, ―anyone who, on
reasonable grounds, believes that a person has committed an indictable offence may lay
an Information in writing and under oath before a justice‖.27 The term ―anyone‖ allows
civilians to act as informants according to the requirements that are set out in section 504.
Once the information is filed, a Justice will hear and consider the allegation made by an
informant and other relevant evidence, and subsequently issue process if he or she
considers that a case for so doing has been made out according to sections 507 and
507.1. 28 According to section 2, anyone, including victims and their counsel, can be
qualified as prosecutors to proceed with a prosecution in accordance with this Code.29
As a crime is considered an act against the state, in most situations, the Crown prosecutor
will conduct a public prosecution against a suspect on behalf of the public it represents. A
public prosecution normally starts from the laying of charges by the police. Before the
accused‘s first appearance in court, the Crown prosecutor will take over the case from the
police and commence the prosecution. It is rare that the police assume a role as

27

Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 507.
Ibid, s 507
29
Ibid, s 2:
“Prosecutor” means the Attorney General or, where the Attorney General does not
intervene, means the person who institutes proceedings to which this Act applies, and
includes counsel acting on behalf of either of them
28

14

prosecutors to proceed with the case, especially in indictable cases.30 In most Canadian
jurisdictions, it is standard procedure for the Crown prosecutor to review the investigative
files pertinent to the charges made by the police, after the charges have been laid but
before the accused‘s first appearance, in a timely fashion for a post-charge screening.31
The post-charge screening is used to make sure that the laid charges meet the minimum
criteria for a case to go forward. In British Columbia, Quebec, and New Brunswick, the
police must obtain the approval of the Crown prosecutor before laying charges.32
In cases where Crown prosecutors or the police fail to act on a case, private prosecution is
an option for victims to initiate a prosecution against their violators. Initiation of a private
prosecution is not normally conditional on the Attorney General‘s consent.33 Such a right
has been referred as ―a valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on
30

In some jurisdiction, like Newfoundland, the police still carry a number of summary cases.
Frater, supra note 15 at 18; See also Steven Penny, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal
Procedure in Canada (Markham: LexisNexis, 2011) at 447- 448; Province of Ontario Ministry of Attorney
General, “Crown Policy Manual” (21 March 2005), online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/crim/cpm/2005/ChargeScreening.pdf>; Criminal
Justice Branch, Ministry of Attorney General, “BC Crown Counsel Policy Manual (Charge Assessment
Guidelines)” (2 October 2009), online: British Columbia <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecutionservice/policy-man/pdf/CHA1-ChargeAssessmentGuidelines-2Oct2009.pdf>.
32
Frater, supra note 15 at 18; Penny, Rondinelli & Stribopoulos, supra note 31 at 446, n 53. See also, Law
Reform Commission of Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecutions: the Attorney General and the Crown
Prosecutor (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1990) at 69-71 [Law Reform Commission of
Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecution]; Criminal Justice Branch, Ministry of Attorney General, “BC
Crown Counsel Policy Manual (Charge Assessment Decision -Police Appeal)” (18 November 2005), online:
British Columbia <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/policy-man/pdf/CHA1.1ChargeAssessmentPoliceAppeal-18Nov2005.pdf> (“It is expected that the police will lay an Information
only after the approval of charges by Crown Counsel, or, if charges are not approved, upon exhaustion of
an appeal of that decision by the police”); New Brunswick Attorney General, “Attorney General’s Policy Public Prosecutions“, online: New Nouveau Brunswick Canada
<http://www2.gnb.ca/content/dam/gnb/Departments/agpg/PDF/en/PublicProsecutionOperationalManual/AttorneyGeneralsPolicy.pdf> (“On completion of the
investigation, if the police are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to lay an information, they will
formulate a charge, or charges, based on their assessment of the case and then forward a full report or
court brief to the appropriate Crown Prosecutor’s office for pre-charge review”).
33
MacIssac v Motor Coach Ind Ltd, [1982] 5 WWR 391, 70 CCC (2d) 226 (Man CA) (The court held that a
private prosecution could take place even without the consent of the Crown prosecutor); See also R v
Dowson (1983), 7 CCC (3d) 527, [1983] 2 SCR 144 [Dowson] (The Attorney General can intervene into a
private prosecution and stop it only after the initial review of an Information by a Justice is completed).
31
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the part of authority‖.34 However, like most common law countries, private prosecution is
secondary to public prosecution, and the right to private prosecution needs to give way to
the interests of justice, if necessary.35 For this reason, the Attorney General is granted a
broad supervisory power over a private prosecution and the exercise of this power is
recognized as a fundamental part of the Canadian justice system. 36 The Attorney General
may attend the hearings concerning the allegations and the evidence presented by the
informant under section 507.1.37 Then he or she can withdraw the charges38 or can stay
the proceeding based on its discretion according to section 579. 39 Since 2002, the Crown
must be given notice of, and an opportunity to participate in, a pre-inquiry to determine if
a private prosecution should proceed. 40 However, it is also important to maintain the
autonomy of the private informant in conducting a private prosecution. For this reason,
the Attorney General only intervenes in a private prosecution when it is necessary, and the

34

Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] AC 435 at 477, [1977] 3 ALL ER 70 (HL) [Gouriet].
R v Bradley (1975), 9 OR (2d) 161 at paras 27, 24 CCC (2d) 482 (Ont CA) [Bradley]:
The Attorney-General, and his agent the Crown Attorney, represent the Sovereign in the
prosecution of crimes. The role of the private prosecutor, permitted by statute in this
country, is parallel to but not in substitution for the role of the Attorney-General, and
where the two roles come into conflict, the role of the Crown's persecutor is paramount,
where in his opinion the interest of justice require that he intervene and take over the
private prosecution.
36
Dowson, supra note 33 at 535-6 (The court held that “[t]he right of a private citizen to lay an
information, and the right and duty of the Attorney General to supervise criminal prosecutions are both
fundamental parts of our criminal justice system”).
37
Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 507.1
38
Law Reform Commission, Private prosecutions (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986) at
15-16
39
Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 579; R v Osiowy (1989), 50 CCC (3d) 189, 77Sack RI sub nom, Osiowy v
Linn, PCJ (CA) [Osiowy] (The Attorney General has authority to intervene and stay a private prosecution);
Bradley, supra note 35 at para 27 ( “Where the interests of justice require, the Attorney General may
intervene and take over a private prosecution of a summary conviction offence”); Hamilton v British
Columbia (Attorney General) (1986), 30 CCC (3d) 65, [1986] BCJ no756(BCSC) [Hamilton] (An intervention
by the Attorney General in a private prosecution is not a violation of s 7 of the Charter); R v Faber (1987),
38 CCC (3d) 49, [1987] RJQ 1763 (Que SC) [Faber] (A decision to stay does not infringe s 7 or s 15 of the
Charter).
40
Joan Brockman & Rose V Gordon, An Introduction to Canadian Criminal Procedure and Evidence, 4th ed
(Toronto: Nelson Education, 2011) at 80
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intervention strictly follows the policy guideline.41

2.1.1 Discontinuance of the prosecution
A public prosecution will not take place if a criminal investigation is terminated. As it is
extremely rare for public prosecutors to conduct investigations and lay charges, decisions
to stop a criminal investigation are mainly made by the police based on their discretion.
Termination can happen at any stage of the investigation, prior to the laying of charges.
Normally, discontinuance made by the police during an investigation is not considered
final for victims. As mentioned above, in most situations one remedy is that victims can
institute a private prosecution if they so desire. In order to proceed with a private
prosecution, victims can hire private investigators and counsel, submit information to a
justice by themselves and play a role as prosecutors at trial. Therefore, even though the
right to a private prosecution is limited and private prosecution might be very expensive,
when a case ends during an investigatory stage, the Canadian system indeed gives a
remedy to victims unless and until the Attorney General or the Crown prosecutors decide
to intervene and stop it.
Since the Criminal Code permits anyone to lay charges if he or she has reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed by an accused person, legally,
everyone is supposed to have discretionary power equally to lay charges regardless of
social status or position.42 That is to say, theoretically, even in British Columbia, Quebec

41

Department of Justice Canada, The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook (Ottawa: Department of
Justice Canada, 2002), Part VI, c 26, online: Public Prosecution Service of Canada <http://www.ppscsppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/fpd/toc.html> [Deskbook].
42
Only for a limited number of offences are the Attorney General’s consent required before charges are
laid. Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 7 (prosecuting a non-national), s 83.24 (terrorism offences), 136 (3)
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and New Brunswick, 43 the police or other individuals can lay a charge, bypassing the
Crown prosecutor. Therefore, only after a charge has been laid does the discretionary and
supervisory power of the Crown prosecutor and Attorney General become powerful and
dominant in a charging decision in a legal sense.44
The Crown prosecutor‘s power to withdraw charges is a power derived from the common
law. The Crown prosecutor has absolute and exclusive control over the withdrawal of
charges prior to a plea or a preliminary inquiry. 45 However, after a plea has been taken at
trial or evidence heard at a preliminary inquiry, previous consent from a presiding judge
is required before a charge can be withdrawn. Furthermore, it is comparatively rare that
the Crown prosecutor would seek to withdraw a charge after plea. 46 The same charge
often cannot be laid if that charge is withdrawn.47
Through another procedure, the Crown has the statutory power to direct a stay of
proceedings, if deemed necessary, based on section 579 of the Criminal Code.48 Unlike a
withdrawal of charges, a proceeding can be re-commenced within a maximum one year

(giving contrary evidence), 174 (3) (public nudity), 283 (2) (parental abduction of child), 318 (3)
(advocating genocide), 319 (6) (public incitement of hatred), 347 (7) (criminal interest rate).
43
In these three provinces, as a procedural rule, the police needs to acquire a Crown prosecutor’s
approval before he or she could lay a charge.
44
Charging standards and charging discretion will be discussed in detailed in the later charters.
45
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Controlling Criminal Prosecution, supra note 32 at 99-100; Judith A
Osborne, “The Prosecutor's Discretion to Withdraw Criminal Cases in the Lower Courts” (1983) 25 Can J
Crim 55 at 58; David Vanek, “Prosecutorial Discretion” (1987-1988) 30 Crim LQ 219 at 224, n 7.
46
Vanek, supra note 45 at 225.
47
R v Karpinsfi, [1957] SCR 343;R v Leonard, Ex parte Graham (1962),133 CCC 230, 38 WWR 300 (Alta
SCTD); Brockman & Gordon, supra note 40 at 76.
48
Criminal Code, supra note 23, s 579 (1):
The Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for that purpose may, at any time
after any proceedings in relation to an accused or a defendant are commenced and
before judgment, direct the clerk or other proper officer of the court to make an entry
on the record that the proceedings are stayed by his direction, and such entry shall be
made forthwith thereafter, whereupon the proceedings shall be stayed accordingly and
any recognizance relating to the proceedings is vacated.
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without laying new charges49 and a defendant cannot invoke a plea of autrefois acquit.50
A stay can happen in any stage of the proceeding, before judgement, in the absence of the
permission from a presiding judge. After a period of one year, if the Crown prosecutor
does not re-commence the proceeding, the prosecution will be deemed to have never
commenced. In practice, most stays are permanent and it is difficult to determine whether
the Crown prosecutor intended to stay a proceeding permanently or just temporarily.
The Attorney General has the authority to stay a private prosecution in order to protect
public interests. It might assess the Information laid by the private prosecutor based on its
own charging guidelines and decide whether to stay a proceeding or not.51 It should be
noted that most private prosecutions are stopped because the Attorney General concludes
that there is ―no reasonable prospect of conviction‖ or ―no evidence‖. 52 The Attorney
General believes that a prosecution, without a reasonable prospect of conviction or
sufficient evidence, is not carried out in the public interest.

49

Ibid, s 579 (2):
Proceedings stayed in accordance with subsection (1) may be recommenced, without
laying a new information or preferring a new indictment, as the case may be, by the
Attorney General or counsel instructed by him for that purpose giving notice of the
recommencement to the clerk of the court in which the stay of the proceedings was
entered, but where no such notice is given within one year after the entry of the stay of
proceedings, or before the expiration of the time within which the proceedings could
have been commenced, whichever is the earlier, the proceedings shall be deemed never
to have been commenced.
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R v Tateham (1982), 70 CCC (2d) 565, 9 WCB 22 (BCCA). See also: Law Reform Commission of Canada,
Controlling Criminal Prosecution, supra note 32 at 100. A plea of autrefois acquit (Law French for
"previously acquitted") means the defendant claims to have been previously acquitted of the same
offence, and that he or she therefore cannot be tried for it again.
51
Deskbook, supra note 41, Part VI, c 26.
52
See e.g. Chen v Alberta (Attorney General), 2007 ABQB 267, [2007] AJ no 458 [Chen]; Ahmadoun v.
Ontario (Attorney General) (2012), 281 CCC (3d) 270, [2012] OJ no 639 [Ahmadoun]; Kostuch v Alberta
(Attorney General), (1995), 101 CCC (3d) 321, 43 CR (4th) 81 (Alta CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused 105
CCC (3d) vi, 133 DLR (4th) vii [Kostuch]; Mitchell v Canada (Attorney General) (1999), 15 Admin LR (3d) 70,
175 Nfld & PEIR 181 (Nfld SCTD) [Mitchell]; R v Parsons, 2000 BCSC 1408, 78 CRR (2d) 254; R v Laforme
(2003), 57 WCB (2d) 40, [2003] OJ no 845 (Ont SCJ) [Laforme]; McHale v Ontario (Attorney General), 2011
CarswellOnt 5984, 239 CRR (2d) 73 [HcHale].
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2.2 Charging Decision-making is Sometimes Problematic
Decades ago, when the accused‘s interests were put in danger due to unavoidable
uncertainties in charge decision-making, strong prosecutorial discretionary power was
diminished, making it easier for the accused to fight against state power. The doctrine of
―abuse of process‖ was introduced into the context of criminal law after the 1964 decision
in Connelly v Director of Public Prosecution, in which Lord Devlin suggested that a court
should have the authority to stay a prosecution when the use of the prosecutorial power
by a prosecutor caused grave injustice to the accused.53 The Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed this doctrine in the 1985 decision of R v Jewitt.54
Nowadays, this doctrine is frequently invoked by the accused to fight against the Crown
prosecutor‘s charging decisions, such as use of the criminal process to collect a debt, precharge delay, multiple trials, the use of direct indictment, improper relationship with other
branches of government, improperly-motivated proceedings, a lack of independence in
the charging decision, splitting the Crown‘s case, improper re-institution of proceedings,
and other misconduct that amounts to ―abuse of process.‖ Other doctrines also emerged to
deal with those situations where Crown prosecutors maliciously deviated from the legal
rules to bring a charge against a suspect arbitrarily. To react to maliciously selective
prosecution, as early as 1951, the Canadian justice system recognized that prosecutorial
discretion could be interfered with if some oblique motive, which influenced decision-

53
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Connelly v Director of Public Prosecution, [1964] AC 1254, [1963] 3 WLR 839 (HL).
R v Jewitt (1985), 21 CCC (3d) 7 at 13-14 [1985] 2 SCR 128 (SCC) [Jewitt]:
[T]here is a residual discretion in a trial court judge to stay proceedings where
compelling an accused to stand trial would violate those fundamental principles of
justice which underlie the community’s sense of fair play and decency and to prevent
the abuse of a court’s process through oppressive or vexatious proceedings.
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making, could be

shown. 55 In recent decades, charging decisions made by Crown

prosecutors can be subjected to the scrutiny of courts or law societies where they breach
their statutory or common law duties, or where there is misconduct amounting to an
―abuse of process‖ on the part of Crown prosecutors in charging decision-making. These
doctrines can show that Crown prosecutor‘s misconduct in charging decisions have raised
concerns to the Canadian criminal system to some degree.
Charging guidelines might have some effects on preventing Crown prosecutors from
acting outside the boundary of their duty. However, sometimes, personal feelings and
motives concerning an alleged crime, alleged defendant, and victims might prevail when
Crown prosecutors making charging decision even though the guidelines try to rule out
such feelings. 56 Many empirical studies have been undertaken to understand public
prosecutors‘ patterns in charging decision-making, with studies in the US having been
especially well developed. After referring to a vast number of research studies on public
prosecutors‘ behaviours in charging decision-making in the US, Bradley Joseph
Michelsen gave a brief summary of the way in which evidentiary sufficiency and public
interest criteria might affect the public prosecutor‘s decision-making.57 According to his
summary, even though public prosecutors should not attempt to win a case at any cost,
they are indeed driven by increasing conviction rates. The quote that follows indirectly
indicates that public prosecutors might be reluctant to take a case in which the evidence is
comparatively weak but still meets the charging guideline.
55

R v Lemay (1951), 102 CCC 1 at 6, [1952] 1 SCR 232.
The sentence “Crown counsel's personal feelings about the accused or the victim” has been included as
“irrelevant criteria” in every charging guideline.
57
Bradley Joseph Michelsen, Elected Texas District and County Attorneys’ Perceptions of Victim
Involvement in Criminal Prosecutions (MA Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of Texas at
Arlington, 2007) [unpublished] at 12-14.
56
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... prosecutors are more likely to file charges when a serious offense was
committed. In addition, there is an increased probability that a prosecutor
will decide to charge a suspect with a crime when strong evidence exists in
a case. Prosecutors are also more likely to pursue a case when the suspect
is a repeat offender and the culpability of the defendant is evident58
This phenomenon becomes worse when it is combined with the following non-legal
factors summarised by Michelsen:
With regards to suspect characteristics, prosecutors are more likely to file
charges against non-white suspects. Additionally, studies have shown that
prosecutors are more likely to pursue a case when a black suspect commits
an offense against a white victim ... Studies have shown that prosecutors
are more likely to charge a male suspect than a female suspect... Schmidt
and Steury found that prosecutors are more likely to charge suspects who
are unemployed. Victim characteristics could affect prosecutors charging
decision. According to Stanko, prosecutors use victim characteristics, not
legal factors, to determine if conviction is likely to occur in a particular
case. Furthermore, prosecutors usually devote limited resources to cases
that have victims who will be perceived by the judge and jury to be ―standup‖ witnesses. In assessing a victim‘s credibility, prosecutors rely on
society‘s perception of who is credible and not deserving of victimization.
For instance, Myers and Hagan found that prosecutors more often file
criminal charges when the victim is older, white, male, and employed.
Female victims who deviate from traditional society norms of female
behavior, or engage in ―precipatory‖ behavior, are deemed less credible.
Another important factor that has shown to influence prosecutors‘ charging
decisions is the relationship between the victim and the suspect. Several
studies have shown that prosecutors are less likely to file charges when the
victim and the offender knew each other. Myers and Hagan suggested that
58

Ibid at 12 [footnote omitted].
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a victim‘s prior relationship with the offender may raise some questions
about the truthfulness of the victim‘s story and may lead the victim to
refuse to cooperate as the case moves through the criminal process ... [In
rape and sexual assault cases], [s]tudies indicated that prosecutors are less
likely to file criminal charges when a rape victim has a non-traditional
work history, such as exotic dancer, masseuse, or prostitute. Similarly,
research has shown that prosecutors are less likely to peruse sexual assault
case when victims have a history of risk taking behavior, such as
hitchhiking, drinking, or drug use. Studies also have revealed that
prosecutors are less likely to pursue a sexual assault case when the victim
has a questionable reputation or moral character.59
In this case, the public prosecutors are likely to assess the prospect of conviction and
allocate prosecutorial resources partly based on the characteristics of the suspect, victims,
and their relationship. One of the concerns in the criminal justice system is that people
might not always apply the law objectively and impartially. Of course, as a part of the
prosecutorial strategy, these factors are frequently used by public prosecutors to predict
the credibility of witnesses before a judge or juries in order to determine the evidential
sufficiency of a case. However, Michelsen categorizes these factors as a non-legal
influence on public prosecutors when deciding whether to continue a case. This is
because public prosecutors are more likely to have personal judgements and biases
against victims and the nature of an alleged offense due to these factors and, as a result,
are reluctant to continue a case regardless of other available evidence. 60 This indeed risks
the possibility that public prosecutors might draw an unfair or wrong conclusion in
deciding whether to prosecute.
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Ibid at 13-14 [footnotes omitted].
Michelsen, supra note 57.

23

Even though this research was conducted in the US, it reflects a common social
phenomenon and human characteristic that, although public prosecutors have been trained
to be legal professionals, they are not able to avoid personal feelings in charging decisionmaking. Charging guidelines exist in order to regulate the charging decision-making
process so that charging decisions can be made as objectively and fairly as possible.
Nevertheless, they are not capable of making public prosecutors abandon completely their
personal feelings and attitudes towards the cases when making charging decisions
because thoughts and feelings cannot be regulated. Therefore, Michelsen‘s research, as
well as other American research, is valuable in indicating and inferring the prosecutorial
behavior in charging decision-making in Canada.
There is a dearth of comprehensive and methodologically sophisticated empirical research
directly dealing with prosecutors‘ behavioral patterns in charging decision-making in
Canada, but the existing documents show that non-legal factors might play a role in
Crown prosecutor‘s charging decision-making when combined with other factors. The
nature of a crime and the character of the accused can have an impact on Crown
prosecutors‘ judgements on whether to prosecute or not. B A Grosman found that Crown
prosecutors were likely to withdraw charges in minor sexual offences if ―the notoriety of
the offence and the social status of the accused will likely result in suffering greatly out of
proportion of the seriousness of the offence‖ and the withdrawal was not a result of the
prosecutors‘ evaluation of the cases‘ merits, but moral consideration of the potential
damage to the accused‘s future if convicted of a notorious offence. 61 In supporting
Grosman‘s research, Judith A Osborne found that, when a complainant failed to appear in
61

B A Grosman, The prosecutor; an inquiry into the exercise of discretion (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press. 1969) at 37-39.

24

court as scheduled, the nature of a crime and the character of the accused would play
significant roles in Crown prosecutors withdrawing charges. In one of his collected cases,
which was about the indecent exposure, the complainant did not appear in court. 62
Consequently, the Crown prosecutor withdrew the charge instead of requesting an
adjournment to give him more time to subpoena the complainant. It was revealed that
such a withdrawal was made solely based on the Crown prosecutor‘s belief that the
accused did not commit the offence on purpose based on his family background.63
The Crown prosecutor might be influenced by other external circumstances, such as
political trends and increasing criminal complaints in the country. Through studying the
prosecution of criminal conspiracy, Wes Wilson expressed his concerns about politically
motivated prosecutions of criminal conspiracy. 64 He pointed out that, because of the
vague and broad definition of ―conspiracy‖ and loose rules of evidence, there is an
increasing threat that Crown prosecutors might utilize criminal charges to suppress
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Osborne, supra note 45 at 67-68.
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Wes Wilson, “The Political Use of Criminal Conspiracy” (1984) 42 UT Fac L Rev 60 at 68:
In State security legislation and criminal offences such as sedition, it is characteristically
the case that wide discretion is afforded the State in prosecuting perceived threats.
When this is compounded by the vagueness, uncertainty, and prosecutorial discretion
embodied in criminal conspiracy, the potential threat to civil liberties and the possibility
of utilizing the charge to suppress political dissent is increased. This is of particular
concern in that the government is the sole determiner of what constitutes the interests
of the State and what is a threat to its security … Reliance on the good faith of the State
and the just exercise of prosecutorial discretion is frequently put forward as an apology
not only for conspiracy law in relation to "security" legislation, but in defence of
conspiracy doctrine as a whole - a rationalization of its most flagrantly unfair flaws, and a
response to anyone who would suggest anything in the way of reform beyond tinkering
with isolated problem areas. Yet an unjust law is always an unjust law, and it does not
become any less so from infrequent application. In times of social upheaval, or in cases
of panicked over-reaction to perceived threats, the State has not hesitated to apply the
most powerful coercive instruments at its disposal. If a law is unjust, or has the potential
for indiscriminate application to deprive citizens of their civil rights in times of social
unrest, that law should itself be attacked (footnote omitted).
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political dissent.65 David Vanek worried that the pressure caused by heavy caseloads can
push Crown prosecutors to take advantage of their discretionary power to dispose of cases
on their daily calendars by using short cuts. 66 In fact, according to the report of the
Canadian Federal-Provincial Task Force on Victims of Crime, in plea-bargaining
processes, there were many instances where charges were withdrawn without proper
consideration of the available evidence.67 Crown prosecutors‘ subjective opinions towards
a case are also a factor. Lucinda Vandervort found that, in Canada, Crown prosecutor‘s
personal attitudes played a significant role in charging decision-making in sexual assault
cases.68
In Canada, it appears that sometimes Crown prosecutors prosecute someone for a
particular act, but do not prosecute others who have done the very same thing. When
talking about possible selective prosecution in Canada, Rober W Hubbard, Peter M Brauti
and Candice Welsch believe that selective prosecutions indeed have been launched in the
country. However, because the challenges on the grounds of selective prosecution
experienced a low success rate, most of the challenges were disguised by other grounds of
―abuse of process‖.69 Even though there is a lack of actual cases, some scholars, such as
Frater, Welling, and Mackinnon, believe that malicious and selective non-prosecution
does exist.70
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It also can be inferred from some studies in similar fields such as the behaviours of the
police and judge/juror that decisions made by Canadian Crown prosecutors may also be
influenced by personal bias or discrimination, and therefore they are not always as square
and fair as we expect. Personal biases and discrimination against certain groups of people
do exist in Canada as a part of the culture.
In a study of mock juror ratings of guilt in Canada, Jeffrey E Pfeifer and James R P
Ogloff concluded that prejudicial attitudes, based on ethnicity, do indeed exist in Canada
today.71 They found that bias against English Canadians and good impressions of French
Canadian women could affect juror‘s subjective perception of victims at trial.72 As well,
the study also shows that the determination of guilt could be influenced by the ethnic
background of the victims. 73 In another study, Pfeifer discovered that accused persons
with high social status are less likely to be found guilty than their counterparts with low
social status, regardless of their race. However, when the accused have the same social
status, the Black individual is more likely to be found guilty than the White individual.74
Evelyn M Maeder, Annik Mossière and Liann Cheung found that the judgments of the
mock jury in domestic violence cases might be influenced by the race and gender of the
jury, which cause attitudinal and perceptional differences towards to the nature of the
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27

defendant and the alleged crime at issue.75
In a research study on whether Toronto police officials engage in ―Racial Profiling‖,
similarly, Ron Melchers found that ―it was highly plausible that, once all legally relevant
factors have been accounted for, differences in the treatment of groups according to race
will remain‖, and concluded that ―the possibility of discrimination cannot be excluded‖.76
In addition, police who have racial biases are more likely to stop an investigation solely
based on their bias without carefully assessing all available relevant evidence, according
to Oscar H Gandy and Lemi Baruh.77 Ray Kuszelewski and Dianne L Martin considered
that some of the police misconduct is caused by biases and assumptions about race, class
and gender. 78 For example, complaints made by vulnerable and low status victims are
easy to be set aside.
Similar to the above-mentioned two fields, some scholars doubt the existence of the
―complete impartiality‖ of judges in actuality even though so many rules have been set to
require judges to act impartially. R Abella argued that judges‘ own values, assumptions,
and experiences can significantly affect their judgements on an issue. 79 A similar
argument was also made by Lord Justice Scrutton.80 These studies suggest that some non75
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legal factors, such as personal bias, values, assumptions, cultural backgrounds, and
experiences, could play significant roles in Crown prosecutors‘ charging decision-making.
It is impossible to regulate subjective perceptions with legal rules just as the law cannot
control what people think. Studies about social science suggest that general belief or
stereotypes associated with the characteristics of the stranger‘s group have an essential
influence on people‘s decision-making and judgment on a person unknown to them.81
This is supported by the observation of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, which
states ―practical experience and psychology both confirm that anyone can stereotype,
even people who are well meaning and not overtly biased.‖82 People may strongly believe
in such stereotypes if they have similar previous experiences or constantly receive such
information through prevailing pop-culture or media. 83 Studies suggest that decisionmakers are likely to rely on group stereotypes if they have to make a vast number of
decisions in a timely fashion, especially in cases where potential criminal or terrorist
activities are concerned.84

your having a certain class of ideas of such a nature that, when you have to deal with
other ideas, you do not give as sound and accurate judgments as you would wish...It is
very difficult sometimes to be sure that you have put yourself into a thoroughly
impartial position between two disputants, one of your own class and one not of your
class.
81
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Non-legal factors might lead to an irrational and unjust decision not to prosecute that will,
in turn, cause great injustice and unfairness to victims. Traditionally, in the Canadian
criminal legal system, victims‘ interests are subsumed in the state‘s interests. I believe
that, even though the Crown prosecutor is not acting on behalf of victims, in most
occasions, they will not deliberately inflict harm on those victims. However, in a case
where Crown prosecutors appear to commit misconduct when deciding not to prosecute a
case or to stop a private prosecution, victims‘ interests will be put in danger and victims
will be unjustifiably deprived of the state protection they deserve.

2.3 Insufficient remedies and rights
When a prosecutor wrongs victims, victims have limited power to redress these wrongs
because of the lack of sufficient and effective remedies and procedural rights in criminal
proceedings.

2.3.1 Information Receiver
In current system, victims are merely information receivers. Not only cannot victims
receive full information regarding their cases, but they also have no power to respond to
the information. As stated in the preamble to the Ontario Victims‘ Bill of Rights, ―the
justice system should operate in a manner that does not increase the suffering of victims
of crime and that does not discourage victims of crime from participating in the justice
process‖.85 However, many scholars have commented on the fact that victims‘ rights in
Canada are comparatively passive and vague than they should be, and the rights do little
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to alter the victim‘s traditional power position.86 This is so in charging decisions. The
principle of giving victims information about the status of an investigation, the
scheduling, progress and outcome of the proceedings is almost duplicated word by word
from the Canadian Statement in most provincial victims‘ bills of rights without
elaboration. Legislation concerning victims‘ rights should provide detailed information
about how this principle is to be put into force. It should at least give the reader a sense
that such a principle is genuinely enforceable in the current framework of the criminal
justice system. For example, if victims should be able to access the information about the
progress of a particular criminal proceeding pertinent to the alleged crime, should
corresponding agents provide the information to victims automatically or only upon their
requests? Not every victim knows where and how to ask for the information. What type
of information related to the progress of criminal proceedings should be available to the
victims? The corresponding agents can reply to the victim simply by saying ―we decide
not to proceed with your case because of insufficient evidence.‖ It seems that the agent
has complied with the principle, but in fact, victims might feel the information
insufficient. If the agent fails to comply with the principle, what are the remedies for the
victims and should that agent be disciplined? If there is no sanction for the violation, the
enforcement of such a principle could be highly ineffective.
Only in Ontario and British Columbia do the statutes mention that victims can receive
information on the reasons behind charging decisions. Section 6 of the Victims of Crime
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Act of British Columbia87 lays down in a mandatory tone that ―the reasons why a decision
was made respecting charges must‖ be given to victims at their request,88 and section 2
(1) of Ontario‘s Victims‘ Bill of Rights also states that ―[v]ictims should have access to
information about: … the charges laid with respect to the crime and, if no charges are
laid, the reasons why no charges are laid…‖89 However, even these two provisions do not
provide any comprehensive information about how detailed reasoning should be given to
victims. In Ontario, the ―right‖ that is put in the name of the ―right of victims‖, together
with others put down in its Victims‘ Bill of Rights, is considered a ―principle‖ rather than
an enforceable ―statutory right‖. It was held in Vanscoy v Ontario that ―[t]he Act is a
statement of principle and social policy, beguilingly clothed in the language of legislation.
It does not establish any statutory rights for the victims of crime.‖90
It seems that the criminal justice system has attempted to treat victims of crime with due
respect by informing them of decisions not to prosecute without undue delay. In fact, the
decisions not to prosecute themselves and the lack of acceptable explanation might afflict
victims with emotional distress when victims (at least for most victims who want a
criminal prosecution) are struck by such unexpected bad news. The victims will be upset
if Crown prosecutors refuse to give them acceptable explanations for decisions not to
prosecute. The situation will get worse if the victims realise that no sufficient and
effective remedies can be sought if the decisions are unjust and unfair.
As a development, Manitoba incorporates victims‘ consultative roles in charging
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decision-making. Section 14 of its Victims' Bill of Rights generally encourages Crown
prosecutors to consult victims when making a decision on whether to lay a charge.91 The
effect of the consultation sometimes is not so significant. Sometimes, conflicting opinions
between victims and Crown prosecutors might be buffered through sufficient
communication, in which victims may be convinced by Crown prosecutors that
prosecutions are not in their best interests before the actual decisions not to prosecute is
delivered. However, where the conflict cannot be solved and victims have reasonable
grounds to believe that a decision not to prosecute is improper, the consultative power
does not give victims much help. In other words, it might give them help, but it leaves
them without any available recourse or control. In conclusion, the Manitoba system is
trying to incorporate victims‘ input in charging decision-making, but the result is not as
helpful as it should be for victims. As a result, victims are still mere information
receivers. Kent Roach described this phenomenon as the following:
[P]olice and prosecutors could treat the new consumer [victims] politely
and give them information about what was happening. Nevertheless,
victims would likely remain frustrated by the lack of control over the end
product and by their involuntary status as consumers of criminal justice.92
Of course, a criminal justice system is not a department store that might accept every little
petty complaint from its consumers. However, where there is a patent miscarriage of
justice on the part of the Crown prosecutor in deciding whether not to prosecute, the
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system should provide a forum to its consumers ---- victims ---- to complain about it and
give appropriate remedies.

2.3.2 Civil Proceedings
If victims are denied access to the criminal justice system because of the prosecutors‘
refusal to initiate a prosecution, they can still theoretically initiate a tort proceeding
through which they can claim monetary compensation and injunctive reliefs. However,
tort proceedings are not always accessible to victims and, when they are accessible, their
outcomes and effects are not always sufficient to replace the criminal ones. Indigent
victims cannot afford a tort proceeding, so they can only rely on the public prosecution.
As well, in situations where the defendant is much richer than the victim, the defendant
has rich resources and power to help him defend the civil suit. Sometimes public
prosecution can be used to even the scale between the rich and the poor. By contrast, in
some situations, victims may walk away empty handed after a tort suit when the
defendant is impecunious, which will be a Pyrrhic victory for victims.
According to one theory, the criminal prosecution can better protect the victims‘ personal
safety. It is true that many scholars propose deterrent effect is just what tort law is for
primarily. However, in reality, as commented by s Kenneth L Wainstein, tort remedies
lack deterrent force, which makes them less effective in preventing the offender from
repeating his or her acts against victims.93 This is supported by other studies that show the
ineffectiveness of civil injunctive reliefs, such as restraining orders. 94 Furthermore,
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regarding pecuniary sanctions, 95 the rich defendant will choose to commit the tort if
benefits of the tort outweigh the potential monetary loss if he or she loses in a tort suit.
For the poor, they might attempt to commit the tort if they can be better off through such
action, and they would not worry about the possible tort claim because they are not able
to pay for the pecuniary remedy anyway. In that case, they might choose to take
opportunities. From another perspective, a potential civil claim brought by victims could
be a trigger for an offender to threaten victims or to commit other violent acts against
them during or before a civil proceeding. Even though the same could happen as a result
of criminal proceedings, victims enjoy less protection during civil proceedings than
during criminal proceedings. This is because, as a general principle, victims of crime are
entitled to basic protection at all stages of a criminal proceeding.96
More importantly, in some cases, tort proceedings are insufficient to meet victims‘
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psychological needs. It cannot be denied that some victims might care more about
monetary compensation. For these victims, monetary remedies in tort proceedings are
indeed more tempting. Victims‘ preference for monetary remedies could always be a case,
no matter in commercial crimes or non-commercial crimes. However, that does not
diminish the significance and necessity of the criminal prosecution for other victims.
Damages caused by some types of acts, such as rape, murder, torture, cannot be recovered
merely by monetary relief, and not every victim prefers monetary compensation.
Victims who prefer criminal prosecution might want retribution on their violator(s) and
social acknowledgement of their suffering. Retribution is still one of the main goals of
criminal law that is used to ―balance the scale‖ by punishing criminals when a victim is
improperly taken advantage.97 It is true that sometimes victims might feel let down by the
sanctions imposed on offenders because they never receive the retribution they want.
However, in order to better include victims in the judicial process, which would provide
victims with a greater possibility of satisfaction in sentencing and its outcome, the
Canadian criminal justice system has granted victims‘ rights to submit an impact
statement to a sentencing judge. Most judges consider that victim impact statements are
helpful and relevant in determining proper sentences.98 Furthermore, in some situations,
the feeling of catharsis might appear as early as at the time that the accused is charged.99
As well, as many have argued, the guilt and criminal accountability of the offender can
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only be legally proven by a criminal judgement, 100 and according to Jamie O'Connell,
"[i]f [criminal] trials symbolize society's acknowledgement and condemnation of what
survivors suffered, those who participate in them... may feel especially acknowledged and
validated."101 In this sentence, O‘Connell might specifically refer to victims‘ participation
at trial, but victims‘ involvement in criminal proceedings is not limited to the trial stage.
The victims‘ right to submit a victim impact statement can also have the same effect, and
the realization of this benefit depends on the institution of criminal proceedings.
Tort law is built on the corrective justice theory, which is concerned about wrongful loss
and wrongful gain and is to protect a distribution of holdings (or entitlements) from
distortions that arise from those unjust enrichments and wrongful loss.102 It is true that
―right‖ and ―wrong‖ fit within corrective justice theory naturally. The issuance of the tort
remedies establishes the fact that defendant‘s acts against victims are a violation of a
norm governing people‘s interaction in a society. 103 That is the justification why the
victims are entitled such remedies. 104 Even though the outcomes of tort proceedings,
admittedly, are dependent on the finding of wrongdoing, it is argued that they still
comparatively lack social condemnation of the accused and acknowledgement of victims‘
suffering.105 The tort proceeding is aimed at restoration for victims, and the establishment
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of fault is to justify victims‘ entitlement to compensation. This reflects the fact that, even
though a victim succeeds in a tort claim, the remedies can hardly be legally categorized as
a sanction imposed on the defendant for his fault. Even though the tort outcome might
sometimes show the act is committed intentionally and with the sort of moral
wrongdoing, the level of its condemnation of the defendants‘ wrongful act is lower than a
criminal conviction. For this reason, some victims might feel tort proceedings cannot
completely replace the significance of criminal proceedings.106

2.3.3 Informal Complaint
In Canada, there is an informal procedure through which victims can write a letter to the
Attorney General requesting a reconsideration of the decisions not to prosecute. For
example, in Labrador Métis Nation v Canada107 and Gentles v Ontario,108 both applicants
made a written submission to the Attorney General after they were informed of the
decision not to prosecute, hoping the Attorney General would change his mind. In both
cases, the Attorney General insisted on dropping the case after victims‘ counsel represented the case to him. They only filed an application for judicial review when their
attempt failed. In an informal complaint, the Attorney General and Crown prosecutor still
monopolize the decision-making power and they are not obliged to reconsider the
complained decisions. When a decision not to prosecute is maintained, victims cannot tell
whether their complaints have been carefully considered without a formal procedure,
given that there is no legal consequence if it is not an obligation of the Crown prosecutor
106
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to review its decision based on the complaint made by victims.

2.3.4 Difficulties of Access to Current Judicial Review
In theory, victims can seek judicial review of the decision not to prosecute from a
competent court.109 In this manner, victims might have a decision not to prosecute made
by the Crown prosecutors or the Attorney General reversed. Even though nowadays
prerogative discretion is theoretically reviewable under certain circumstances, the
judiciary is extremely reluctant to interfere with the Crown prosecutor‘s exercise of
discretion in charging decisions. In fact, in recent decades, the Crown prosecutors‘
discretion to decide whether to prosecute has been subject to challenge. However,
permissible grounds and standards of evidential proof have been too rigorous for victims
to ever achieve success in judicial review proceedings.110 Even though the standard of
review for other discretionary administrative decisions has been lowered in the context of
administrative law, the change does not extend to judicial review of the decision not to
prosecute. In past applications, victims have attempted either to seek an order in a nature
of certiorari to quash a decision to stay a private prosecution111 or to seek an order in a
nature of mandamus to compel the Crown prosecutor to prosecute. 112 However, these
applications ended up with no finding of abuse of discretion.
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The judicial review for charging decisions has not caught up with the development of that
for other administrative discretionary decisions. Victims are unlikely to succeed in the
application for judicial review of the decision not to prosecute for several reasons. First,
the judiciary is extremely reluctant to interfere with the Crown prosecutor‘s exercise of
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute. Second, the standard of review and proof are
very rigorous. Third, victims can rarely find conclusive evidence in order to support their
arguments.
In order to guarantee that the Attorney General and the Crown prosecutor can function
effectively and efficiently in charging decision-making, some discretionary powers are
given to them in situations where there is a need to discontinue a case. The nature of the
charging decisions was described in Krieger v Law Society of Alberta:
In making independent decisions on prosecutions, the Attorney General
and his agents exercise what is known as prosecutorial discretion. This
discretion is generally exercised directly by agents, the Crown attorneys,
as it is uncommon for a single prosecution to attract the Attorney General's
personal attention.
"Prosecutorial discretion" is a term of art. It does not simply refer to any
discretionary decision made by a Crown prosecutor. Prosecutorial
discretion refers to the use of those powers that constitute the core of the
Attorney General's office and which are protected from the influence of
improper political and other vitiating factors by the principle of
independence.
…
Without being exhaustive, we believe the core elements of prosecutorial
discretion encompass the following: (a) the discretion whether to bring the
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prosecution of a charge laid by police; (b) the discretion to enter a stay of
proceedings in either a private or public prosecution, as codified in the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 579 and 579.1…(d) the discretion
to withdraw from criminal proceedings altogether…113

2.3.4.1Judicial Reluctance to Interfere
Judges appear to believe that the court is not in a position to deal with prosecutorial
charging decisions for several reasons. First, the interference with the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to prosecute can raise the issue of separation
of powers.114 In R v Balderstone et al, Monnin CJM stated as follows:
The judicial and executive must not mix. These are two separate and
distinct functions. The accusatorial officers lay informations or in some
cases prefer indictments. Courts or the curia listen to cases brought to their
attention and decide them on their merits or on meritorious preliminary
matters. If a judge should attempt to review the actions or conduct of the
Attorney General – barring flagrant impropriety - he could be falling into a
field which is not his and interfering with the administrative and
accusatorial function of the Attorney General or his officers. That a judge
must not do.115
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Relatedly, courts do not want to be responsible for the institution of the prosecution.116
Once the court opens the door for the judicial review of charging decisions, increasing
applications to seek judicial review of such decisions will be brought to the court and the
court will become the ultimate place to decide whether to prosecute.
Second, it is also a concern that judges might lose their independence and impartiality if
they are given overly broad judicial power over the exercise of discretion by Crown
prosecutors and the Attorney General. 117 Once judges get the power to control the
institution of a prosecution, they are likely to become ―supervising prosecutors‖ and start
considering administrative issues, which may or may not include many non-legal
considerations. Some of these issues might not be appropriate for a court to consider.
Allowing judges to consider these issues will undermine the court‘s objective
independence and impartiality in deciding the merits of a case that is brought to it merely
based on legal considerations.
Third, many scholars and judges consider that discretion is necessary for a criminal
justice system to function efficiently. A court second-guessing the Crown prosecutors‘
exercise of prosecutorial discretion will narrow the discretionary power of Crown
prosecutors in making charging decisions:
This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the
strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the
Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the
116
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kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision
in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern.
Examining the basis of prosecution delays the criminal proceeding,
threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives
and decision effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement
policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.118
Crown prosecutors and Attorney General are considered the most competent and
experienced authorities in making charging decisions because they have mastered the
complexity of charge decision-making through day-to-day practice.119 The assessment of
the same set of existing factual and legal materials by two equally reasonable persons
could result in both a decision to prosecute and a decision not to. Both decisions might be
equally reasonable or reasonable within a range of possibility. In this case, the court
should respect and uphold the choice made by the Crown prosecutor who is specialized in
the field.
Finally, the system always has numerous legitimate reasons to reject a check on the
prosecutorial discretion, but it seems to me it just wants to protect the prerogative position
and power of the Crown prosecutor. It can be attributed to people‘s inertia to change their
traditional practice - unfettered discretionary power of the Crown prosecutor to institute a
prosecution.
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2.3.4.2High Standard of Review
In principle, decisions not to prosecute are reviewable by the court, but for the
aforementioned reasons, courts give the highest order of deference to the judgment of the
Crown prosecutor or the Attorney General in making those charging decisions, and
―flagrant impropriety‖ must be proven by an applicant for judicial review to succeed.
Looking into behavioural problems of the Crown prosecutor is not equal to probing into
the reason behind a decision. Courts examine only conduct amounting to ―flagrant
impropriety‖ of the Crown prosecutor in the charging decision-making process, which
make a charging decision look suspicious and questionable immediately. It will not probe
into the deeper cause or consider different factors attributing to the decision not prosecute.
Misconduct on the part of Crown prosecutors and the Attorney General that constitutes
―flagrant impropriety‖ has been described in Kostuch v Alberta (Attorney General):
We agree with the statement of Miller A.C.J. in Re W.A. Stephenson
Construction (Western) Ltd. (1991) 81 Alta L.R. (2) 214, 121 A.R. 219
(Q.B.), 66 C.C.C. 201 that flagrant impropriety can only be established by
proof of misconduct bordering on corruption, violation of the law, bias
against or for a particular individual or offence.120
The definition has been quoted and followed by subsequent cases repetitively. In Perks v
Ontario, the Court defined ―flagrant impropriety‖ as ―misconduct bordering on corruption,
violation of the law, bias or improper motive‖. 121 In Gentles v Ontario, judicial
intervention is permissible if ―it is shown that the Attorney General's actions were
flagrantly improper, or prompted by improper motives or bad faith, or were so wrong as
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to violate the conscience of the community‖.122 In spite of the different wording, ―flagrant
impropriety‖ refers generally to those behaviors and actions committed by the Crown
prosecutor and Attorney General that were summarised in Kostuch during the charging
decision-making process. Currently, grounds amounting to ―flagrant impropriety‖ are
strictly limited to the above-mentioned situations, and ―flagrant impropriety‖ is the sole
standard automatically applied in judicial review applications for decisions not to
prosecute in most Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada. 123 This
standard of judicial review is indistinctively employed for compelling a prosecution and
quashing a decision to stop a private prosecution.
Various arguments have been raised to expand the definition of ―flagrant impropriety‖ on
the part of the Crown prosecutor and Attorney General, but none of them has ever
succeeded. Courts have always ruled in favor of the Crown prosecutor and Attorney
General.
The court rejected Charter rights violations as permissible grounds to review charging
decisions. In Kostuch v Alberta (Attorney General),124 the counsel of the applicant argued
that the stay of the private prosecution deprived the applicant of his liberty of access to a
court of law and justice, and created a state-imposed psychological stress for him, which
was a violation of section 7 of the Charter (Charter s 7). The court rejected the argument
on the grounds that Charter s 7 did not give the citizen unlimited rights to conduct a
private prosecution and that the rights of the accused should be taken into consideration.
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A similar argument was made in Gentles v Ontario 125 where the court referred to the
reasoning in Kostuch and found no violation of Charter s 7. The court dismissed the
application for review because the applicant did not raise any issues concerning ―flagrant
impropriety‖, which would allow the court to intervene, and Charter s 7 violations do not
constitute ―flagrant impropriety‖. In McHale v Ontario (Attorney General), 126 the
applicant filed an Information alleging the putative accused had committed common
nuisance contrary to section 180 of Criminal Code by failing to deploy police whose job
it was to prevent the riot, and the prosecution was later stayed by the Crown prosecutor.
The applicant claimed that, by staying the prosecution, the Crown prosecutor had showed
bias in favor of the police, which breached the Criminal Code as the obstruction of justice
and a violation of section 15 of the Charter. The court followed the ruling in R v Power127
and held that Charter rights violations did not constitute grounds to allow the court power
to review a prosecutorial decision and grant extraordinary remedies.
Allegations of violations of aboriginal rights were also made to challenge decisions not to
prosecute, but never succeeded. In Labrador Metis Nation v Canada (Attorney
General),128 the applicant alleged that a stay of a private prosecution against the Province
of Newfoundland and Labrador impaired aboriginal rights and interests because the
Attorney General failed to consult aboriginal people. The prosecution was about potential
violations of the Fisheries Act129 because of the Province‘s construction of a bridge and a
causeway over river that was claimed under the aboriginal right or title. The court found
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the argument unsustainable on several grounds: First, unlike the decision to construct the
bridge and causeway, the stay of the private prosecution would not directly affect or
impair aboriginal right or title. As well, the duty of consultation is aimed at promoting an
aboriginal right, but the nullification of a stay would not have promoted the aboriginal
right at issue. Second, a duty to consult would improperly influence the Attorney General
exercising discretionary power in terminating a prosecution. Third, the Crown
prosecutor‘s manual only required the Crown prosecutor to recognize the duty of
consultation, which was different from imposing an obligation to consult. 130 Other
allegations such as a simple ―error of law‖ were also dismissed. In Zhang v. Canada
(Attorney General), the Federal Court of Appeal held that a simple ―error of law‖ did not
constitute ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the Crown prosecutor in charging
decision-making. 131 The aforementioned cases show that the court allows only those
limited instances of ―flagrant impropriety‖ mentioned at the beginning of this section, a
highly deferential and limited standard of review.
By contrast, courts in Quebec seem to be applying a broader definition of ―flagrant
impropriety‖. The scope of review extends to the decision per se. If a decision is patently
130
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unreasonable, it amounts to ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the Crown prosecutor in
decision-making, which allows the court to interfere with discretionary decisions. In
Bérubé c Québec (Procureur général), the Court held:
The stay of proceedings ordered by the chief deputy, in accordance with
his discretionary power, was not subject to judiciary review save in cases
of abuse of process, of "flagrant impropriety" or if the decision proved
"carrément déraisonnable" … However, a decision labelled "carrément
déraisonnable" was equivalent to a "flagrant impropriety". In other words,
the applicant bore the burden of proving that staying the proceedings was a
decision "carrément déraisonnable", to the point that it constituted a
flagrant impropriety equivalent to an abuse of process likely to blemish the
image of justice.132
Under this definition, some unsuccessful applications might have succeeded. For example,
in Mitchell v Canada (Attorney General),133 the court found that the existing evidence
only showed the lack of diligence on the part of the prosecuting authority, which was not
sufficient to form prima facie flagrantly improper behaviour. However, the lack of
diligence on the part of a prosecuting authority might have established a reasonable
ground to believe that the resulting decision was patently unreasonable, which would
have permitted the court‘s intervention. In my opinion, it would be very strange that a
decision resulting from prosecutors‘ flagrantly improper actions constitutes miscarriage
132
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of justice, but wrong or patently unreasonable decisions resulting from other reasons do
not.
However, the definition used in Quebec is not accepted in other jurisdictions in Canada.
In Kostuch v Alberta, the court doubted whether ―patent unreasonableness‖ was
appropriate to be categorized as ―flagrant impropriety‖. 134 In Johnson v Saskatchewan
(Attorney General), the court dismissed the applicant‘s argument because manifestly
unreasonable stay of the private prosecution did not constitute permissible grounds for a
court to intervene into prosecutorial discretion.135 Similarly, in R v Laforme, the court
found that not all wrong or incorrect decisions made by the Crown not to prosecute
resulting from flagrant impropriety can justify the court‘s intervention into prosecutorial
discretion. 136 In sum, in most regions of Canada, the standard for judicial review for a
decision not to prosecute is still very high, and other standards of review used in the
context of administrative law, such as ―patent unreasonableness‖, ―reasonableness‖, and
―correctness‖, are ruled unsuitable for a court to interfere with the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.137

2.3.4.3Lack of Supporting Documents and Jurisprudence
High evidential standards and the lack of existing successful claims are also major
hurdles for victims to succeed in an application for a judicial review. Most applications
result in a judicial declaration that there is ―no evidence of flagrant impropriety‖.
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Just as stated by JA Finlayson in R v Durette, the applicant had a burden to provide
sufficient and clear evidence to support his allegation against the Crown prosecutor
before the court was willing to look into the exercise of the discretionary power of the
latter, otherwise the court would assume that the Crown prosecutor had properly carried
out their duties. 138 Finlayson further laid out the evidential standard for this type of
judicial review:
Such an allegation must be supportable by the record before the court, or if
the record is lacking or insufficient, by an offer of proof. Without such an
allegation … [T]he allegation of improper or arbitrary motives cannot be
an irresponsible allegation made solely for the purpose of initiating a
"fishing expedition" in the hope that something of value will accrue to the
defence. The mere fact that the Crown made a decision does not, without
more, form a basis for an allegation of bad faith. Nor does it require a trial
judge to allow an evidentiary hearing to inquire into why the discretion
was not exercised differently.139
This evidential standard is cross-referred to and accepted in the judicial review of
decisions not to prosecute.140 In any case, speculation or mere conjecture is not sufficient
to establish ―flagrant impropriety‖.141
However, it is very difficult for the applicant to find direct and conclusive evidence for
the application for judicial review to succeed. For one reason, this is due to the nature of
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those permissible grounds for judicial review mentioned in the previous section, which
makes the permissible grounds difficult to prove. For example, in some other cases,
applicants argued that Crown prosecutors were acting in favor of the accused, where the
accused persons were police officers, because of their close and ongoing working
relationship with the latter.142 In McHale v Ontario (Attorney General),143 the court could
not find a pattern of Crown prosecutors having bias favoring the police in past cases that
involved police as the accused, and stated that such an allegation could not be solely
based on speculation. Of course, the court could not find the bias in the past cases. This is
because, even though similar arguments had been laid before courts, no court had ever
ruled in favor of the applicants. In addition, if such ―bias‖ has turned into day-to-day
practice and an unwritten rule of cooperation between the police and the office of the
prosecutor, it leaves no tangible evidence to establish such ―bias‖. As well, this practice
might seem normal and acceptable in the eyes of judges. This leaves victims no choice
but to rely on speculation: when I see it, I know it.
No applicant has ever applied for judicial review of decisions not to prosecute on the
grounds of corruption, which requires the applicant to establish a clear case of corruption
on the part of the Crown prosecutor when he or she made such charging decisions. That
would be no different than asking the applicant to prove that the Crown prosecutor is
guilty for corruption before the court is willing to examine the decision not to prosecute.
That would be a very high standard of proof. As well, by reviewing cases concerning
decisions not to prosecute, I have an impression that the courts, in their judgements, are
more willing to put emphasis on their reluctance and unsuitability to review a charging
142
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decision made by the Crown prosecutor than to seriously consider whether or not the
evidentiary standard for the applicant to seek a judicial review is realistic and enforceable.
For another reason, the Crown prosecutor is not even obliged to provide reasons for
charging decisions to the accused person who has a right to discovery as a part of his or
her fair trial rights.144 As Frater noted, ―where the Crown does choose to give reasons,
sometimes it gives a fair amount of detail in its explanation, and sometimes it gives a
more perfunctory response‖.145 It is even harder for the victims to find solid evidence
because they do not even have procedural rights at the charging stage and their rights to
information, in most provinces, do not cover the reasons behind the decision not to
prosecute. To make things worse, the court in Johnson v Saskatchewan (Attorney General)
clearly stated that ―the applicant was not an accused therefore any allegation as to a lack
of disclosure is not a factor to be taken into account‖ in the application of judicial review
for the decision not to prosecute.146

2.3.4.4Limited Ground to Review
The accused has more grounds to challenge a charging decision. Apart from ―flagrant
impropriety‖ and ―malicious prosecution‖, the accused can request a court to stay a
proceeding based on other grounds of ―abuse of process‖, which has the same effect as
quashing a discretionary decision to prosecute made by the Crown prosecutor.147 In fact,
most successful challenges were brought based on these grounds because the court had
extraordinary judicial power to control the court process in order to protect the accused
144

R v Light (1993), 78 CCC (3d) 221 at 252, 37 WAC 241 (BCCA); R v N (D) (2004), 188 CCC (3d) 89, 122
CRR (2d) 250 (Nfld & Lab CA). In these two cases, the Crown prosecution did not give reasons for charging
decisions.
145
Frater, supra note 15 at 48-49
146
Johnson, supra note 135.
147
Krieger, supra note 113; Nixon, supra note 117; Campbell, supra note 115.

52

from the misconduct of the prosecutor and uphold the principle of justice. This power is
upheld in a root case R v Young:148
I am satisfied on the basis of the authorities that I have set forth above that
there is a residual discretion in a trial court judge to stay proceedings
where compelling an accused to stand trial would violate those
fundamental principles of justice which underlie the community's sense of
fair play and decency and to prevent the abuse of a court's process through
oppressive or vexatious proceedings. It is a power, however, of special
application which can only be exercised in the clearest of cases.149
―Flagrant impropriety‖ can be a basis for finding both breaches of statutory or common
law power in the context of administrative law and abuse of process in the context of
criminal law. In most cases, applicants of judicial review of decisions not to prosecute
allege that the Crown prosecutors breached their statutory or common-law power by
acting flagrantly improperly when dropping a case. Recently, smart applicants have
attempted to rely on the doctrine of abuse of process to seek certiorari against the Crown
prosecutor‘s stop of a private prosecution because the court has more power to intervene
on these grounds. However, the attempt failed in Ahmadoun v Ontario,150 in which the
court denied the applicant‘s formal standing to seek a certiorari to stop the Crown
prosecutor from entering a stay of a private prosecution on the grounds of ―abuse of
process‖. The court reasoned that, because the Crown prosecutor had intervened into a
private prosecution, the applicant was no longer a ―prosecutor‖, but a mere ―victim‖ or
―witness‖ that was not a party to the proceedings. As a non-party, he had no standing to
accuse the conduct of the prosecutor based on the ―abuse of process‖ doctrine. It quoted
148
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the statement in R v Jewitt151 and stressed that the doctrine was ―a judicial discretion to
enter a stay of proceedings to control prosecutorial behaviour prejudicial to accused
person‖. In other words, the doctrine is to prevent the Crown from overpowering the
accused in the criminal proceeding. As the private prosecutor is no longer a party of the
criminal proceeding after the Attorney General intervenes, the private prosecutor cannot
claim to be a victim of the Crown prosecutors‘ abuse of the court‘s process. Therefore,
there is no victim in such an allegation unless the accused is willing to join the private
prosecutor‘s allegation. This is nonetheless highly unlikely. Hence, the grounds for the
victims to challenge a charging decision are further limited.
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CHAPTER III
3 Victims should have the opportunity to challenge a
decision not to prosecute
3.1 Victims’ Interests in Criminal Process are at Stake
If there is a social value in allowing victims the right to make impact statements at the
post-conviction stage, that value is lost when the Crown prosecutor improperly decides
not to prosecute. This means that the social value is at stake at the ―discretionary
decision-making stage‖. Undoubtedly, victims have real interests after a guilty verdict is
entered. Sarah Welling, as one of a few scholars who advocate victims‘ participation in
charging decision, identified victims‘ indirect interests in charging decisions when she
tried to evaluate the victims‘ interests versus the interests of the accused and the public
prosecutor in charging decisions:
[V]ictims do have an indirect interest in the charging decision because the
conviction and sentence are dependent upon the charging decision, and
victims have significant interests in the conviction and sentence. With
regard to sentencing, the victim has a financial interest because restitution
is usually a possibility. Another interest in the sentence is psychological.
The victim may desire retribution in the form of a severe sentence. The
victim may also wish to incapacitate the defendant: if the sentence
includes incarceration, the defendant will no longer be a threat to the
victim. With regard to the conviction, the victim‘s interests are twofold.
First, the conviction sets limits on the potential sentence and therefore
implicates the victim‘s sentencing interests. Second, the conviction
decision itself carries a symbolic significance for the victim because it is
society‘s judgment that the person who harmed the victim is criminal.
Thus the victim has an indirect interest in the substance of the charging

55

decision because it affects both the conviction and sentencing decisions.152
In recognition of victims‘ interests in the post-conviction stage, victims have been granted
a right to participate, in several ways, in criminal proceedings. The most symbolic and
formal participatory role granted in Canada concerning victims‘ rights is to allow them to
fill out an impact statement and present it before a court, narrating the nature of the harm
that they have suffered as a result of the accused acts. 153 Currently, victim impact
statements can be provided during sentencing, 154 section 745.6 hearings, 155 a ―not
criminally responsible‖ or ―unfit to stand trial‖ disposition hearing, 156 and a parole
hearing.157 Empirical study shows that a majority of victims will be dissatisfied with the
disposal of their cases if they are not given an opportunity to present an oral victim
impact statement in court proceedings. 158 In addition, in most provinces, victims are
eligible to receive criminal compensation. Even though a criminal conviction is not
always necessary, such a conviction is a conclusive proof of the commission of a crime.159
If the Crown prosecutor drops a criminal prosecution, it might also negatively affect the
152
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assessments for the eligibility of governmental compensation during the hearings.160
Furthermore, the trial process itself is also meaningful to victims. In some cases, an open
court trial may contribute to the restoration of victims‘ dignity. As noted by Carlos Nino
during the military junta trials in Argentina,
What contributes to re-establishing [the victims'] self-respect is the fact
that their suffering is listened to in the trials with respect and sympathy, the
true story receives official sanction, the nature of the atrocities are publicly
and openly discussed, and their perpetrators acts' [sic] are officially
condemned.161
Even though Carlos Nino‘s original purpose of making this comment was to support
victims‘ participatory roles at the trial stage, the comment explains why an open court
trial is meaningful for victims. In a trial, the Crown prosecutor is not victims‘ counsel
who should represent the interests of the victims. However, when conducting a
prosecution, he or she does present victims‘ side of story to a trial judge (or trial judges).
The public can feel and hear victims‘ stories in open court. By testifying in a court and
following the trial, even in the absence of a formal standing in the trial process, victims
may ―find meaning in being heard, in having a witness who affirms that [their abuse] did
happen, that it was terrible, [and] that it was not their fault‖.162 The reason behind citing
this statement here is not to try to argue for victims‘ formal participatory roles at trial, but
to show that an open court trial can be meaningful to victims. Of course, defense lawyers
may attack victims during the trial and an acquittal might be finally entered. However, if
160
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an accused is convicted, the trial proceeding can contribute a level of healing to victims.
It is true that the healing effect of trial process is largely conditional on the conviction of
the accused. Of all criminal prosecutions, there is never a hundred per cent conviction
rate, nor a hundred per cent acquittal rate. That means victims have a chance to receive
this healing effect through a criminal prosecution. This chance should not be taken away
improperly merely based on the supposition that the victims might not have benefited
from the trial process because the accused might not have been convicted at the end.
It is not meaningless to emphasize the existence and importance of victims‘ interests at
the trial and post-trial stage. Just because these interests are not directly affected in the
charging stage, 163 it does not mean a charging decision will not affect the victim‘s
interests. In fact, these interests are so significant that a decision that can determine
whether or not a victim might pursue the interests in the future should be made with due
prudence. If a decision not to prosecute is entered, a criminal process is considered closed,
which means that no trial and sentence will follow. In cases of the permanent termination
of the prosecution, although the decision not to prosecute is not legally or factually
synonymous with acquittal, the decision may be perceived as a ―not guilty‖ verdict by
those victims or the general public who are not trained as legal professionals. Therefore,
it cannot be said that victims‘ interests will not be significantly and personally affected by
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a decision not to prosecute. Of course, there are other considerations that can be weighed
against victims‘ interests in the Canadian justice system, such as public interests, national
security, etc. However, if these considerations cannot be justified, victims‘ interests can
be considered unreasonably impaired by prosecutorial inaction.

3.2 The state should not ignore victims’ interests in criminal
proceedings
Professor William McDonald criticized the fact that victims were losing protection in the
modern criminal justice system:
The age-old struggle of civilization has been to persuade people not to take
justice into their own hands but rather to let their vengeance and righteous
indignation be wrought by the law. Western civilization had by the Middle
Ages succeeded in substituting private prosecutions for blood feuds. The
next step was to replace private prosecution with public prosecution, while
asking the victim to forego whatever satisfaction he might derive from
personally prosecuting his transgressor and settling for the more intangible
satisfaction of knowing that justice would be done. Now, the modern
criminal justice system operates in an age of computers and instant
telecommunications, disposing of large numbers of cases without trial and
without bothering to give the victim even the minimal satisfaction of
knowing what happened to his case and why.164
So should a state ignore victims‘ interests? Some scholars have attempted to use social
contract theory to drive an assertion that victims enjoy state‘s protection. 165 The basic
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idea of social contract theory is that citizens surrender certain natural rights to a state in
exchange for certain protections from that state. According to Hobbes, individuals in a
state of nature are free to take any action, in their own judgement and reason, to protect
themselves and their property, and this is an attribute of the nature of humankind.166 In
general, Hobbes‘s social contract theory describes a situation where individuals are forced
to submit some of their natural rights to an armed authority in order to promote coexistence and security. Locke argued that individuals are not forced, but consent to
surrender their natural rights to a trustful and neutral authority in exchange for neutral and
equal protection.167 If this authority fails to protect people who confer that authority and
power, its exercise of power is not legitimate.168 If a state merely deprives its citizens of
their interests and rights without returning anything or without justification, it is a
dictatorship.169
Wainstein contends that, based on this theory, a state should be responsible for shielding
citizens from crime because it monopolizes prosecutorial resources. 170 For a state, merely
criminalizing any action that might harm individuals‘ interests and rights is not enough to
protect individuals. Effective implementation of the law is necessary, which means, when
there is an allegation of violations of rights and interests, effective investigation,
prosecution, and punishment should be carried out either by the individual or state. The
Fourteenth Amendment” (1991) 41 (3) Duke LJ 507 at 514; Wainstein, supra note 93 at 730; Richard L
Aynes, “Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right Not to be a Victim” (1984)
11 Pepp L Rev 5 (1984) 63 at 75-77.
166
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co, 1994) at Chapters XIII–
XIV; James A Donald, “Natural Law and Natural Rights”, online: James's Liberty file collection index
<http://jim.com/rights.html>.
167
John Locke, Two treatises of government, student ed by Peter Laslett (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), arts 129, 130, 135.
168
Ibid.
169
Donald, supra note 166.
170
Wainstein, supra note 93 at 730.

60

law is a dead letter without government to enforce them effectively. Effective
investigation, prosecution, and punishment can deter potential lawbreakers by sending a
message that they will take consequences for their breaches of the law.
Several scholars such as Josephine Gittler, Richard L Aynes and Wayne A Logan have
contended that victims of crime should not be re-victimized by the justice system for the
latter‘s improper inaction.171 According to Wainstein, if a state fails to fulfil its duty to
protect its citizens from victimization, it can no longer monopolize law enforcement and
prosecution. 172 Of course, when a public prosecutor makes a decision whether to
prosecute, he or she must consider the big picture, namely, whether a prosecution
promotes public interests at large. However, if the prosecution is dropped without a
legitimate reason, this is equal to the state‘s failure to protect victims from crime and, as a
result, victims‘ interests will be completely ignored. In this case, as Wainstein said, the
state loses its exclusive right to determine whether or not to prosecute and victims should
therefore be allowed to invoke judicial power to reverse the decision not to prosecute in
order to defend for their interests.
In Canada, the criminal justice system is a government-paid public service. After all, its
budget partly comes from taxpayers, the citizens. If victims are unreasonably blocked
from accessing the criminal justice system, it is no different from being unable to enjoy
the benefits of insurance for which they have paid premiums, which might further
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frustrate the victims and increase their suffering. This is also contrary to the objectives of
promoting victims‘ rights in Canada.173
Even though the courts have emphasized that ―the criminal process is not the preserve of
the private individual‖,174 they never state that the interests of private individuals should
be completely ignored. In Kostuch v Alberta (Attorney General),175 the Attorney General
stepped in and terminated a private prosecution based on the lack of evidentiary proof.
The termination resulted in an application of judicial review, and the court dismissed the
application: ―[i]n deciding whether to prosecute, the Attorney General must have regard
not only to the interests of the person laying the charges, but also to the rights of the
person charged with an offence, and to the public interest.‖ 176 This sentence has been
cited in many subsequent cases to emphasize the duty of the Attorney General to maintain
fundamental justice for the public. However, if it is read from another perspective, the
court has recognized that private persons have interests in a criminal prosecution. The
Attorney General and its agents are supposed to try their best to balance the various
interests arising out of a decision whether or not to prosecute. In any cases, victims‘
interests should be an important factor for the Crown prosecutor to decide whether to
prosecute or not.
In conclusion, Canada should protect victims from re-victimization by instituting a
criminal prosecution in good faith, or by allowing a private prosecution, if possible,

173

Ontario, Victims’ Bill of Rights, supra note 26, preamble
[T]he justice system should operate in a manner that does not increase the suffering of
victims of crime and that does not discourage victims of crime from participating in the
justice process.
174
Kostuch, supra note 52.
175
Ibid.
176
Ibid [emphasis added].

62

against alleged lawbreakers unless there are legitimate reasons not to do that. Victims‘
interests should be taken into account in charging stages. This not only means that the
Crown prosecutor should try their best to consider victims‘ interests when deciding
whether to prosecute, but also means that the system should provide remedies to victims
when their interests are impaired because of improper prosecutorial action.

3.2.1 The Attorney General, Crown Prosecutors and Charging
Guidelines
3.2.1.1Role of the Attorney General and the Crown prosecutors
The power of the Attorney General and Crown prosecutors in Canada are entrusted by the
Crown. The Attorney General traditionally acted as a legal adviser to the Crown, as well
as the government. His or her principal function has been, and still remains, to prosecute
alleged criminals. The proper role of the Attorney General in the prosecution of an
offense is well described in J L'Heureux-Dubé‘s comment in R v Power:
As will be developed in more detail further in these reasons, the AttorneyGeneral is a member of the executive and as such reflects, through his or
her prosecutorial function, the interest of the community to see that justice
is properly done. The Attorney-General's role in this regard is not only to
protect the public, but also to honour and express the community's sense of
justice. 177
In order to share the increasing workload of the Attorney General in other fields, Crown
prosecutors are appointed as agents of the Attorney General to proceed with criminal
prosecutions. The role of the Crown prosecutor was summarised in R. v. Boucher:
It cannot be overemphasized that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is
177
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not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown
considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime.
Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is
presented; it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength,
but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion
of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in
civil life there can be none charged with greater responsibility. It is to be
efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the
seriousness, and the justness of judicial proceedings.178
For decades, the phrases ―the community‘s sense of justice‖ and ―reflects the interest of
the community to see that justice is properly done‖ have been specifically referred to the
necessity of convicting an accused person through an impartial and fair trial. While
hoping prosecutors keep the community safe by putting away criminals, the public also
expects a fair procedure in the criminal justice system.
However, ―the community‘s sense of justice‖ should be broader than that. In particular, in
recent decades, the public has gradually paid increasing attention to victims‘ interests in
criminal proceedings. It is appropriate to contemplate the broader interpretation of ―the
community‘s sense of justice‖ of including whether or not victims‘ interests have been
properly considered through making a decision pertinent to the prosecution. As well, the
phrase also suggests that a decision should not be contrary to victims‘ interests unless
reasons behind such a decision are reasonably acceptable by the public. For the public,
not having their interests represented in the prosecution of a crime is almost as horrible as
being accused of a crime they did not commit. For most average citizens, there are more
chances to become a victim than to be prosecuted by the state in their whole lifetime. If
178
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the public cares about victims‘ interests and rights in criminal proceedings, once victims‘
interests are disregarded improperly or mistakenly by the Crown prosecutor, the public
would not consider that they have seen justice properly done through such a decision. The
comment has been put down in the charging guidelines of some provinces, which states
that, in order to strengthen public confidence in the criminal justice system, Crown
prosecutors should act as ―a minister of justice with duty to make sure that the criminal
justice system operates fairly to all: the accused, victims of crime, and the public‖.179

3.2.1.2Charging Guideline
In the 1980s, prosecution policy was summarized, put into writing, and published. As
James Vorenberg has suggested, ―the lack of general rules or a record of action taken in
individual cases has made it extremely difficult to show clearly deviations from the
norms.‖ 180 Not until the mid-1980s did a description of charging guidelines exist in
Canada.181 In 1990, recognizing that ―[a]n equitable justice system requires a reasonable
degree of consistency in the circumstances in which prosecutions take place‖, the Law
Reform Commissioner of Canada made a recommendation of publishing charging
guidelines.182 Based on the studies of prosecutor‘s repetitive practices in making charging
decisions, two core factors were identified significant to a legitimate charging decision
and should be included in the guideline: ―reasonable prospect of conviction‖ and ―public
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interest‖.183 Currently, in order to promote fairness, transparency, and accountability in
charge decision-making, most provinces and the federal prosecution service have created
detailed guidelines for charging decision-making and have made the guidelines public.
The crown prosecutor can drop a case, if (1) there is no reasonable prospect of conviction
based on the existing evidence, (2) it is not in public interest to pursue the case, or (3)
both (1) and (2) are met.
According to David Layton, the interpretation and implementation of the charging
guidelines should be consistent with the following basic principles:
…To begin with, charging guidelines must strive to prevent the conviction
of the innocent and the unjustifiable trammelling of individual rights.
Nonetheless, in proper cases Crown counsel should be resolute in
conducting prosecutions with an eye to bringing offenders to justice. As
well, charging decision standards should avoid illegitimately usurping the
function of the trier of fact and overriding the legitimate community
interest in seeing justice done in a public forum. Prosecutorial guidelines
must also avoid inflexibility that, despite best intentions, can cause
injustice by failing to accommodate the particular circumstances of each
case. Ultimately, the fundamental concern is to encourage prosecutors to
act fairly, impartially and consistently in making charging decision.184
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A fixed charging guideline is important to give the public basic information about how a
charging decision is made. It also tells the public that the Crown prosecutor will not apply
one charging policy today and another tomorrow. As well, it sends a message to the
accused that their cases are handled in the same manner as others. Meanwhile, the
guideline should also leave sufficient room for Crown prosecutors to make a charging
decision based on their discretion in a particular case. Without flexibility, the Crown
prosecutor may not perform his duty efficiently and handle the uniqueness or special
needs raised in each single case properly.185 However, the Crown prosecutor is supposed
to comply with the basic norms that govern whether or not to initiate a prosecution. The
credibility of the Crown prosecutor and the confidence of the public in the criminal
justice system will be undermined if the Crown prosecutor ignores or wrongfully
implements the published charging guideline. This is partly because the public will live
within a state of fear of not knowing when and how they may be charged.
When Crown prosecutors discharge their charging functions following these guidelines,
the abovementioned principles should be accommodated and promoted by their decisions.
When a Crown prosecutor assesses evidentiary sufficiency, he or she should not attempt
to determine whether an accused is innocent or guilty. As well, the Crown prosecutors‘
objective is not to win a case at any cost. Instead, he is responsible to present all
185
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available, relevant, and admissible evidence necessary to judges so that the latter are able
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. 186 In other words, the Crown
prosecutor cannot wrongfully replace a standard of ―likelihood of conviction‖ to
―substantial prospect of conviction‖ or ―conviction without reasonable doubt‖ in order to
pursue a high conviction rate or for any other reason. It is inappropriate to drop a charge
by employing a higher standard. How to determine whether a case has ―reasonable
prospect of conviction‖ is still quite subjective. Correctly assessing the admissibility,
reliability, and credibility of evidence relies on working experiences, a level of expertise
concerning charging decision-making, a degree of impartiality to the case and the
judgement of the Crown prosecutor. For example, a new prosecutor might draw an
immature conclusion due to the lack of experience. As well, bias and personal attitude to
the case can also influence the judgement. In addition, if a Crown prosecutor has
reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused, but still believes there is a realistic
prospect of conviction, the prosecution is likely to be dropped.
Victims‘ interests are also relevant to the charging decision nowadays, which should also
be properly taken into account. When Layton mentioned, ―the unjustifiable trammelling
of individual rights‖ in his statement above, he specifically referred to a defendants‘
constitutional rights. However, times have changed and defendants‘ rights and interests
are not the sole concern in the criminal process. The interpretation of ―individual rights‖
should not fall behind. Nowadays, the importance and relevance of victims to the criminal
process have been generally recognized in Canada. It is also true that the interests of
justice and the public are still paramount in criminal proceedings. This requires the
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Crown prosecutors to make a decision not to prosecute carefully balancing all relevant
factors. When dropping a case, they should carefully consider whether the interests of
justice and the public are so significant in the case that they are willing to set aside the
interests and rights of the potential victims. 187 In fact, this principle is specifically
included in the charging guidelines of a few provinces:
According to the Decision to Prosecute (Charge Screening) in Nova Scotia:
The decision to prosecute or to discontinue a prosecution is the most
important decision that a prosecutor makes in the criminal justice process.
Such decisions must reflect sound knowledge of the law and careful
consideration of the interests of victims, the accused and the public at
large.188
According to Withdrawing a Charge or Stopping the Prosecution of an Offence in
Saskatchewan:
Crown Prosecutors always consider the impact that a criminal prosecution
may have on the victim when deciding whether it is in the public interest
to prosecute.189
According to the Deciding to Prosecute in Manitoba:
Crown attorneys have a responsibility to treat victims of crime with
compassion and respect. As much as is practicable, Crown attorneys strive
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to be mindful and sensitive to the needs and wishes of victims.190
There is the lack of empirical research reflecting on how Crown prosecutors‘ ways of
thinking and behaving have been improved in the charging decision-making process in
these three provinces. Victims‘ interests and entitlements has been ignored or suppressed
for hundreds of years in Canada. It is always hard for a developed system to accept new
changes, in particular the ones that are contradicted to its original value, principles and
practice, within a short period of time. The adaption of charging guidelines in these
provinces shows a positive sign that victims‘ interests and entitlement at the charging
stage start gaining weight in some areas in the country.
Finally, the most important thing is that Crown prosecutors have to interpret and
implement these guidelines in charging decision-making in good faith. Theoretically,
public prosecutors should be presumed to act consistently with the principles of justice by
discharging their duties with fairness, objectivity, and integrity, the public.

3.3 Victims have right to equal protection
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognizes citizens‘ most fundamental
rights, entrenched in the Constitution of Canada, which is the supreme law in Canada. It
protects these important rights and freedoms by requiring governments to legislate and
operate in a manner of not violating the rights listed in the Charter.191 In most situations,
violations are likely to render impugned legislation and operations invalid.192 It ensures
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that the government is not above the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. In a
criminal law dimension, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was traditionally
understood as a constitutional guarantee for citizens to fight against the state‘s arbitrary
criminal prosecutions.
Section 15 of the Charter provides citizens the right to equal protection. According to this
section, an individual should not be singled out as a target for a prosecution or any other
things based on impermissibly discriminatory grounds, such as race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. 193 A court is allowed to
intervene if a violation of section 15 is proven in a clear case. In R. v. O’Connor, the court
stated that it could stay a proceeding for the accused as an appropriate remedy when his
rights under the Charter suffer irreparable damage. 194 In cases of this type, the courts
generally accepted selective prosecution based on above-mentioned grounds as valid
grounds that constitute an abuse of court‘s process on the part of the Crown prosecutor.
However, most cases were ultimately dismissed due to the applicants‘ failure to provide
evidentiary proof.
Victims are also entitled to protection under the Charter. Concerning a decision not to
prosecute, victims have ―equality rights‖ under Section 15 of the Charter:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
193
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origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.195
The right to equal protection is not exclusive to the accused. Individuals are equally
protected by law, and therefore, they are supposed to have the equal right to access to the
criminal justice system when they are harmed by lawbreakers. It is true that the Crown
prosecutor, as a ―minister of justice‖, can deny individual‘s access to criminal
proceedings in order to preserve other higher-valued interests, such as the rights of the
accused and public interests. However, under no circumstance can the Crown prosecutor
refuse to commence a prosecution, either by himself or by the victim, based on the
discriminatory grounds listed in Section 15.

3.4 Victims can obtain satisfaction and closure
3.4.1 Satisfaction
In the studies about victims‘ satisfaction with justice when participating in sentencing,
scholars split ―satisfaction with justice‖ into two parts: outcome satisfaction (satisfaction
with the sentence) and process satisfaction (or satisfaction with the criminal justice
system as a whole).196 Restitution and punishment can correct an inequitable relationship
between victims and offenders, in which the victims‘ dissatisfaction of disadvantages
caused by the crime committed by the offenders, can be alleviated. 197 Meanwhile,
victims‘ participation in sentencing may increase their feelings of control over the
sentencing process and receiving opportunities to raise their voices before an authority
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before the decisions are made, can promote a sense of procedural justice.198 The studies
reach the conclusion that victims‘ participation in criminal justice processes can enhance
their satisfaction with justice.199
Because victims have not been granted a formal role in charging decision-making, there
are few scientific studies directly about their satisfaction in participating in charging
decisions. However, some research, as showed in the following paragraphs, suggests that
allowing victims to complain about charging decisions can increase their satisfaction with
charging decisions made by Crown prosecutors. Usually, citizens should have confidence
in Crown prosecutors and believe that they are performing their duties with due diligence.
Once they are involved in an event where their interests are in danger, people are likely to
become cautious. The right to challenge the decision not to prosecute might make victims
feel secure because they know they can appeal if the Crown prosecutor makes
unreasonable decisions. In addition, such a right might promote communication between
the Crown prosecutor and victims, and as a result, victims may feel validated, respected,
considered, and consulted by the criminal justice system and find themselves being
treated fairly by the system.
A key feature of procedural justice is that it provides a cushion of support when people
feel fairly treated, making unfavourable decisions more palatable.200 In other words, if a
Crown prosecutor treats a victim with dignity and respect and is able to gain victim's
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confidence, most victims might still have the feeling of being treated fairly, even when the
prosecutor makes an unpopular decision. This is particularly important in the criminal
justice system where the participation of victims cannot always guarantee favourable
outcomes.201 As a result, non-prosecution should be more easily accepted by the victims
who have participated in the non-prosecution decision-making. In contrast, as shown in
other research, victims who are excluded from the criminal justice process may
overemphasize the outcome of the criminal procedure202 because the outcome is all that
the victims have through the whole prosecution. Once unfavorable results come out,
victims are likely to be more disappointed and frustrated at the criminal justice system.
Hence, victims who are merely notified about the non-prosecution of their cases and
receive questionable decisions not to prosecute are likely to overemphasize the fact that
the system fails to do justice for them. An unreasonable refusal to charge a suspect may
lead the victims to feel strongly that there has been no official acknowledgement of their
suffering.

3.4.2 Closure
The term ―closure‖ has come to connote several different and poorly differentiated
concepts. It is partly associated with death penalty cases in which victims can speak out
about the harm caused by their offenders in an open courtroom. Currently, it is also used
to support the use of victim impact statements, claiming that speaking publicly about
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one‘s loss can promote a sense of catharsis, which can constitute a feeling of closure.203
More generally, closure has also come to stand for the constellation of feelings—peace,
relief, a sense of justice, the ability to move on—that come with finality.204
Allowing victims to challenge decisions not to prosecute helps them achieve closure
psychologically, so they can move on with their lives, especially when the decisions are
finally upheld in court proceedings. Non-prosecution is not always roundly rejected by
victims. However, some victims might want to activate prosecutions against their
violators when the prosecutions are discontinued by Crown prosecutors or other relevant
authorities, especially in a situation where victims have reasonable grounds to question
the discontinuance but they are not able to make any effort to change it. They do so
because they are unlikely to otherwise alleviate the trauma of the accused‘s alleged act
from their minds.
When substituting private prosecution with public prosecution, some activists made an
effort to persuade average citizens to believe that justice will be done for them by their
state and therefore it is not necessary to have justice done by themselves.205 That is to say,
they no longer need to seek justice and closure by their own because the state would
provide this for them. However, in such situations, a sense of distrusting Crown
prosecutors might stem from a refusal to prosecute, especially if the refusal is flagrantly
improper, and a belief of ―justice will be done‖ will fall apart. For example, when
commenting on whether broadening self-defence laws might encourage vigilantism in
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Canada, Prime Minister Stephen Harper considered that vigilantism should not be
condoned, but that the public felt a need to protect itself because the law does more to
protect criminals than to protect victims:
It has become increasingly unclear what we can legally do to protect
ourselves and our property. In the view of many Canadians, the scales of
justice have tipped too far away from the right of self-defence, and toward
the protection of criminals.206
As a negative result of the public‘s losing confidence in the criminal justice system, even
though the decision not to prosecute is the actual finality for victims in a criminal law
dimension, they might not feel closure psychologically from such a decision and, in
extreme cases, might choose to seek closure in their own way.207
Closure can be the result of both putting in effort and having a chance to have their
concerns heard and considered by a neutral third party. When a dispute occurs, the
conflicting party, which is in an disadvantageous position, in this case, victims, are likely
to entrust adjudicatory power to a third authority to determine the facts and are prone to
accept findings delivered by such a third authority. It also can be said that a second
opinion is more acceptable to victims. When the second opinion is the same as the first
one, it can corroborate with the first opinion, which can create a psychological effect that
206

Colin Perkel, “New citizen's arrest law may spark vigilantism: lawyer” (18 February 2011), online:
Winnipeg Free Press <http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/canada/new-citizens-arrest-law-may-sparkvigilantism-lawyer-116459618.html>.
207
“Rehtaeh Parsons' mom calls for vigilantes to stop: No grounds to reopen alleged sex assault case, says
Crown” CBC News (10 April 2013), online: CBC <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/novascotia/story/2013/04/10/ns-rehtaeh-suicide-reaction-todd.html>. In April 2013, a teenager committed
suicide after alleging being raped and photographed by four boys. These four boys were not charged. The
mother of the victim spread the story of her daughter and shamed the unnamed accused in order to push
a police investigation, which caused public outrages about the alleged rape. Even though the mother
reiterated she did not want the boys physically harmed, her posting story on website in fact incited
vigilante justice in public.

76

the result is more trustworthy. As well, regardless of how the decision is resolved, victims
may feel less offended for having put effort into preventing a decision that is against their
will.208 Allowing victims to seek redress in a courtroom as a last resort, on one hand, can
symbolize ―ending the case in their own hand‖, and on the other hand, promote fairness
and acceptability of the decision not to prosecute. Either can contribute to a sense of
closure that is helpful for victims to move on and rebuild the credibility of the criminal
justice system in victims‘ minds, which can reduce the risk of victims taking justice into
their own hands. 209 It may also prevent victims from victimizing others besides the
offender. For example, mental health issues are also significantly related to violence in the
family.
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CHAPTER IV
4 Private Challenge of the Decision not to Prosecute in
Other Jurisdictions
Private challenges to decisions not to prosecute made by public prosecutors have been
exercised in different jurisdictions in a variety of ways, either to protect victims‘ interests
by giving them the right to review such a decision (such as in European countries) or to
promote an equitable criminal justice system by limiting wide discretionary power of the
public prosecutors (such as the US). In different jurisdictions, the challenges can take
place internally in the office of the public prosecution, in front of the judiciary, or both.

4.1 European Protection
4.2 Regional Protection
European countries have an established history of recognizing the necessity of victims
having a role in charging decision-making. Beginning in the late 20th century, European
intergovernmental organizations started advocating that and requiring their Member
States to implement the victims‘ rights legislation in their jurisdictions. In 1985, the
Committee of Ministers of the Member States of the Council of Europe adopted a
Recommendation No. R (85) 11(the Recommendation) pertinent to victims‘ role in the
framework of criminal law and procedure. 210 In this Recommendation, the Committee
raised three points about how to protect victims‘ interests in charging decisions:
1) issues involving victims‘ financial restitution should be considered when the
decision whether or not to prosecute is made;211
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2) the final decision about whether or not to prosecute should be automatically
provided to victims unless they indicate that they do not require such
information;212 and
3) as an alternative right to a private prosecution, victims should have the right to
seek a review of a decision not to prosecute by a competent authority.213
The right to seek a review of the decisions not to prosecute was first proposed in the
Recommendation in 1985 as an alternative method for victims to deal with prosecutorial
inaction. However, over the next 26 years, this right was not formally included in
subsequent European binding instruments regarding victims‘ rights in criminal
proceedings. Before 2009, only 21 out of the 27 Member States of the European Union
(EU) had formal procedures, or at least general frameworks, in their domestic systems
that allowed victims to review decisions not to prosecute made by public prosecutors.214
In 2011, the right to review a decision not to prosecute was brought up again regionally
when the EU intended to replace its old directive with a new one in order to include more
comprehensive and viable victims‘ rights. In article 10 of the draft of a new Directive, it
was proposed that ―Member States shall ensure that victims have the right to have any
decision not to prosecute reviewed‖,215 accompanying with a corresponding rationale in
its Explanatory Memorandum:
The purpose of [Article 10] is to enable the victim to verify that
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established procedures and rules have been complied with and that a
correct decision has been made to end a prosecution in relation to a
specific person.216
The proposed right was finally adopted and included in Directive 2012/29/EU, dated 25
October 2012.217 The new Directive was a new instrument, which formally established
minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime. Article 11
highlights the obligation of Member States to ensure victims‘ right to review the decision
not to prosecute:
“1. Member States shall ensure that victims, in accordance with their role
in the relevant criminal justice system, have the right to a review of a
decision not to prosecute. The procedural rules for such a review shall be
determined by national law.
……
3. Member States shall ensure that victims are notified without
unnecessary delay of their right to receive, and that they receive sufficient
information to decide whether to request a review of any decision not to
prosecute upon request.
4. Where the decision not to prosecute is taken by the highest prosecuting
authority against whose decision no review may be carried out under
national law, the review may be carried out by the same authority.‖218
Unfortunately, there is still no common standard pertaining to when victims can exercise
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this right, and to what degree a competent authority is able to interfere with the decision
not to prosecute. For example, the Directive does not expressly indicate what types of
review should be granted, be it a judicial review or an internal one. Paragraph 4 of the
Directive seems to restrict the potential review to the internal investigation within the
prosecutor‘s office. ―The review may be carried out by the same authority‖ nonetheless
seems to suggest that a decision not to prosecute taken by the highest prosecuting
authority may also be reviewed by a different authority, such as a reviewing judge.
However, the EU recognizes that many of its Member States have different national
mechanisms for implementing victim‘s right to review, and is willing to allow those
Member States to continue to use their mechanisms provided they do not contravene the
EU‘s framework for such a right. In addition, to supplement this right, the Directive
further strengthens victim‘s right to seek an explanation related to a decision not to
prosecute in its article 6:
1. Member States shall ensure that victims are notified without
unnecessary delay of their right to receive the following information about
the criminal proceedings instituted as a result of the complaint with regard
to a criminal offence suffered by the victim and that, upon request, they
receive such information:
(a) any decision not to proceed with or to end an investigation or not to
prosecute the offender…
3. Information provided for under paragraph 1(a) … shall include reasons
or a brief summary of reasons for the decision concerned …219
Even without the Directive, to provide reasons for a decision not to prosecute seems to be
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a general policy or practice in most European countries. For instance, in Sweden even
though it is not a written policy, reasons behind decisions not to prosecute are generally
provided and, in practice, public prosecutors are encouraged to provide detailed reasons if
possible, especially in felony cases.220 Dutch policy is in favor of giving details to victims
and, under some circumstances, a decision not to prosecute and relevant reasons will be
released to the public via various media sources.221 In Norway, explanations are provided
to both victims and their families.222 Even countries with common law traditions, such as
Northern Ireland, England and Wales, and Scotland, have developed the tendency to
provide victims with reasons for a decision not to prosecute. In Northern Ireland, there is
a propensity to make detailed reasons available to victims.223

4.2.1 Practice in Civil Law Countries
Victims in European countries are more active due to the existence of various means in
their national schemes. Matti Joutsen, a director of the Helsinki Institute for Crime
Prevention and Control, summarized several methods that victims can use to deal with
non-prosecution decisions made by prosecuting authorities in European countries. 224
According to him, the most basic way is to communicate in some way with the
corresponding prosecutor, such as writing a letter, asking the prosecutor to reconsider and
reverse the original decision not to prosecute. This method is commonly accepted in most
European jurisdictions.225 Secondly, a few jurisdictions provide standard procedures for
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victims to request a superior prosecuting authority to direct a reconsideration or compel a
prosecution, and allow the victims to challenge the decision not to prosecute in a
competent court as a last resort. Finally, in a few jurisdictions, the right to seek review of
a decision not to prosecute is not necessary because victims have an absolute right to
institute a private prosecution.226
In the Netherlands, as a judicial control over prosecutorial discretion, a request for
mandamus can be filed to a court of appeal by anyone that has an interest in the
prosecution, including victims.227 A Dutch court is authorized to examine decisions not to
prosecute on the grounds of legal considerations, such as the application and
interpretation of applicable law, and the correctness and proportionality during the
exercise of discretion. 228 As a part of administrative control in the prosecution office
concerning the charging decision-making process, victims can write to a higher
prosecutorial authority requesting a review of the decision not to prosecute made by the
subordinate.229
In Germany, a procedure known as ―Klageerzwingungsverfahren‖ is enacted230 through
which victims may first appeal to the supervisor of the prosecuting authority on the
grounds limited to technical issues, such as evidentiary sufficiency that is essential for
prosecution to take place. Then, if the supervisor still refuses to compel prosecution, the
legal representative of the victims may appeal to a court on their behalf. The victim is
226
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considered a subsidiary prosecutor if the court compels prosecution. 231 A similar court
proceeding is used in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Spain, and Turkey to allow victims
to seek a court‘s adjudication and compel a prosecution.232
In Austria, victims are also entitled to appeal a decision to a court, but the court can only
direct a prosecutor to review the original decision. The court does not have the power to
compel a prosecution.233 Nevertheless, in Austria, like in a few of the European countries,
an appeal to a court is not necessary because victims can initiate a private prosecution that
a public prosecutor cannot object to or intervene in.234 One deficiency is that victims have
to bear all the costs, including their own costs, court costs and defense costs in the event
that the prosecution fails.235 Similarly, in Finland, victims‘ right to prosecute overrides
prosecutorial actions carried out by the public prosecutors, where victims may initiate a
prosecution regardless of the public prosecutor‘s decisions.236

4.3 United Kingdom (UK)
Both the Canadian legal system and UK legal system were developed from the English
common law in terms of both substance and procedure, although it is important to keep in
mind that substantial changes occurred later on. The development of the English law
should accordingly be of interest to the Canadian legal system. The legal system in the
UK is different from the Canadian one primarily because it has been influenced by
231
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various EU legal practices. For instance, the UK has incorporated some civil law
elements into its domestic law, which makes it significantly increase victims‘ rights in
criminal proceedings. In the UK, victims of crime have a number of ways to appeal and
challenge the decision not to prosecute. Unlike most common law countries, three
interests, namely the interests of the State, the accused and the victims, have to be taken
into account and carefully balanced when deciding whether or not to pursue a case, 237
although on some occasions the interest of the state may outweigh the others. The
decision not to prosecute made by the public prosecutor can be subject to internal review
conducted by the relevant office of prosecution service and to judicial review by an
administrative court. Both procedures are discussed in the sections that follow.

4.3.1 Internal Review
A recent case entitled R v Killick 238 is a milestone case that put forward the
implementation of victims‘ right to seek a review of the decision not to prosecute
internally. In June 2007, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) had decided not to
prosecute Mr. Killick. Later, counsel for the victims filed a series of complaints seeking
both internal and judicial review, which finally led to the review of the original decision
within the CPS. The review process took more than two years in part because the CPS
was reluctant to conduct a review based on an informal ―complaint‖ made by the victims.
The court in this case pointed out some defects of the prosecution system concerning the
implementation of victims‘ right to seek review:

237

R v B [2003] EWCA Crim 319 at para 27; R v Christopher Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608 at para 48
[Killick]; Public Prosecution Service, Victims & Witnesses Policy (Belfast: Public Prosecution Service, 2007)
at 10.
238
Killick, supra note 237.

85

Although in form the request was made as "a complaint", what was sought
was a reconsideration by an interested person of the decision. Far from the
CPS being able to refuse to do this, it was bound to do it. In the first place,
the CPS has made clear that it will review if a "complaint" is made.
Second, it has for some time been established that there is a right by an
interested person to seek judicial review of the decision not to prosecute; it
would therefore be disproportionate for a public authority not to have a
system of review without recourse to court proceedings. Third, it is clear
that in considering whether to prosecute the prosecutor has to take into
account the interests of the State, the defendant and the victim – the three
interests in a criminal proceeding as identified for example by Lord Woolf
CJ in R v B [2003] 2 Cr App R 197 at paragraph 27. As a decision not to
prosecute is in reality a final decision for a victim, there must be a right to
seek a review of such a decision, particularly as the police have such a
right under the charging guidance.239
This paragraph reveals several important points that were affirmed by this court:
1) The CPS has an obligation to consider victims‘ request for the reconsideration of
the decision not to prosecute;
2) An internal review scheme is necessary so that victims do not always have to seek
recourse from the court in the form of judicial review;
3) Victims‘ interests should be carefully considered when evaluating a decision
whether or not to charge; and
4) It is essential to recognize the significance of the decision not to prosecute as an
end of criminal prosecution for the victims.
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In June 2013, a new Victims' Right to Review Scheme was initiated in England and Wales
to institute victims‘ right to internal review similar to what was proposed in the EU
Directive and the case of Killick in 2011.240 The scheme establishes a formal complaint
procedure for victims to request an internal review in the event that victims are
unsatisfied with a decision not to prosecute. A fresh review of evidential sufficiency and
public interests concerning the cases will be conducted using the internal review process.
The scheme includes three instances of complaint. In the first instance, the decision not to
prosecute will be reviewed by the CPS or Central Casework Division, and full
explanations will be provided if the decision is not reversed. Then, victims can appeal the
decision to the Appeals and Review Unit and to the relevant Chief Crown Prosecutor or
Head of a Casework Division if it fails again. The decision not to prosecute made by the
relevant Chief Crown Prosecutor or Head of a Casework Division will be considered final
for the internal review process. If the Crown prosecutor has called no evidence in court or
the case has passed the statutory time limitation, only an apology can be issued to the
complaining victims. This is because in the UK the Crown prosecutor is not allowed to
re-institute a prosecution in these two situations. The information about this scheme is
automatically provided to victims by relevant authorities. Northern Ireland also has a
similar internal review system in their prosecution service, even though the structure is
not as comprehensive as those in England and Wales are.241
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4.3.2 Judicial Review
Even though an internal review scheme has been established in the United Kingdom, a
judicial review in administrative court as the last resort for victims is still in effect. In the
UK, the discretionary power of the public prosecutors can be compromised when the
court finds a need to maintain the rules of law and justice by directing Crown prosecutors
to reconsider the decisions on whether to prosecute a complaint. In fact, the court feels
responsible to do that. In R. (on the application of Corner House Research and Others) v
Director of the Serious Fraud Office, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO, an
investigatory and prosecutorial authority) stopped an investigation against BAE Systems
(a company) for its questionable military aircraft contracts with the Saudi government.
The SFO decided to discontinue the investigation because of Saudi government‘s threat to
terminate all contractual relationships with the UK. A counter-bribery non-profit
organization Corner House Research requested the court to intervene and review the
decision, and the court held as follows:
The courts protect the rule of law by upholding the principle that when
making decisions in the exercise of his statutory power an independent
prosecutor is not entitled to surrender to the threat of a third party, even
when that third party is a foreign state. The courts are entitled to exercise
their own judgment as to how best they may protect the rule of law, even
in cases where it is threatened from abroad. In the exercise of that
judgment we are of the view that a resolute refusal to buckle to such a
threat is the only way the law can resist.242

242

R (on the application of Corner House Research and Others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, 2008
EWHC 714 (Admin) (QB) at paras 78-79.

88

4.3.2.1Standard of Review
In England and Wales, administrative courts employ different standards in reviewing
decisions to prosecute and not to prosecute. The courts apply a strict standard of review to
the decision to prosecute. In R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, the court held that the
decision to prosecute could only be judicially reviewed by a competent court in the
presence of demonstrable fraud, corruption, and mala fides.243 ―Fraud, corruption, and
mala fides‖ on the part of the Director of Public Prosecutor (DPP) in deciding to pursue a
prosecution could significantly increase the risk of forcing an innocent person to go
through a criminal proceeding, and a court has the responsibility to prevent the criminal
justice system from being arbitrarily used against individuals. It would be better to quash
the decision to prosecute before the court proceedings commence so that the unnecessary
suffering of the accused caused by the improper prosecution can be minimized. Even
though several courts agreed to expand the permissible standard theoretically to ―acting
perversely or contrary to the Code for Crown Prosecutors‖, the courts in practice are
attitudinally reluctant to intervene for these expanded grounds.
The existence of subsequent criminal trials as an alternative remedy is a critical reason for
the court to refuse to probe into the deeper cause of the decision to prosecute without first
demonstrating fraud, corruption, and mala fides in the DPP‘s decision-making process.
The accused could file a motion to stay a prosecution in light of the abuse of process
doctrine during the prosecution.244 In Sharma v Antonine, judicial review was sought to
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prevent an allegedly politically motivated prosecution against the Chief Justice of
Trinidad and Tobago who was charged with attempting to pervert the course of justice.
The request was rejected for the reason that the criminal process should be the right
forum in which to address the decision to prosecute and the criminal court has jurisdiction
over it:
It is clear that the criminal courts would have the power to restrain the
further pursuit of any criminal proceedings against the Chief Justice if he
could on the balance of probabilities show that their pursuit constitutes an
abuse of the process of the court: cf R v Horseferry Road Magistrates'
Court, ex p Bennett [1993] 3 LRC 94 at 108 where Lord Griffiths
explained the rationale in the following passage:
If the court is to have the power to interfere with the prosecution in the
present circumstances it must be because the judiciary accept a
responsibility for the maintenance of the rule of law that embraces a
willingness to oversee executive action and to refuse to countenance
behaviour that threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law. My
Lords, I have no doubt that the judiciary should accept this responsibility
in the field of criminal law.245
Unlike ―Fraud, corruption, and mala fides‖, procedural mistakes are not serious enough to
constitute an arbitrary prosecution that would be patently unreasonable and unjust, or
significantly inconsistent with the principle of justice. Counsel for the accused can make
an effective defence for his or her client in court.

We stress that the Legal Services Commission and those advising prospective applicants
for judicial review should always realise that judicial review is very rarely appropriate
where an alternative remedy is available. If such a remedy is available, a judicial review
application should not be pursued.
245
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As well, the administrative court also considers that the process to seek judicial review
will cause a delay for a criminal trial, which might put the accused into a worse position,
especially when such an application is dismissed or leave to appeal is granted. 246
Therefore, the court is very harsh when dealing with applications for a review of the
decision to prosecute.
The grounds permissible for judicial review for decisions to prosecute are still applicable
for judicial review for decisions to discontinue one. However, courts are willing to apply
a comparatively lower threshold when considering a review for a decision not to
prosecute. This is because a high standard of review for decision not to prosecute will
leave victims with no effective remedies to deal with flawed decisions. The decision not
to prosecute will not be followed by a criminal trial or other proceedings that can check
the legitimacy of such a decision. In R v DPP, ex parte Manning, Lord Bingham CJ
supplied a comprehensive reasoning:
In most cases the [decision not to prosecute] will turn not on an analysis of
the relevant legal principles but on the exercise of an informed judgment
of how a case against a particular defendant, if brought, would be likely to
fare in the context of a criminal trial before (in a serious case such as this)
246
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a jury. This exercise of judgment involves an assessment of the strength,
by the end of the trial, of the evidence against the defendant and of the
likely defences. It will often be impossible to stigmatise a judgment on
such matters as wrong even if one disagrees with it. So the courts will not
easily find that a decision not to prosecute is bad in law, on which basis
alone the court is entitled to interfere. At the same time, the standard of
review should not be set too high, since judicial review is the only means
by which the citizen can seek redress against a decision not to prosecute
and if the tests were too exacting an effective remedy would be denied.247
This reasoning and principle was upheld in subsequent cases.248 While ―fraud, corruption,
and mala fides‖ remain valid grounds for judicial review of the decision not to prosecute,
249

the court frequently uses a lower standard in assessing whether the exercise of

discretion by the DPP is lawful. For this reason, this type of application has experienced
some degree of success in the country. The basic principles that should be considered
when determining whether to overturn a decision not to prosecute were established in R.
v. DPP Ex parte Chaudhary:
[Judicial review can occur] if and only if it is demonstrated to us that the
Director of Public Prosecution acting through the Crown Prosecution
Service arrived at the decision not to prosecute:
1) Because of some unlawful policy…
2) Because the Director of Public Prosecutions failed to act in
accordance with his or her own settled policy as set out in the
Code; or
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3) Because the decision was perverse. It was a decision at which no
reasonable prosecutor could have arrived.250

4.3.2.1.1

Error in Law

The court can examine the application and interpretation of the law by the CPS to guide
itself in determining whether or not to prosecute. In R v DPP, ex parte Chaudhary, 251 the
applicant C reported that her husband, who was a police officer, sodomised her repeatedly
without her consent, but the CPS dropped the case because it found lack of evidence
pertaining to consent and that consensual buggery between two males over 21 in private
is not an offence. In the CPS‘s affidavit, it claimed that it had satisfied the evidentiary
criteria for the alleged offence, but prosecuting the alleged offender on the ground of
consensual buggery in private, which is not an offence based on the age of the applicant
and the accused and is insufficient proof of not giving consent, is contrary to public
consideration. When examining the explanation given by the CPS, the court found the
CPS had either confused or conflated consensual buggery and non-consensual buggery,
which were two different and separate offenses, when assessing the evidentiary
sufficiency criterion. According to the court, the CPS should bear in mind that the
evidentiary sufficiency criterion should be satisfied in relation to non-consensual buggery,
which was alleged by the applicant. In contrast, it assessed the evidence merely based on
consensual buggery, which made it look as if consensual buggery and non-consensual
buggery were the same offenses. As a result, the CPS‘s decision to discontinue this case
was irrational.
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Similarly, in R v DPP, ex parte Jones,252 the DPP dropped the case because it considered
―gross negligence manslaughter‖ not dangerous enough to constitute a crime and the
evidence was insufficient to support ―subjective recklessness‖. The court rejected the
DPP‘s justification because it considered the DPP was wrong when it reasoned that ―gross
negligence manslaughter‖ did not constitute an indictable criminal act. In these cases, the
administrative court allows itself to assess whether the DPP and the CPS has correctly
applied the law.
When making charging decisions, the DPP might have doubts about the interpretation of
the relevant law when the law is ambiguous and/or confusing. In these situations, he or
she might interpret the law in favour of victims to avoid freeing a potential criminal, and
therefore choose to prosecute the accused for cautions. When the DPP takes such
cautions, his defense lawyer can, at worst, make arguments towards an effective defense
concerning whether there are errors in interpreting the law at trial. However, when the
DPP‘s discretion to interpret the law is mistakenly used or abused to drop a case, it might
cause injustice to victims because of the victim‘s lack of means to bring the issue before a
criminal court. In addition, judges, who indeed have common law power to interpret the
law, might be better suited to determine whether a law has been interpreted within a range
of possibility. That is why victims should at least have a chance to have such discretion
reviewed in a reviewing court as the last remedy to make an argument about the DPP‘s
misinterpretation of the law, and have that error corrected.
The question is what type of the interpretation of the law can be considered incorrect,
which makes a decision not to prosecute unreasonable and allows the court to set it aside.
252
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The UK jurisprudence does not clarify this issue. Should a reviewing judge overturn a
decision not to prosecute just because he or she has a different interpretation of the law? I
believe the answer is no. It is the job of a trial judge to determine what the law is, and the
job of a reviewing judge is to see whether the interpretation of the law by the DPP is
plausible when making a decision to continue or drop charges.
Surely, the DPP should have discretion in interpreting the law that is going to apply in his
or her case if only the interpretation is not obviously unreasonable. This would mean that
the DPP should have legitimate bases, such as case law, legal commentary or other
documents and supports, to make them believe that the accusation against the accused is
not well-supported or/and the judge will likely interpret the law in the same way in court.
When the law is unclear on the alleged act, the DPP may choose to act cautiously by
prosecuting the person who performs this act and leave to the court to make the final
decision on whether an act falls under the scope of the law. One might argue that, even
though the accused can be exonerated of all responsibilities for the alleged act through
effective defense, the prosecution might still damage the reputation of the accused, which
might have huge negative impact on the accused‘s life and career. However, in my
opinion, once the prosecuting authority‘s bases to initiate a prosecution are supported by
some documents, it is hard to say that the interests of the accused are improperly or
arbitrarily impaired. In fact, in most cases, the accused is himself or herself responsible
for the investigation and prosecution against him or her because of he or she deliberately
taking opportunities by exploring profits from the gray area of the law in the first place.
In addition, it would be very inefficient if the DPP has to consult the court regarding how
to interpret the law in every case in which the law is vague. If the DPP does that, the
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consultation would be meaningless when a judge makes a different interpretation
concerning the law after hearing the accused‘s arguments. However, if the interpretation
of the law is ascertained during the consultation, the defense of this issue will become
meaningless. In this way, the accused will lose the opportunity to make an argument
about the interpretation of the law in court. Therefore, in my opinion, the prosecuting
authority should have a workable margin for their errors in interpreting the law when
deciding whether or not to prosecute. A decision not to prosecute can only be considered
perverse on the ground of erring in law when the prosecuting authority‘s interpretation
appears to be clearly unreasonable, perverse or completely ungrounded.

4.3.2.1.2

Evidential Insufficiency

In the Manning case, 253 the court examined the reasonableness of the prosecutor in
applying an ―evidential sufficiency‖ criterion when deciding not to pursue a case.254 In
order to deal with this issue, the court summarized five points for charging decisionmaking in the current case.255 The court considered these points were so obvious that any
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The victim was remanded in prison custody awaiting trial for an offence of violence, and later died of
asphyxia while under restraint following an altercation with two officers. His death was investigated by
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Manning, supra note 9.
255
Ibid at para 41-42:
…In the end we are, however, satisfied that there are five points which Mr N as
defendant would have to overcome if he were to defeat the prima facie case which in
Mr Western's judgment lay against him and these were points which Mr Western did
not address and resolve. Put in their simplest terms these points are:
(1) If Mr N's account were accepted, there would be no explanation of how
the injury to the throat of the deceased and the interruption of his breathing
occurred. It was on this basis that Mr Western concluded that Ms T could not
be taken as a truthful witness and was therefore a witness whom the Crown
need not call.
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reasonable person would have taken them as an objective appraisal of the prospect of
conviction. It considered that the failure to carefully consider these five points would
make the decision not to prosecute unreasonable because it makes the evidentiary
threshold for this case higher than ―realistic prospect of conviction‖ laid down in the
Code for Crown Prosecutors. The court emphasized that it would defer to the judgment of
the experienced prosecutors on whether a jury is likely to convict. In fact, it is difficult to
say, when listing these five points, whether the court had incorporated its wisdom in
determining a reasonable way to assess ―evidentiary sufficiency‖.
Again, in another case of R. (on the application of B) v DPP,256 the victim‘s left ear was
bitten off by the alleged offender during an incident that took place in a coffee house, and
was later personally assaulted by him. The victim reported the incident to the relevant
authority and, as a result, a prosecution was instituted. However, the prosecution was
stopped the night before the trial because the CPS received a negative opinion from an
expert about the victim‘s mental history, which made the CPS consider the victim an
(2) If Mr N's account were rejected it is very difficult to see how it could be
regarded as simply mistaken, particularly having regard to his evidence of
constantly talking into the ear of the deceased during the journey to the
servery and of the deceased himself on occasion speaking.
(3) If Mr N's account were rejected as untruthful, as Mr Western judged Ms T's
account to be, there was no evidence to contradict the evidence of the
prisoners who said they saw the head of the deceased held in a headlock.
(4) There was no evidence to suggest that contact was accidental or noncontinuous, and that possibility was directly contradicted by Mr N's own
evidence.
(5) There was no medical evidence to suggest that accidental, non-continuous
contact between Mr N's forearm and the neck of the deceased could have
caused or contributed significantly to the death of the deceased.
In our judgment these are matters which should have been taken into account on an
objective appraisal of the prospects of success of a prosecution if brought, and the
failure to take them into account vitiates the Director's decision. It also appears to us
that Mr Western (inadvertently, we feel sure) applied a test higher than that laid down
in the code. We accordingly quash the decision.
256
R (on the application of B) v Director of Public Prosecutions, Equality and Human Rights Commission
intervening, [2009] EWHC 106 (Admin) [R (on the application of B) v DPP].
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unreliable witness that might not survive in front of the jury at trial. The court considered
that the CPS magnified the expert‘s negative opinion regarding victim‘s mental history
and tended to believe in the unfounded stereotyped concept that a complainant could not
be regarded as a credible witness on any matter if he or she had a history of mental
problems. It concluded that, if a case were originally well founded enough to be brought
to a court, it would be irrational if it was dismissed merely based on the fact that the
credibility of one witness was in question. In this case, the court had in fact had a second
opinion on how the DPP should have weighed the evidence in assessing whether a case
should be continued or not. However, it is inappropriate for the court to judge how the
CPS assesses and balances relevant factors and evidence at its own discretion and then
develop an alternative viewpoint on the outcome (decision not to prosecute). However,
this type of approach has been widely accepted in dealing with evidentiary insufficiency
for decisions not to prosecute in the UK.257
The DPP is restricted from using ―evidentiary sufficiency‖ to intervene in a private
prosecution. The court can review a decision to discontinue a private prosecution even
when the DPP takes over and stops the prosecution because it does not meet the
evidentiary sufficiency threshold laid down in the Code for the Crown Prosecutor. In the
case of R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Duckenfield,258 the court determined
what standard the DPP or the CPS should apply when taking over and stopping a private
prosecution. In this case, the representative of victims‘ families charged two retired senior
police officers with manslaughter and wilful neglect of duty in the 1989 Hillsborough
257

R (on the application of Joseph) v DPP, [2001] Crim LR 489 [Joseph]; R (on the application of Peter
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disasters259 in which many people were killed. The two police officers requested the CPS
to take over the prosecution and stop it, but the request was refused by the CPS. The court
upheld the CPS‘s ―clearly no case to answer‖ approach, which means that ―the DPP only
intends to stop private prosecutions on this ground where no reasonable decision maker
could conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the case to go forward‖260. The court
reasoned that to ―stop a private prosecution merely on the ground that the case is not one
which he would himself proceed with ... would amount to an emasculation of [right to
private prosecution] and itself be an unlawful policy‖,261 and a private prosecutor did not
need to follow the Code for the Crown Prosecutor when deciding to institute a case. The
DPP should not apply its own evidentiary sufficiency criterion to a private prosecution.
This point was established in R (on the application of Charlson) v Guildford Magistrates'
Court and The South Western Magistrates' Court And Walsh (Interested Party).262 This
rule for the DPP‘s intervention into a private prosecution had not been changed for years.
Recently, in R (Gujra) v CPS,263 the question of whether the DPP can impose its own
evidentiary sufficiency criterion in making charging decisions on a private prosecutor was
re-examined. The majority of the court agreed that judicial review should not be granted
if the CPS or the DPP complied with its Code when deciding to halt a private prosecution.
However, Baroness Hale of Richmond and Lord Mance JJSC dissented. They considered
private prosecution a safeguard for individuals to activate a prosecution against their
259

The Hillsborough disaster was an incident that occurred on 15 April 1989 at the Hillsborough Stadium in
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blamed primarily on the police. The incident remains the worst stadium-related disaster in British history
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violators when a public prosecutor had some evidence but dropped a case out of caution
or for other reasons. According to these two judges, allowing the CPS to have a final
word on evidentiary sufficiency of a case will diminish the effectiveness of the private
prosecution and violate individuals‘ rights. Just as Baroness Hale of Richmond explained
in the case:
The possibility of judicial review of the prosecutor's decision is not a good
enough safeguard [to protect individual rights], as this case demonstrates
only too clearly. Just as a reasonable prosecutor could take the view that
the case should proceed, a reasonable prosecutor could take the view that it
should not. The possibility of bringing a private prosecution, however
remote to most people, is a much more effective safeguard. Now that the
new policy has effectively removed it, the victims of crime will have little
prospect of challenging the prosecutor's decisions… That obligation [to
provide positive protect laid down in the ECHR] is not fulfilled if a private
prosecution, which a reasonable prosecutor could consider more likely
than not to succeed before a reasonable court, can be prevented because
another prosecutor takes a different view.264

4.3.2.1.3

Procedural Fairness

English courts allow judicial review for the decision not to prosecute on the grounds of
procedural unfairness in certain circumstances. One of the prominent aspects of the
Manning decision is that the court stressed that not giving clear explanations for a
decision not to prosecute an unlawful killing case was a violation of article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR):
…the right to life is the most fundamental of all human rights. It is put at
the forefront of [the ECHR]. The power to derogate from it is very
264
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limited …Where such an inquest following a proper direction to the jury
culminates in a lawful verdict of unlawful killing implicating a person
who, although not named in the verdict, is clearly identified, who is living
and whose whereabouts are known, the ordinary expectation would
naturally be that a prosecution would follow. In the absence of compelling
grounds for not giving reasons, we would expect the Director to give
reasons in such a case: to meet the reasonable expectation of interested
parties that either a prosecution would follow or a reasonable explanation
for not prosecuting be given, to vindicate the Director's decision by
showing that solid grounds exist for what might otherwise appear to be a
surprising or even inexplicable decision and to meet the European Court's
expectation that if a prosecution is not to follow a plausible explanation
will be given.265
Later in 2006 in R (on the application of Peter Dennis) v DPP, the court upheld the
Manning reasoning and ruled that a court was allowed to review a decision not to
prosecute ―where an inquest jury has found unlawful killing, the reasons why a
prosecution did not follow have not been clearly expressed‖.266

4.3.2.2Relief sought
In the UK, while there is a relatively lower standard for the judiciary to review a decision
not to prosecute than Canadian counterpart, this remedy is limited. It seems that the court
cannot compel a prosecutor to perform an affirmative action, such as compelling a
prosecution. In R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene,267 where the DPP refused to give consent to a
private prosecution against terrorists, Lord Hope argued that judicial review should not be
granted in this type of case because the court cannot order the DPP to give consent, which
265
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was the sole possible remedy that could be sought in this type of case. However, in
judicial review of the decision to discontinue a public prosecution, the court cannot only
nullify a decision not to prosecute, but also direct the prosecutor to reconsider such
decision. Of course, it cannot control the outcome of the reconsideration.268 The decision
not to prosecute still depends on the prosecutor‘s discretion, and it is possible that a
prosecutor can maintain his or her original decision after the reconsideration.
Two points are worth discussing in this situation. First, if the court can direct a
prosecution to review a decision, does it mean that the court has some power to force a
prosecutor to perform an action? If the court has such power, in cases where it can be
certain that the decision not to prosecute is incorrect, 269 why can it not just compel a
prosecution in order to prevent the prosecutor from insisting upon maintaining his or her
incorrect decision after reconsideration? Even though it will be very rare, if the prosecutor
maintains the original decision, victims might repeatedly make an application for judicial
review if they continue believing that the new result is still incorrect or unreasonable. In
this case, it is possible that the review proceeding becomes endless. Of course, it is
unrealistic for average victims to spend so much money and time on one case. Moreover,
in some cases, even though a non-prosecution decision is in dispute because some
mistakes or improper acts on the part of the Crown prosecutor are found in the decisionmaking process, the decision might be unreasonable but correct because the Crown
prosecutor may accidentally reach a correct conclusion of not prosecuting through the
problematical decision-making process. This can result in the maintenance of the decision
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not to prosecute after a reconsideration because the conclusion of not prosecuting a case
appears to be an correct answer although the original decision not to prosecute is
concluded based on questionable reasons.
In addition, in most situations, it is less likely that the maintenance of the decision not to
prosecute would result from the DPP or the CPS persisting in his or her incorrect or
irrational reasoning through which no proper reconsideration actually took place when
making the second decision not to prosecute. However, it is still possible that, in cases
where the DPP is corrupt, acts in bad faith or discontinues the prosecution for improper
purposes, he or she would deliberately ignore the instructions from the reviewing judge.
In these situations, if a court cannot compel the DPP to prosecute, the result of its order to
direct a reconsideration is no different than the request of the victims sent to the CPS for a
reconsideration of their case through an internal review. Therefore, extraordinary
responses such as compelling a prosecution are necessary under exceptional
circumstances. Compelling a prosecution could be more effective than directing a
reconsideration for the court to deal with the abovementioned situations at its discretion.
Second, it makes little sense if a prosecutor still does not prosecute a case after a court
nullifies a decision not to prosecute. Does this not mean that the decision not to prosecute
is still in effect? It can be argued that the decision not to prosecute challenged by victims
in court has been quashed, but the non-prosecution actually results from the CPS‘s second
decision not to prosecute, which is still in effect. This is not a violation of the court‘s
order. However, it is difficult to tell whether a prosecutor has made a second decision or
has just insisted on not prosecuting. If it is the second situation, the court‘s order is
violated. If the order were violated, it would seem that a court is not able to impose any
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sanction on the DPP or the CPS other than to re-direct a consideration of a decision not to
prosecute. This goes back to the first question pertaining to whether the court can force a
public prosecutor to prosecute. Although this remains problematic, the English court
seems reluctant to address this issue.
Furthermore, in UK, if the Crown prosecutor has called no evidence in court, such a
decision not to prosecute is not reversible in court. In R. (on the application of B) v. DPP,
even though the court found that the decision not to prosecute was not reasonable, it had
no power to reverse the decision because the prosecution had offered no evidence. 270
Instead, in order to provide satisfaction to the victim through its judgement, the court
provided the victim with monetary compensation to account for the deprivation of an
opportunity to initiate criminal proceedings.271 This is problematic. First, what if a victim
is not seeking monetary compensation but would only be satisfied with a criminal
proceeding? In this situation monetary compensation does not provide adequate
satisfaction. Secondly, it risks the possibility that ―offer no evidence‖ can be a means for
the DPP to block the victim from seeking reversal of his decision not to prosecute.

4.4 American Experience
American practices and jurisprudence have an undeniable impact on the development of
Canadian legal system. The District Attorney (DA, prosecuting authority in the US) in the
US traditionally has exclusive jurisdiction in deciding whether to initiate a prosecution
and this role has not changed for over 200 years. The DA‘s discretionary power to make

270
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charging decisions was originally absolute and unreviewable by courts.272 Courts in the
US are reluctant to review the DA‘s decision to decline a prosecution for three main
reasons: 1) the constitutional principle of separation of powers prohibits the judiciary
from intervening in the administration of executive power, including prosecutorial
decisions; 273 2) prosecutorial discretion is necessary for the prosecuting attorney to
effectively distribute limited prosecutorial resources for public good through decisionmaking;274 and 3) prosecutorial discretion helps to allocate limited budgetary resources
effectively and reduce the workload for the expensive and over-burden criminal justice
system.275
However, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, concerns about
unfettered prosecutorial discretion were studied and a number of old criticisms reappeared. Some scholars have expressed their worries regarding the DA‘s absolute power
to determine the fate of private individuals by discharging its duty to decide whether to
prosecute might lead to potential abuse or arbitrariness against them. 276 Others have
argued that, rather than performing the executive function of determining who should be
charged, the DAs might in fact replace the court‘s function by interpreting the applicable
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law or judging whether an alleged offender was guilty or not before a trial takes place.277
In addition, as others have also argued, prosecutorial discretion might conceal
malfunction in the criminal justice system, which exacerbates the above-mentioned
situation. The public prosecutor might try to avoid complicated judgements and reasoning
for charging decisions, and therefore frame discretionary power as a necessary means to
speed up the system and promote public good.278 This can easily create secrecy within the
charging decision-making process because it is hard to trace the legitimacy and rationality
behind the decisions even though such decisions look suspicious. Secrecy makes public
prosecutors feel safe to act in whatever way suits their own purposes. The lack of fear of
the consequence of misconduct in charging decision-making increases the possibility that
charging decisions are rendered unjust and unfair.
Later in the 1980s, these criticisms provided a proper justification to those who advocated
for victims‘ participation in the charging stage. For example, Wainstein claimed that
improper discontinuance of a criminal prosecution could re-victimize victims of crime.279
As a result, efforts were concentrated towards reviewing jurisprudence and legislation
with regards to the possibility of checking on charging decisions by private parties in the
277
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US.280
Currently in the US, even though courts are still prone to refrain from interfering with the
DA‘s decisions concerning whether or not to prosecute and give high deference to the
DA‘s exercise of discretion, prosecutorial discretion is in principle reviewable in
exceptional circumstances. 281 In some states, judges are granted power to address an
unjustified decision not to prosecute challenged by the person who is directly affected or
aggrieved, including victims. No matter what is the real cause of these changes, it
signifies that victim‘s private challenges to unjust and unfair charging decisions are
gradually increasing in the US.282

4.4.1 Compelling a prosecution
When a DA refuses to file a charge, a mandamus can be sought as a remedy in court to
compel a prosecution. Stuart P. Green found that several states in the US have clearly
granted the court power to force a DA to commence a prosecution in exceptional
circumstances in the corresponding legislation.283 For example, in Michigan, Colorado,
Nebraska and Pennsylvania, a judge has the power to compel a prosecution if necessary.
According to section 767.41 of Michigan Compiled Laws,
The court may examine the [statement of reasons for not filing
information], together with the evidence filed in the case and if, upon
examination, the court is not satisfied with the statement, the prosecuting
280
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attorney shall be directed by the court to file the proper information and
bring the case to trial.284
This provision is duplicated in the legislation of Nebraska and Colorado.285
Owing to the significance of prosecutorial discretion in charging decision-making, a high
standard of review is employed for a private citizen to challenge a decision not to
prosecute and seek a mandamus to compel a prosecution. A private person needs to
provide clear and convincing evidence to prove that a refusal to initiate a prosecution is
an abuse of discretion. A mandamus is considered an extraordinary remedy to compel a
public officer to perform his duty laid down in the law. When making a charging decision,
the DA‘s duty is to use his or her discretionary power to decide what case to be brought to
the court. Usually, it is inappropriate to use a mandamus to force a public officer to act in
a situation where he has a legal option of refusing to act based on his discretion.286 That
will amount to the court using discretionary power to make a decision for the public
official. Therefore, it is commonly agreed that the legitimate grounds to compel a
prosecution is limited to ―abuse of discretion‖. In Tanenbaum v D'Ascenzo, the court
explained that, ―where … by an arbitrary exercise of authority there has been in fact no
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actual exercise of discretion‖,287 a mandamus is actually used to urge a decision-maker to
exercise his discretion, which is different than exercising the discretionary power for the
decision-maker or having a ―second thought‖ about the decision-maker‘s original
decision. In these cases, the court can compel the DA to bring a case against the suspect.
An ―objective reasonableness‖ test is not appropriate in a proceeding where a mandamus
is sought as a remedy.288 A reviewing judge‘s responsibility is not to find whether or not
he will reach a different conclusion based on the same evidence than the DA might do.289
This is because two equally reasonable people might reach two opposite conclusions
based on the same facts and the judge should not take over the DA‘s duty to decide who
should be prosecuted.290 It has been well established that ―abuse of discretion‖ can be
reflected in the disputed decision per se and the intent of the DA. If a decision appears to
be so manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair that a reasonable person would have
had reached a completely opposite conclusion or would have had never adopted the
course of action in the first place, the decision-maker is abusing his discretion.291 As well,
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a DA‘s refusal to press a charge cannot be ―motivated by bad faith, malice, or personal
vindictiveness‖.292
Supposedly, non-prosecution resulting from impermissibly discriminatory grounds might
also be used to challenge a decision not to prosecute. However, this remains inconclusive
in the absence of an actual case. Non-prosecution based on impermissibly discriminatory
grounds, such as race, religion, or any other arbitrary classification, could constitute abuse
of discretion. Arbitrarily selective prosecution is impermissible in the US. This has been
pointed out in Wayte v. United States:
[A]lthough prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not ―‗unfettered‘.
Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is... subject to
constitutional constraints.‖ ... In particular, the decision to prosecute may
not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification…293
In Wayte, the court went on to explain that, because ―even if the passive policy had a
discriminatory effect, petitioner has not shown that the Government intended such a
result‖, a prosecution that caused the discriminatory effect but was made out of a nondiscriminatory policy did not violate equality protection.
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supposed to protect individuals from unconstitutional violations. Of course, if the law or a
policy is discriminatory, the resulting decision is inherently unlawful. However, if a
legitimate law is implemented in a way that causes discriminatory effects on an
individual, the relevant decision should be equally unjust and unfair to the individual who
is aggrieved or affected. Unfortunately, the decision in Wayte was followed in subsequent
cases295.
The burden of proof lies on the complainant. In order to understand reasons behind the
DA dropping a case, a judge might order the DA to provide a justification for his or her
decision. Nevertheless, this does not mean the DA has to provide clear and convincing
evidence to support his reasoning. 296 The aforementioned does not shift the burden of
proof to the DA. 297 Furthermore, the standard of proof is very high. In DiLeo v Koltnow
and Metro Moving & Storage, the judge emphasized that ―[c]lear and convincing
evidence is that evidence which is stronger than a preponderance of the evidence and
which is unmistakable and free from serious or substantial doubt.‖298 This is because, in
general, even though the DA‘s decisions not to prosecute can be examined by the court
upon the victims‘ request, before the abuse of discretion is proven by solid evidence, the
DA should be presumed to be performing their duty correctly and in good faith.299 As a
result, in situations where a combination of factors, some favoring prosecution and others
favoring the DA‘s decision to drop a charge, are presented, evidence that supports the
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DA‘s decision to terminate prosecution usually proves to be enough to justify nonprosecutions.

300

Only in the case where evidence supporting prosecution clearly

outweighs evidence against does the court side with the victims.

4.4.2 Disapproval of private prosecution
4.4.2.1Legal Considerations
Unlike a request for a mandamus, the standard to allow a de novo review of a district
attorney‘s disapproval of private prosecution is comparatively lower. 301 In the US, a
private prosecution might be conditional on the consent of the DA. The DA can exercise
its discretion to refuse or to approve a private prosecution on the grounds of evidentiary
insufficiency, public policy or both. However, in some states‘ practice, if a DA rejects a
private prosecution based on solely legal considerations, which falls in legal
interpretation, a de novo review is permissible.302

4.4.2.1.1

Evidential Insufficiency

It is established that the evidential sufficiency to sustain a criminal charge is a legal issue,
which makes a decision based on that a legal conclusion. 303 Therefore, the court has
jurisdiction to review the decision to prosecute that has been disapproved by the public

300

JS v Carol Chambers, 226 P (3d) 1193 (Colo 2009) affirmed in Stene v Chambers, 2010 Colo LEXIS 220
(Colo 2010).
301
When requesting for an order in the nature of mandamus, victims expect a court to force a public
prosecutor to commence a prosecution as a result of the successful judicial review. An “abuse of
discretion” standard of review is applied in this type of judicial review, which, as demonstrated in the
previous section, shows a very high level of deference to public prosecutors’ discretionary decisions. If a
victim wants a court to nullify a public prosecutor’s disapproval of his or her private prosecution, a court
can have a fresh review of such disapproval if issues concerned are legal considerations. No deference to
the public prosecutor is expected.
302
In re Wilson, supra note 299 at 214-215.
303
Commonwealth v Malloy, 450 A (2d) 689 at 692 (Pa Super 1982); Commonwealth ex rel Guarrasi v
Carroll, 979 A (2d) 383 at 385 (Pa Super 2009) [Carroll].

112

prosecutor and does not need to give special deference to the public prosecutor.304 If the
court found that the evidence submitted by the private complainant could sustain a prima
facie case, it can undo the disapproval. In Commonwealth ex rel Guarrasi v Carroll, the
court clearly stated:
If a prosecutor's decision to disapprove a private criminal complaint was
based on a legal evaluation of the sufficiency of the complaint, then the
trial court must undertake a de novo review of the complaint to ascertain
whether it establishes a prima facie cause of action. 305
In the context of American law, a prima facie case means a case in which ―the amount of
evidence which would be sufficient to counterbalance the general presumption of
innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by evidence
tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove facts inconsistent with it;
that which is received or continues until the contrary is shown.‖ 306 This is a primary
requirement for a case to go to a jury.307 In spite of disregarding possible contradictory
evidence and arguments against the accusation or existing evidence, judges still somehow
exercise some personal thoughts concerning the value, admissibility, reliability, and
relevance of the evidence submitted by the private complainant in order to determine
whether the evidence has made a prima facie case. It is a judgmental call on the judges‘
part on how to weigh the evidence. It is possible that, in some less obvious cases, the
same set of evidence leads to a different conclusion if put in front of a different judge.
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This standard of de novo review seems appropriate in the case where a disapproval of
private prosecution occurs. In a private prosecution, it is the private prosecutor‘s power to
exercise the prosecutorial discretion as a prosecutor in deciding whether to prosecute after
assessing the possibility of conviction. When considering whether or not to disapprove a
private prosecution based on the minimum evidentiary threshold, a DA is to assess
whether a case should be put forward according to the existing evidence at his or her
discretion as if he or she were the prosecutor who would conduct the private prosecution.
This means that they will probably disapprove a case because they would have never
initiated such a prosecution if they were the prosecutor in the case. However, the private
prosecutor and the DA could have reached two opposite but equally reasonable
conclusions concerning the establishment of a prima facie case based on the same set of
evidence. Holding an opposite opinion about whether or not to prosecute than the DA
does not necessarily mean that the decision made by the private prosecutor is incorrect. If
the private prosecution does not err in filing a charge against a lawbreaker, a district
attorney‘s intervention based on his own judgment of no prima facie case will amount to
unjustifiably disrupting the individual‘s exercise of his right to file a private complaint
granted by the law.
However, another issue I am concerned about is whether a judge should give certain
deference to private prosecutors. In fact, American jurisprudence seems to hold that a
judge is the best person to have the final say on whether a prima facie case has been made
because such determination falls within a judge‘s expertise. In an application of judicial
review of the disapproval of a private prosecution based on evidentiary insufficiency,
judges do not review the decision of disapproval made by the DA, but rather determine
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whether or not the private prosecutor has provided enough evidence to sustain a prima
facie case. However, I believe a private prosecutor could reach an equally reasonable
counter-conclusion on the matter. It would be unfair to deny a particular conclusion
because one judge does not agree with it. Therefore, it would be better if the reviewing
judge assesses only the possibility of whether a prima facie case can be sustained based
on the existing evidence.

4.4.2.1.2

Decision made based on error of law

If the exercise of discretion is based on error of law, is a decision made from such
discretion reviewable by American courts? If the disapproval of a private prosecution is
based on the DA‘s misinterpretation of law, a reviewing court can undo the disapproval
because such an issue is a legal consideration rather than the exercise of discretion. In
contrast, a court cannot compel a DA to prosecute if her or his refusal to prosecute is
caused by that reason because the issue has not reached the level of abuse of discretion. A
court can only issue a mandamus when a DA abuses charging discretion. This limitation
reflects one of the main differences between a mandamus and a certiorari proceeding. In
Seeton v Adams,308 the appellant sought a mandamus to compel the DA to prosecute an
association accused of needless and cruel treatment of pigeons after several private
complaints filed by two individuals against the potential suspects were struck down by
the DA. The DA disapproved the private prosecution because she believed that the ―live
pigeon shoots‖ activity did not break the law. The court found that ―live pigeon shoots‖
was prohibited based on the criminal code and the DA indeed misinterpreted the law.
However, the court still refused to issue a mandamus to compel a prosecution because no
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abuse of discretion was found, and the court emphasized that the mistaken use of
discretion was not enough to compel a DA to act.
However, in his dissenting opinion, Judge Bernard L McGinley considered that legal
considerations include whether the DA had applied the correct law when making a
decision not to prosecute, which would make the decision in the current case reviewable.
He relied on Commonwealth v Jury,309 in which the DA disapproved a private prosecution
because he considered that the allegations against the alleged offender could not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt based on the existing evidence. The judge in that case
allowed a de novo review because the district attorney applied an incorrect standard when
assessing the prospect of conviction. Even though the majority did not agree with that, in
my opinion, Judge Bernard L McGinley did not err in his categorization of the DA‘s
misinterpretation of law as legal considerations, which allows a court to review. However,
the main difference in Jury and the Seeton case is that, in the latter, the complainant
wanted the court to order the DA to prosecute the case, not to quash the disapproval of a
prosecution, which would allow the appellant to re-file a private complaint. Because a
mandamus imposes a higher burden on the DA, the standard of review should be
comparatively higher. The superior court was correct to employ a higher standard to
assess the merit of the application and finally decline to issue a mandamus.

4.4.2.2 Public policy
In contrast, if the refusal to prosecute is on the grounds of public policy over which the
DA has exclusive prosecutorial discretionary power, courts are generally reluctant to
become involved unless a clear abuse of discretion is proven. The standard and burden of
309
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proof are the same as to seek a mandamus. This tendency has been upheld in many
cases. 310 In comparison to legal-consideration-based refusal, policy-based refusal is
subject to a higher standard of review. It is vital for the judge to carefully examine the
rationale behind the decision to disapprove a private prosecution.
In the case where the DA submits that the decision to stop a private prosecution is based
on public policy, a court can require the district attorney to present evidence to show the
existence of ―an established policy‖ in order to determine whether they are following an
actual public policy. 311 It has been pointed out that the ―lack of sufficient evidence‖
cannot be categorized as a part of public policy, which the district attorney might use to
object the court‘s de novo review. In Commonwealth ex rel Guarrasi v Carroll, the court
explained:
…the D.A. in this case has a policy of not accepting private criminal
complaints that lack legal merit does not transform the law-based rejection
of such a complaint into a public policy decision or a hybrid of legal and
public policy reasons. The significance of this point is simply this: If the
D.A. were permitted to characterize all law-based rejections of criminal
complaints as policy decisions, then every rejection would be subject to the
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard upon review by the Common
Pleas Court. Thus, the D.A.'s decisions to reject private complaints would
never be subject to de novo review even though the law requires that
standard of review for rejections based on lack of legal merit.312
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Another issue is whether the ―existence of adequate civil remedies‖ constitutes a policybased reason. In Commonwealth v Michaliga,313 the complainant requested a nullification
of the DA‘s decision not to prosecute, which was made based on an assumption that the
complaint would be better addressed in a civil suit. The appellate court overturned the
trial court‘s decision to review and emphasized that adequate civil remedies was a policybased reason for the disapproval of charges, which was unreviewable in the absence of
abuse of discretion.314 However, I find the conclusion of the trial court concerning the
issues about available civil remedies more convincing:
…this court cannot agree with the definition provided by the learned
Justice Cappy [in Commonwealth v. Brown, 550 Pa 580 (1998)]: "bad
faith is shown where the action under review was undertaken with a
dishonest or corrupt purpose.‖ …However, his definition would provide a
judge no opportunity to check a District Attorney's exercise of power
under the present facts; namely, a decision not to prosecute because of
available civil remedies. There are civil remedies available in this and like
cases, there are always civil remedies available, but Justice Cappy would
deny this court the needed latitude to determine their adequacy.
Take for example an aggravated assault. The District Attorney could deny
prosecution claiming a civil action for battery would be an "adequate" civil
remedy. Then on appeal, how could a Petitioner prove that the District
Attorney denied [the complaint] out of "a dishonest or corrupt purpose"?
Under Justice Cappy's definition, how could a court possibly find an abuse
of discretion when it must first find corruption and dishonesty? Under
313

Commonwealth v Michaliga, 947 A (2d) 786 (Pa Super 2008) [Michaliga].
Ibid. See also Commonwealth v Cooper, 710 A (2d) 76 at 81 (Pa Super 1998) (District attorney's
assertion that the complainant had an adequate civil remedy "sufficiently sets forth a clear statement as
to the particular policy that dictates withholding prosecution."); Hearn v Myers, 699 A (2d) 1265 at 1268
(Pa Super 1997) (Trial court's determination that district attorney's policy disapproving charges where an
adequate civil remedy existed was appropriate "[i]f a private prosecutor feels individually harmed his
remedy is a civil suit for damages").
314

118

facts similar to this case, he would provide the judiciary no checks or
balances on the District Attorney's use of discretion.315
In my opinion, the trial court was correct to reverse the DA‘s decision not to prosecute,
but it was wrong to conclude that the court should have the power to determine the
adequacy of civil remedy. Its argument is partially problematic. First, the reasoning is
illogical. When the court made this conclusion, it agreed with the fact that the
discontinuance of a prosecution based on the existence of civil remedies was a nonprosecution policy. If such a policy was lawful, whether the civil remedy was adequate
was supposed to be a part of the DA‘s exercise of his or her discretion in determining
whether a case should be dropped based on the availability of civil remedy. The court
reiterated that it should give high deference to the DA‘s exercise of discretion in charging
decision-making, so how can it determine ―adequacy of civil remedy‖ for the DA?
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that a court, which has limited judicial power over
prosecutorial discretion, should have the power to determine the ―adequacy‖ of the
existence of civil remedy without proving the DA abused discretion when making
decisions based on this ground. For another reason, no one should have the right to
determine whether a remedy is sufficient other than the one who is suffering and needs
the remedy. Using ―existence of civil remedy‖ as a non-prosecution policy deprives
victims of liberty and the opportunity to choose the suitable remedy they desire.
In my opinion, the discontinuance of a prosecution based on the existence of civil remedy
should not be considered as a valid policy. As the trial court pointed out, there is always a
civil remedy present. The DA can therefore frequently use ―existence of civil remedy‖ as
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an excuse to stop a private prosecution and effectively block the court from reviewing the
decision because the standards of judicial review for policy-based non-prosecution are
extremely high. Furthermore, the policy is unconstitutional. If a victim fails in his
criminal complaint, he can always apply a civil suit or other civil remedies. If one case
were dropped because the complainant had sufficient civil channels to recover his
damages, other cases that involve the same or similar alleged criminal acts would also be
eligible for exemption from prosecution based on the same policy. For example, A loses
$2,000 from an insurance fraud, and the DA determines not to prosecute claiming that A
can file a civil suit to recover that damage. Then, if B also loses $ 2,000 from similar
insurance fraud when the policy is still in effect, the DA should drop that case as well if
other factors are similar, for otherwise, his actions will lack consistency. It can be inferred
that, if the DA keeps consistency in his decision-making, the other subsequent similar
insurance fraud should not be prosecuted due to the existence of adequate civil remedy,
unless there are other distinctive factors that come into play. However, such insurance
fraud is still an indictable offence listed in criminal law, but in practice the DA‘s policy
and practice instead takes it off the list of indictable offences. Therefore, by posting this
policy, the DA‘s actions have the same effect as assuming the legislative function to
amend the criminal statute, which is unconstitutional based on the separation of power.
The court is allowed to interfere with a policy-based decision not to prosecute in the
presence of unconstitutionality.316 In sum, the ―existence of adequate civil remedies‖ as
policy per se is not valid.
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4.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, in the EU, there is an increasing emphasis on victims‘ interests at the
charging stage of a criminal proceeding in recent decades. Most EU countries have
granted victims either the right to review decisions not to prosecute or the strong right to
private prosecution to respond to public prosecutors‘ inaction. The adoption of the
Victims‘ Rights Directive, 317 which grants victims the right to review decisions not to
prosecute, further strengthens victims‘ power to confront public prosecutors‘ improper
refusal to commence a prosecution throughout the EU. Influenced by the EU practices
and legislation, the UK has made progress on the reform of its review system for
decisions not to prosecute. The UK has lowered standards of review of decisions not to
prosecute, and it recently set up a formal internal review scheme in its prosecution office
in 2013. In addition, English courts restrict public prosecutors to discontinue a case based
on ―evidentiary sufficiency‖ grounds. In the US, even though courts still apply
comparatively high standards of review of public prosecutors withdrawing or staying
public prosecution, they have absolute power to review the disapproval of the private
prosecution based on legal considerations such as the lack of sufficient evidence. The
practice in these areas demonstrates that victims‘ interests at the charging stage of a
criminal proceeding have gained increasing attention worldwide.
With the combination between the information about Canadian system given in section
2.3.4 in Chapter 2 and the information set out above in this chapter, a brief comparison is
made in the following chart.
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Figure 1. Comparison of practice in the EU, US, UK and Canada concerning
victims’ possibility to review a decision not to prosecute
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CHAPTER V
5 Proposed Reforms
5.1 General Overview
Drawing on the experiences of the practice in the EU, UK and US, this chapter proposes a
series of reforms to ensure that victims in Canada have effective opportunities to
challenge unreasonable and incorrect decisions not to prosecute made by Crown
prosecutors. The recommended reform includes a two-level process, Internal Review and
Judicial Review. In section 6.1, I will provide an introduction regarding the application
and limitations of the Internal Review and Judicial Review respectively, including their
process, scope of application, eligible and potential participants, and statutory limitations.

5.1.1 Definition of Victims: “who may seek review”
The definition of ―victim‖ commonly used in the Canadian legal system is also applicable
in this review system. A direct victim is the person to whom harm was done, or who
suffered personal physical, emotional, or economic loss as a direct result of the
commission of the alleged offence. A person can claim to be a victim eligible for this
review system based only on emotional loss only when such mental suffering caused by
the alleged offence is so severe that this person is not able to have a normal life. The
reason behind this narrow definition of ―mental suffering‖ is to prevent a huge number of
applications for review merely based on their trivial emotional distress. A person who
finds himself or herself falling into this definition is eligible to seek review of decisions
not to prosecute through this review system. Meanwhile, an eligible victim can give up
his or her opportunity to use this system. Therefore, it is not the system that should
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automatically identify victims in alleged crimes, but the ―victims‖ who should claim and
prove that they are victims who are eligible for the system.
―Indirect victims‖ are the spouse, common-law partner, dependent, or any relative of the
direct victim, or anyone who has, in law or fact, the custody of the direct victim or is
responsible for the care or support of the direct victim who suffers emotional or economic
loss as a result of the alleged offence against the direct victim. In most situations, indirect
victims alone should have no legal standing to complain about a decision not to prosecute
because their harm is not directly caused by the alleged offender. However, in cases
where the direct victim is dead or otherwise incapable of filing a complaint, an indirect
victim should be able to file a complaint on his or her behalf. In John Doe murder cases
where the identity of direct victims cannot be confirmed, anyone can file a complaint
anonymously on behalf of the victims. I consider this situation to be rare and the case is
likely to be high-profile. At the internal review level, even though it is possible multiple
complaints are filed given that anyone can act on behalf of the victims in these cases, a
prosecutor would only conduct one internal review for all complaints, and issue a public
explanation for his or her decision not to prosecute. At the judicial review level, I assume
that few people will want to bear the cost of the judicial review process for strangers.
Therefore, to allow citizens to file review applications for John Does in murder cases will
not improperly increase the burden on Crown prosecutors because of the increasing,
sometimes frivolous, complaints.
Under my proposed reform, a direct victim can block an indirect victim from filing a
complaint. If the direct victim is a minor or a person who is intellectually disabled, his or
her express refusal to pursue a case can block an indirect victim from filing a complaint
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on his or her behalf. This system is a method by which direct victims can assert their
wishes to have a criminal trial for alleged crimes. If direct victims do not have such
wishes, indirect victims have no right to force them to go through a trial (if the decision is
reversed), which can re-victimize the direct victims. As well, it is possible that the
indirect victims explore the direct victims‘ grievance for their own benefits, for example,
using potential criminal prosecution or the review of decisions not to prosecute to reach a
settlement with the accused. However, the effect of this refusal will not expand to barring
the Crown prosecutor from conducting a prosecution if he or she deems it necessary
because the Crown prosecutor‘s job is to protect public interests and security by
instituting a prosecution, and this should not be compromised by the victims‘ wishes.
I recognize that it is possible that conflicting ideas concerning whether or not to pursue a
criminal proceeding appear in cases where multiple victims are involved. However, the
opportunity to review is given to any eligible individual victim, not victims of an alleged
offense as a group, so the refusal of others should not hinder one particular eligible victim
from accessing the system. Once the decision is found flawed and the prosecution is recommenced following the review, the willingness of the victims of the alleged offense is
not relevant to whether or not a Crown prosecutor should commence a prosecution
against the will of the majority of the victims. This is because the Crown prosecutor is
acting on behalf of the state, not victims, to prosecute the accused.
In cases where a large number of victims are involved the court can join the applications
pertinent to the same prosecution and direct the applicants to integrate all arguments and
elect one representative to present the common interests of the applicants in the judicial
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review process. For internal review, the Crown prosecutor can conduct only one review
and send the result and full explanation to all complainants.

5.1.2 Internal Review System
In reference to the practice in the UK and the reasoning in the English court in Killick, it
is necessary that Canada should have an internal review system to protect victims‘
potential interests in criminal proceedings. The English court in Killick correctly pointed
out that the implementation of the victims‘318 right to review should not rest merely with
his or her seeking judicial review in court.319 Victims could not effectively exercise their
rights to review in the Killick case partially because of the lack of a formal internal review
system in the Crown Prosecutor‘s Office.320 If victims had a right to review in the UK, the
Crown Prosecutor‘ Office should have had a systematic, efficient review mechanism to
receive and re-examine the complaint about its service. Otherwise, the affected victims in
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the country exercising their rights to review will be undermined.321 As a result, the UK
government recently implemented an internal review system to promote the victims‘ right
to review a decision not to prosecute. Even though the situation in Canada is different
given that, in this country, victims have not been formally granted the right to review,
they have sufficient interests to request the Crown prosecutor to review decisions not to
prosecute. In this case, it will be more efficient or convenient for victims to protect their
interests if the Canadian Crown Prosecutor‘s Office provides internal review for them.
The Internal Review System is necessary. First, it can reduce the incidents wherein
victims seek judicial review in court because most complaints can be addressed internally
faster and with less expense for both victims and the justice system. Second, it can
promote prosecutor-victim interaction in charging decision-making and encourage the
Crown prosecutor to consider victims‘ interests while following the requirements laid
down in charging guidelines. In most situations, sufficient communication might
effectively reduce the immediate tension between the Crown prosecutor and victims
caused by the decision not to prosecute. By operating the internal review system, the
Crown prosecutor may realize most complaints can be addressed with sufficient
communication during the decision-making process. Third, the possibility of heightened
scrutiny through a review process might promote Crown diligence and caution, and
reduce prosecutorial misconduct. A Crown prosecutors‘ integrity and ability might be
questioned by the public and people working in the field if his or her decisions are
constantly complained and reviewed. Realizing the possibility of review and its
consequences, Crown prosecutors are likely to be more diligent and careful when making
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decisions to discontinue a case.

5.1.2.1Process
The proposed internal review system should work in the following way. In general, after a
Crown prosecutor withdraws charges or stays a proceeding, victims should be informed in
person on the same day about the decision not to prosecute and about the opportunity to
request a review for such a decision. The notification and basic information about the
decision not to prosecute should be put into writing and given to the victim. In the case of
a stay of a proceeding, unless the Crown prosecutor clearly declares the stay permanent,
victims are only allowed to challenge the corresponding decision not to prosecute
beginning one year from the stay of the proceeding. This is because it is unclear whether a
stay of a proceeding is permanent or temporary. However, after a year, a proceeding that
was stayed will be deemed never commenced.322 In this case, victims can be sure that no
prosecution is ongoing for their cases, unless the police re-lay the same charges again.
It is incorrect to think that this one-year period further prolongs the review process, which
might have a negative impact on the accused. The accused and his or her representative
should have known of the Crown prosecutor‘s power to re-commence a prosecution
within one year even without a review system. Therefore, this one-year period should not
be counted into the period that the review system would use. This means the negative
effect on the accused caused by the review system concerning time limitation in the
situation of staying a prosecution would be no different than in the situation of
withdrawing charges.
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If victims decide to make a complaint, they should file an application within fourteen
days either of receiving notification of non-prosecution or the day the proceeding is
deemed never commenced. During those fourteen days, the victims can approach the
local Crown prosecutor‘s office through informal channels to address the issues
concerning the decision not to prosecute. For an internal review, a victim does not need to
show any flaws in the Crown prosecutor‘s decision not to prosecute. Instead, they should
prove that he or she is the ―victim‖ eligible to ask for a review for a decision not to
prosecute for a particular alleged offense. The Crown prosecutor is obliged to conduct an
internal review once the application is filed and the eligibility of the applicant is
confirmed.
Once victims file an application for reviewing the decision not to prosecute, an internal
review will take place. Just as many courts have maintained, an administrative decision is
best handled by people with expertise in the relevant area.323 A special review unit should
be set up in the Crown Prosecutor‘s Office in every city to review victims‘ complaints in
that city. In addition, the review unit should provide full explanations of the decision not
to prosecute if the Crown prosecutor did not do so previously. The unit should be made up
of two to three experienced prosecutors who can identify potential flaws in the reasoning,
criteria, standards, etc. behind the decision not to prosecute and decide whether to reverse
the decision. The unit should only accept complaints pertinent to the Crown prosecutor‘s
decision to terminate a prosecution permanently after charges have been laid. Meanwhile,
the Crown prosecutor should inform the accused of the status of the review process and
the possibility of reversal of the decision not to prosecute. In most situations, the whole
323
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process should be completed in no more than two months from the day the complaint is
filed. An extra month could be given to the unit to reassess the decision not to prosecute if
the case is exceptionally complicated.

5.1.2.2Scope
Victims can only apply to the internal review system when a case is discontinued
permanently and completely. Victims cannot apply in the following situations: (1) the
Crown prosecutor withdraws one or several charges or alters the charges substantially,
but the prosecution continues; (2) the Crown prosecutor clearly indicates, when staying a
prosecution, that the stay will last for only a short period; and (3) the Crown prosecutor
withdraws charges or stays a private prosecution as a result of a deal with the accused.324
In the first situation, victims do not have a right to a specific prosecution and cannot
decide how the Crown prosecutor should conduct a prosecution. Even though victims‘
satisfaction with the prosecution might be comparatively reduced, if the prosecution
continues, victims still have opportunities to uphold their interests and exercise their
rights in the trial and post-trial stages at the least. Furthermore, if the prosecution is
commenced, the Crown prosecutor is in a better position than victims to know how to
conduct a prosecution effectively and how to get a conviction. In the second situation,
victims can file a complaint for internal review a year from the day the proceeding was
stayed because the prosecution is deemed never commenced if a stay is more than a year
old.
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The type of non-prosecution in the third situation, in which the Crown prosecutor stops
prosecution as quid pro quo for receiving something from the accused, comes from the
Crown prosecutor‘s power to make a deal with the accused and is not discussed in this
thesis. Allowing victims to review this type of decision will open a Pandora's Box of
victims‘ power to interfere with the Crown prosecutor‘s power to make deals.
Furthermore, it has been held in R v S (N) that a just and proportionate balance should
always be maintained between the victims‘ rights in criminal proceedings and the
accused‘s right to a fair trial.325 A review in this type of situation, more than others, risks
the possibility of significant damage to the right of the accused.
In some cases, the Crown prosecutor‘s need for the accused‘s information is urgent, and
making a deal for such information cannot wait for the victim to exhaust appeals for
review of the deal. The accused feels secure in disclosing possibly damaging information
because of the belief that the Crown prosecutor will not renege on their deal. Just as
Berger J stated in R v Smith, ―the ordinary man is entitled to expect that the Crown will
keep its word‖. 326 A review and subsequent reinstitution of the prosecution would be
unfair to the accused given that the incriminatory information may have been disclosed in
the deal, which could be used against the accused in court. This risks the possibility that
the Crown prosecutor uses the internal review and victims to trap the accused into self-

325

2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 SCR 726; Department of Justice Canada, “Victims Rights: Enhancing Criminal Law
Responses to Better Meet the Needs of Victims of Crime in Canada” (2 May 2013), online: Department of
Justice Canada <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/victims-victimes/vrights-droitsv/discussconsult.html>; Basic Principles for Victims, supra note 1.
326
R v Smith (1974), 22 CCC (2d) 268 at para 21, [1975] 3 WWR 454 (BCSC).

133

incrimination: a blatant violation of the accused‘s right to be silent and avoid selfincrimination.327
For example, in the case of R v Talon,328 Talon entered into an immunity agreement with
the Crown prosecutor in exchange for the former‘s testimony against two accomplices in
a double murder. Two years later, while promoting his book about his criminal career, he
admitted, to third parties, to having committed the murders. As a result, he was charged
with murder, but the prosecution was stayed because it was prejudicial and unfair to
Talon, who would never have admitted committing the crime without the immunity
agreement.
This example also reveals another issue. Incriminatory evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional way might be ruled inadmissible in court, which would be detrimental to
the prosecution. As well, the court might stop prosecution if the repudiation of a nonprosecution agreement is deemed to cause irreparable damage to a fair trial. Repudiation
of non-prosecution amounts to the abuse of power by the Crown prosecutor if he unfairly
reneges on expectations he has generated in the accused.329 This would make a victim‘s
application for review of a deal meaningless, because the prosecution ends up stopped
anyway.
If internal review happens, and is successful, a Crown prosecutor will re-commence the
prosecution. If internal review upholds the original decision not to prosecute, victims
have an option to bring their complaints to a competent court for judicial review.
327
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5.1.3 Judicial Review in Competent Court
In general, I do not recommend victims be overly dependent on the court‘s adjudication.
The superior court is supposed to be the last resort for victims to seek a remedy. The court
considers itself the least viable option to challenge decisions not to prosecute because
judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion does not prevail in most circumstances.
In such a situation, the court takes action only when victims have run out of options and a
court feels a need to uphold the rule of law and the integrity of the criminal justice
system. For this reason, the application for judicial review can be easily rejected if there
are other available remedies.

5.1.3.1Process
If victims are still dissatisfied with a decision not to prosecute after an internal review,
they should be able to apply for a judicial review to the superior court in the
corresponding province within fourteen days after receiving the internal review process
result. The superior court has ―inherent jurisdiction‖ which, in principle, makes no matter
beyond its jurisdiction.330 It should have jurisdiction over an application for reviewing a
decision not to prosecute.331 Therefore, the superior court is the best place for victims to
apply for judicial review of decisions not to prosecute. In fact, many previous
applications of this type were brought before the superior court. In cases where the
subject matter is authorized to be heard before the Federal Court in accordance with the
Federal Courts Act332 or other federal statutes,333 the judicial review of decisions not to
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prosecute can be brought before the Federal Courts. A court‘s proceeding should start no
more than twenty-eight days after victims file an application. The length of time it takes
to complete a judicial review should not be longer than nine months.
Victims can challenge decisions not to prosecute on the ground of ―flagrant impropriety‖
of the Crown prosecutors‘ behavior and ―reasonableness‖ and ―correctness‖ of the
decisions. These standards of review will be further elaborated in later sections. Before
accepting the application, a court needs to be satisfied that the victim has established a
prima facie case of those grounds.334 Although, in this proposed judicial review system,
the standard of review is lowered from the existing one, 335 the burden of proof and
persuasion still lies with the victims. In most situations, the Crown prosecutor performs
his or her role as a minister of justice independently and effectively and should not be
influenced by external duress or be unduly called into question. Therefore, during the
judicial review, he or she should be presumed to be acting in good faith and in a correct
manner unless someone can prove otherwise.336
In the application, victims should specify a particular remedy they are seeking. However,
in the end, deciding when and how to use a prerogative remedy is at the court‘s
discretion.337 The court should be able to compel a prosecution, direct reconsideration,
quash a stay of private prosecution, or combine any two of them on a case-by-case basis.
For example, in cases where the applicant originally seeks to compel a prosecution but
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fails to establish ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of Crown prosecutors, the court can
refuse to grant such a remedy. However, if after the judicial review of the original claim,
a court instead finds the decision is irrational based on the ―reasonableness‖ standard, it
has the power to quash the decision not to prosecute and direct the Crown prosecutor to
reconsider his or her decision. The applicant does not need to file a new application.

5.1.3.2Statutory Power of the Crown Prosecutor to Discontinue a
Prosecution
Crown prosecutor‘s prerogative power to decide not to prosecute a case should be
replaced by a statutory power. The scope of a Crown prosecutor exercising discretionary
power to stop a prosecution should be laid down in the relevant legislation. Unlike the
existing Crown charging guideline or manuals, the statute is binding, which can impose
upon Crown prosecutors legal obligations to comply with it. As well, the statute can
provide courts with legal guidance when examining whether the Crown prosecutors‘
decisions not to prosecute are legitimate and valid. This point will be further discussed in
the later section 6.3.1.

5.1.3.3Participation of the accused
In the judicial review process, the only parties are victims and the Crown prosecutor. The
prospective accused should not be a party to the judicial review process, but he or she
should be allowed to have limited participatory role in such a process provided the
prospective accused would be significantly harmed by some particular outcomes from the
judicial review, such as compelling a prosecution or nullifying a stay of private
prosecution.
The prospective accused should only be allowed to raise arguments concerning
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procedural issues of the judicial review process. Conducting a judicial review in a
particular way might have caused significant or irreversible damage to the prospective
accused‘s possibility of receiving a fair trial if the judicial review resulted in a
prosecution. The accused is in a better position than the Crown prosecutor to demonstrate
how the procedure would affect him. For example, if a victim demands an adjournment in
order to collect more evidence, arguments of the accused should be relevant and
important for the court to determine whether or not to grant an adjournment and the
proper length of the adjournment if granted. The adjournment might further extend the
judicial review process, which can harm the accused if important evidence goes missing,
mental suffering prolongs or other unexpected and detrimental incidents happen in the
period of the adjournment.
However, the prospective accused should not be allowed to make a submission
concerning the merits of the judicial review. To allow the prospective accused to make an
argument for the merits of the judicial review will improperly delay the judicial review
process, which would have negative impact on both the prospective accused and the
efficiency of the judicial review system. First, because the Crown prosecutor is the one
who is actually accused by the victims, he or she might have raised all possible arguments
for his or her position. The accused would probably raise the same arguments as the
Crown prosecutor did, which would be useless.
Second, the reviewing court is not a trial court. The reviewing court‘s job is to determine
whether or not a reason behind a decision not to prosecute is reasonable or whether or not
the decision is correct. I do not believe that the accused would have better knowledge of
the charging decision-making process and reasons behind such a decision than the Crown
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prosecutor would have, which makes the accused not in a better position to justify the
decision not to prosecute. This is especially the case when the issues in dispute are about
how the Crown prosecutor weighs the evidence, considers possible defense of the accused
at trial, or determines a policy concerning non-prosecutions.
In addition, the participation of the prospective accused might have a negative impact, as
the prospective accused may try to inappropriately influence the judges to deliver a
favorable outcome by providing arguments that are supposed to be addressed in a trial
court and are irrelevant to determination for a judicial review. If a reviewing judge does
not take the irrelevant factors into account when deciding whether or not a decision is
flawed and what remedy is going to be issued, then introducing such irrelevant factors
would be merely a waste of time. If a reviewing judge might be influenced by such
irrelevant factors and unconsciously consider those factors in his or her judgement, it is
improper and unfair to the participants to bring them up.
Third, the prospective accused has limited interests in the result of a judicial review in
most situations. The accused will be significantly affected by the judicial review only
when the review results in the reinstitution of the criminal proceeding. However, only on
limited grounds will the court compel a prosecution or quash a stay of private
prosecution.338 In most situations, the court will only re-direct a reconsideration. An order
to re-consider a decision is not an order to reinstitute a prosecution, nor will it definitely
result in a reinstitution of a prosecution. This means, in such situations, the reinstitution
of the criminal proceeding, if any, does not directly result from the judicial review. In
addition, the limited grounds that might finally lead to the reinstitution of the prosecution
338
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directly from the judicial review are related to the integrity of the Crown prosecutor,
which makes the Crown prosecutor be more motivated to argue with due diligence. In
conclusion, in order to promote the efficiency and fairness of the judicial review, the
participation of the accused should be limited.

5.1.4 Issue on limitation periods for summary conviction offences
There is a limitation period of six months for summary conviction offences to be
pursued. 339 It makes no sense for the reviewing court to reverse a decision not to
prosecute if the limitation periods of the alleged offence have expired. For some hybrid
cases, even if the time limitation for a summary conviction proceeding has passed, the
Crown prosecutor can still proceed with the case by indictment. It is possible that a
judicial review could turn a summary conviction case into a case that proceeds by
indictment. The latter affords the accused all sorts of expensive procedural rights and is
comparatively lengthy, which could be detrimental to the victim. For example, in sexual
assault cases, the accused can require a jury trial. In this case, attacking the character of
the victim and his or her sexual history might be a strategy to discredit the victim before
the jury.
To prevent the time limitation from running out, an amendment to section 786 of the
Criminal Code340 is necessary. The clock should stop running the day the charges are
filed against a suspect. The limitation period was created to urge the investigating and
prosecuting authorities to perform their duties with reasonable diligence and to reduce the
339
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possibility that the accused loses evidence for his or her effective defense. In order to
balance these interests, the statute of limitations should continue running fourteen days
after the day the judgement is delivered by the court of last appeal. A fourteen-day period
is also given to the Crown prosecutor for reconsideration of the original decision not to
prosecute. In cases where victims do not apply for judicial review or miss the deadline for
the application, the statute of limitations starts running fourteen days after the day the
outcome of the internal review is delivered.

5.2 Internal Review Scheme
5.2.1 The victims should receive full explanation through an Internal
Review Scheme
Victims should only receive a full explanation of the decision not to prosecute after they
file a request for an internal review. Before that, victims should receive only the
notification of the decision and brief reasons at the Crown prosecutor‘s discretion. In my
opinion, it is not necessary for the Crown prosecutor to provide detailed reasons for every
decision not to prosecute. For one reason, as explained by Robert J Frater, the prosecution
system would be unworkable if the Crown prosecutor had to give a full explanation for
every decision because countless cases need to be dropped every year.341
For another reason, not all victims are obsessed with a criminal prosecution and are
anxious to receive a full explanation of the termination of a prosecution. For various
reasons, some victims might be satisfied with brief reasons behind decisions not to
prosecute. Perhaps they do not want to spend more time questioning the decision, or the
Crown prosecutor has successfully explained the reason behind the termination of the
341
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prosecution. Alternatively, civil recourse might be more tempting for some victims, and
therefore they do not care about criminal prosecution at all. In some cases, such as sexual
assault or domestic violence cases, some victims do not want to go through a complete
criminal proceeding.342 For them, a notification of the termination of a case is, instead,
good news. Therefore, in the aforementioned cases, it would be a waste of time for the
Crown prosecutor to prepare a lengthy and detailed explanation because victims do not
need one.
For some victims, a basic reason is enough. In most situations, in Canada, brief
explanations of the termination of a prosecution will be provided to victims. In many
provinces, it is recommended in the Crown prosecutor manuals that the Crown prosecutor
provide some explanations of stopping a prosecution. At federal level, according to the
Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, the federal government attempts to balance
transparency, in the interests of victims and the public, and privacy, in the interests of
suspects and justice:
Where a decision is made not to institute proceedings, it is recommended
that a record be kept of the reasons for that decision. Furthermore, counsel
should be conscious of the need in appropriate cases to explain a decision
not to prosecute to, for example, the investigative agency. Ensuring that
affected parties understand the reason for the decision not to prosecute,
and that those reasons reflect sensitivity to the investigative agency‘s
mandate will foster better working relationships.343
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It is true that this paragraph actually emphasizes providing reasons to the police, not so
much to victims. However, it somehow implies that victims should be given some
explanations of the non-prosecution given that they are affected parties as well. This rule
is applied in several provinces. For example, similar text is put into the guidebook of
policies and procedures for the Conduct of Criminal Prosecutions in Prince Edward Island
and Newfoundland. 344 In Nova Scotia, Crown prosecutors have the duty to release
reasons behind decisions not to prosecute to both victims and the public.345 The Crown
prosecutors in this province are encouraged to ensure victims understand the reason
behind a non-prosecution decision in order to maintain confidence in the administration
of justice. In other provinces, such as British Colombia and Ontario, victims have the
right to receive reasons behind decisions not to prosecute according to relevant victims‘
bill of rights.346 Therefore, at this stage, I believe that, in general, victims are more or less
expected to receive the basic information about decisions not to prosecute.

5.2.1.1After the application for internal review
In my opinion, if a victim applies for an internal review, this means that this victim is firm
about instituting a criminal prosecution and that the basic information on the decision not
to prosecute is not acceptable to him or her. In this case, the Crown prosecutor should
provide a full explanation to this victim if the decision not to prosecute is maintained after
344
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an internal review. The full explanation must be given to victims after the internal review.
The explanation can help the victim understand the reasons behind the termination of the
case, possibly agree with the Crown prosecutor‘s judgement, and forgo pursuit of the case
in the criminal dimension.
If the victim is not satisfied with the Crown prosecutor‘s reasons, he or she can use those
reasons to challenge in court the decision not to prosecute. Apart from judges‘ reluctance
to intervene in prosecutorial discretionary decisions, the low success rate in judicial
review for a decision not to prosecute is attributable to the lack of conclusive evidence for
the victim to make a strong claim. This is partially because, in most situations, victims do
not receive full explanations of the decision not to prosecute. In most provinces, the law
allows the Crown prosecutor to withhold information for security reasons. In Canada, the
Crown prosecutor is not obligated to give reasons for decisions not to prosecute.347
For example, in Nova Scotia, while the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act requires the public body to disclose reasons behind decisions not to prosecute if a
person demanding the information is aware of the investigation, it also includes a list of
information that a Crown prosecutor is allowed to withhold. 348 Empirical research is
lacking on Crown prosecutors‘ practice of giving victims reasons for decisions not to
prosecute. However, in the case of decisions to institute a prosecution, the Crown
prosecutor either refuses to give any reasons or merely gives a perfunctory response. 349 It
is not a bad prediction that victims can hardly receive a full explanation of decisions not
347
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to prosecute given that they do not even have a solid ―right‖ to disclosure as do the
accused. Without the full explanation of the termination of a prosecution, victims would
have difficulties in finding flaws in the decision not to prosecute. This makes it difficult
for victims to convince a judge to review a decision not to prosecute without strong
arguments and sufficient evidentiary support. In most cases of judicial review of charging
decisions, both decisions to prosecute and decisions not to prosecute, the applicants can
only contest from the decision itself, and there is seldom any ―smoking gun‖ evidence.350
In an administrative law context, the duty of an administrative decision maker to give
reasons for a decision is generally recommended to ensure a rational and transparent
decision-making process.351 For example, in Canada v Baker, the Court recognized that:
Reasons, it has been argued, foster better decision making by ensuring that
issues and reasoning are well articulated and, therefore, more carefully
thought out. The process of writing reasons for decision by itself may be a
guarantee of a better decision.352
Written reasons for decisions can promote transparency. Once the decision is questioned
by citizens, written records can clearly show what happened in the decision-making
process, which can prevent secrecy. Transparency in decision-making is necessary to
promote the accountability of the decision-maker to the person affected and to the
public. 353 Even though giving reasons for a decision is not necessary in common law
tradition, under some circumstances, the Supreme Court has recognized that the duty to
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provide reasons is appropriate and necessary:
In certain circumstances, the duty of procedural fairness will require the
provision of a written explanation for a decision. The strong arguments
demonstrating the advantages of written reasons suggest that, in cases such
as this, where the decision has important significance for the individual,
where there is a statutory right of appeal, or in other circumstances, some
form of reasons should be required.354
In Baker, the court also affirmed that ―reasons are invaluable if a decision is to be
appealed, questioned, or considered on judicial review‖. 355 Victims have significant
interest affected by the decision not to prosecute. In this proposal, I recommend that
victims‘ ability to access judicial review should be further strengthened. With this change,
victims should receive a full explanation of the decision not to prosecute when they deem
judicial review is necessary. Normally, reasons behind a decision are important for the
reviewing authority to determine whether the decision is correct or rational. Not knowing
the reasons behind a decision not to prosecute would put victims at a disadvantage in
exercising their power to protect their interests through applying for judicial review. Even
if victims‘ suspicions about the decision not to prosecute are correct, they will not have
enough ammunition to make a successful claim. In this case, the operation of the review
system will be extremely unfair to victims. Victims are not given a reasonable opportunity
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to present their claims because the system puts them at a substantial disadvantage vis-àvis the Crown prosecutor. This significantly reduces procedural fairness in the legal
system.

5.2.2 The Crown prosecutor should be allowed to overturn his original
decision not to prosecute without introducing new evidence
In order to ensure the effective operation of an internal review system when victims
request a review, the Crown prosecutor should be allowed to reverse his or her original
decision not to prosecute without referring to new evidence. The accused should not be
able to claim that the Crown prosecutor abuses the court‘s process merely based on the
fact that the latter reverses a decision not to prosecute after an internal review process.
First, from a practical perspective, for an internal review, victims will often complain that
the judgement of the Crown prosecutor is incorrect or irrational. In such a situation,
victims will not bring in new evidence, but merely request a reassessment of the existing
evidence or reconsideration of public interest policy. The system will be unworkable if
the Crown prosecutor is not allowed to reverse the original decision without introducing
new evidence.
Secondly, the power to reverse a decision not to prosecute is fundamentally connected to
the Crown prosecutor‘s discretionary power to determine whether to continue a criminal
prosecution. A Crown prosecutor can decide to drop a case at this moment, but find it
wrong or improper in the next moment. When people make complex decisions, there
might be conflicting ideas in their mind, and they might want to change their decisions
through thinking and evaluating the relevant elements. All these constitute a basic part of
discretion. If a Crown prosecutor cannot effectively reverse his or her own decision, the
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exercise of discretion to decide whether to continue a case is subject to improper
limitation. This is also to maintain a good quality of the outcome resulting from the
discretionary decision-making. In R v Papaioannou, the court found that re-laying
charges is appropriate and permissible if flaws were found in dropping charges. 356 The
reversal is forbidden only when such a reversal is motivated by bad faith or influenced by
improper motive or policy.357

5.2.2.1Limitations and Notification
One important issue is how much negative impact will be imposed on the accused if the
Crown prosecutor has unlimited power to reinstitute a prosecution without referring to
fresh evidence after a charge is withdrawn or permanently stayed. The jurisprudence in
Ireland and the UK can assist in analyzing the use of the reversal by public prosecutors in
the absence of fresh evidence.

5.2.2.1.1

Ireland

In Ireland, as an informal procedure, victims can write a letter to the Director of Public
Prosecutor (DPP) and request a review for the original decision not to prosecute. If the
DPP considers it is appropriate, an internal review will be conducted by an official who is
not the one who made the original decision. 358 The DPP can stop a case in both precharge and post-charge stage, but it is his or her general right to re-commence the case at
both stages.359
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In general, the DPP is allowed to have second thoughts on the decision not to prosecute
without introducing new materials. This does not amount to arbitrariness or perversion if
the DPP‘s exercise of this function does not impair the accused‘s fair procedure right. The
most famous case dealing with this issue is Eviston v DPP360 in 2002. Mrs. Eviston was
involved in a car accident that resulted in the death of the victim, and later her lawyers
were informed that the DPP had decided not to file a charge against her based on the lack
of necessary mens rea for the crime. Six days later, the father of the victim wrote to the
DPP and requested reconsideration of the decision not to prosecute. Even though he had
not received any new evidence, the DPP still decided to review the decision, and because
of that, the original decision not to prosecute was reversed. Mrs. Eviston filed a complaint
to the High Court in order to seek an injunction against the prosecution. The High Court
granted the motion by finding that the reversal was not consistent with the DPP‘s official
charging guideline, which amounted to the DPP acting ―arbitrarily‖ and ―perversely‖. The
Supreme Court affirmed the injunctive relief granted by the High Court but rejected its
reasoning. It emphasized that the DPP‘s change of mind in the charging decision is a part
of his discretion, and the mere disobedience of the guideline did not constitute valid
grounds to review a decision to prosecute. It continued pointing out that the essential
issue in this case was whether the fair procedure right was infringed, concluding as
follows:
In thus holding, I am bearing in mind all the facts of the case as they have
emerged during the course of the proceedings. I also bear in mind the level
of stress and anxiety which has been borne over a considerable period by
the Applicant. On these particular facts it seems to me that once the DPP
360
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had unequivocally and without any caveat informed the Applicant that no
prosecution would issue against her in connection with this road traffic
accident, it was a breach of her right to fair procedures for him to reverse
his decision and to initiate a prosecution by the issuing of the summons on
the 23rd December 1998.361
Eviston did not define what level of stress and anxiety generated by the reversal would
make it a violation of procedural fairness. Later in the same type of case, Carlin v
DPP,362 the Supreme Court partly followed Eviston‘s reasoning. It agreed that a sort of
exacerbating anxiety and stress caused by the reversal of a decision not to prosecute
without the proper warning of the possible future review could amount to the denial of a
fair procedure. However, it stressed that ―[t]he appellant would have to have shown that
the level of anxiety or stress suffered was raised beyond that normal level by reason of the
failure of the Director to observe fair procedures.‖363
In Carlin, the Chief Justice only emphasized the degree of the anxiety and stress Mr.
Carlin suffered at the moment when he received the notification of prosecution against
him a year after the original decision not to prosecute was delivered. In Eviston, by
contrast, the Chief Justice based the denial of fair procedure on the hypothesis that if a
notification of the decision not to prosecute was not a final one, Mrs. Eviston might have
lived in the fear of not knowing when she would be prosecuted on the same grounds
again. In his dissenting judgement in Eviston, Justice Francis D. Murphy expressed his
disagreement on the point that the exercise of discretion by the DPP is reviewable for
Eviston types of violation of fair procedure. In Eviston, the violation of fair procedure
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means the violation of ―a right to peace of mind‖, which means that a person is entitled to
be free from a sense of stress and anxiety caused by the uncertainty of being prosecuted.
Justice Murphy stressed the point that ―there is no suggestion that she altered her position
for the worse as a result of being informed in the first instance that she would not be
prosecuted‖364. Furthermore, he also considered that, even if the DPP had warned Mrs.
Eviston of the possible reversal of the decision not to prosecute, she would not have
received peace. Rather, she would have been more disrupted by knowing the decision was
not final.
In this case, should we suggest that in no circumstances could the DPP change his or her
decision after informing the suspect? Justice Murphy clearly has a point on this issue.
However, he, as well as the majority in Eviston, failed to consider the stress that might be
imposed on an accused at the moment when he or she is informed about the reinstitution
of the proceedings. The accused might recently have located a new job after
unemployment caused by the previous investigation and prosecution and might be
stressed and scared about losing a job again for the same reason. He or she might have
disposed of materials valuable to the defence prepared for the dropped prosecution.
Important witnesses may not available anymore for various reasons. He or she may also
have ceased investigations for the defence, and a new investigation may turn negative
because exculpatory physical evidence could be long gone after a period of time since the
alleged crime was committed. This could be detrimental to the accused‘s defense. All of
these could cause stress to the accused.
The length of delay for the reversal is also an important factor influencing the
364
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determination of whether the accused is denied fair procedure. In LON v DPP, 365 the
interval of time between the two decisions was thirteen years. In MQ v Judges,366 the
interval was four and a half years. In both cases, the court found that the accused‘s fair
procedure right was impaired due to the great time gap between the original decision not
to prosecute and the reinstitution of the proceeding.367
Justice J Pearts suggested, from another perspective, that official notification is not
necessary because everyone should know the decision not to prosecute might be reversed
after Eviston case has been made public:
…since the Eviston case it has become public knowledge that the
respondent may review decisions made by him, and that the applicant
cannot successfully complain that the respondent failed to indicate when
he made his first decision that he was entitled to review and alter that
decision.368
It is true that a suspect or an accused is normally accompanied by a lawyer who should
know this case. However, if he or she chooses self-representation and refuses legal
representation, should the suspect or accused still be expected to know the case? Should
the accused blame himself or herself for the failure of warning after rejecting legal
representation to which he or she is entitled?
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5.2.2.1.2

United Kingdom

The courts in Wales and England affirm the DPP‘s discretionary power to reverse a
decision not to prosecute as the Irish courts do. However, they do not consider that the
failure to inform the accused about this possibility will invalidate such a reversal. In the
case of R v DPP, ex parte Burke,369 the victim claimed to be sexually assaulted by the
applicant B when she was thirteen years old, but the case was originally dropped due to
evidential insufficiency at that time. The decision was sent by mail to notify the applicant.
The mother of the victim was dissatisfied with the decision and made an informal
complaint to the DPP, which resulted in the reinstitution of the case. The DPP concluded
that the original decision not to prosecute was wrong. The applicant objected to the
reversal of the decision, claiming that the notification of the decision not to prosecute had
given him a legitimate expectation of non-prosecution. The court refused to review the
decision to prosecute:
[D]ismissing the application, that (1) the DPP had discretion to form her
own view on the facts before her, for which it was necessary to consider
what was in the public interest…It was not necessary for there to be
special circumstances in addition to the fact that the decision was clearly
wrong before the DPP could exercise her discretion to reinstate and (2) …
It could not be said that the standard letter sent to B that the prosecution
was to be discontinued would justifiably have led B to believe he was free
of jeopardy…370
The reasoning was affirmed and put forward in the recent Killick case. In June 2007, the
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decided not to prosecute Mr. Killick and sent an e-mail
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to his counsel to notify him of the decision. A prosecution re-commenced two years later,
after the decision not to prosecute was reversed through the internal review process. Mr.
Killick and his counsel contended that the reversal of the CPS‘s decision not to prosecute
was an abuse of process. The court re-affirmed that the CPS had a general right to review
its original decision not to prosecute and recommence the case. In addition, it held that a
notification of such decision sent to the counsel of a suspect or a defendant could not be
deemed as legally binding promises and reasoned that counsel would have known such a
decision would be subject to review. However, it also considered that the repercussions of
such reversal to the accused should not be completely ignored and should be assessed on
a case-by-case basis.371

5.2.2.1.3

Solutions

Considering the jurisprudence in Ireland and the UK, I think that the negative impact of
the reversal of a decision not to prosecute should be taken into account and reduced as
much as possible. After a charge has been withdrawn or permanently stayed, the power of
the Crown prosecutor to reverse a decision not to prosecute without introducing new
evidence should be limited. This power can only be used through victims‘ application for
an internal review process. If the Crown prosecutor is allowed to reverse his or her
decision not to prosecute without introducing fresh evidence, it might risk the possibility
that the Crown prosecutor keeps bothering the accused with the same case. This can
prevent the Crown prosecutor from prosecuting the accused suddenly or threatening the
accused with the possible prosecution in order to obtain some information years later
without having any new evidence about that prosecution.
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As well, when a decision not to prosecute is made, the Crown prosecutor should inform
the accused that the decision might be reversed within a maximum of three months
through an internal review process and that there is a possibility that the victims will
apply for judicial review afterwards. Although the failure to notify the accused of the
possibility of the reversal of the decision not to prosecute is not always detrimental to the
reinstitution of the prosecution, a proper notification can be helpful to promote procedural
fairness. With a proper notification, the accused can be well prepared, both physically and
psychologically, for a future reversal of the decision not to prosecute. It does no
significant harm to the Crown prosecutor or victims to provide such information to the
accused and to impose time limits on the internal review process to maintain procedural
fairness.

5.3 Judicial Review
As previously mentioned, limited grounds to challenge, rigorous standards of proof, and
the judicial reluctance to intervene into the prerogative power have all caused difficulties
for victims in seeking judicial review of decisions not to prosecute. However, judicial
review is the last and sole recourse for victims when they find their interests and
individual rights jeopardised due to such decisions. In my opinion, the following reforms
should be carried out:
1. The prerogative power of the Crown prosecutor to decide whether to prosecute should
be replaced by a statutory one.
2. Broader standards of review for administrative discretionary decisions should be
employed in judicial review of decisions not to prosecute.
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3. Various standards of review should be employed in judicial review for the decision not
to prosecute based on the nature of available remedies and the nature of the issues at
dispute.

5.3.1 Prerogative power of the Crown prosecutor to decide whether to
prosecute should be replaced by statutory power
The scope and exercise of the Crown prosecutor‘s prerogative power is derived from the
long-term common law practice, which is not yet codified. This makes the power
different from those statutory powers that have clear regulation and limitations put down
in the corresponding statutes. The statutes assist the court in determining whether an
administrative power is exercised within the statute‘s limitations. The court‘s role in
administrative law is to ensure that the governmental decision-maker‘s action is not
contrary to what is expressly put down in legislation and to protect individuals‘ legal
rights from invalid administrative decisions.372 If duties and powers are not clearly laid
out in legal instruments, it is difficult for the court to determine whether a prerogative
power is properly exercised. This is the case for judicial review of decisions not to
prosecute.
The common law tradition and the Crown empower the Attorney General and his counsel
to discontinue a case based on their discretion, which leaves unlimited room to Crown
prosecutors to determine and interpret when, where and how to exercise such power.
Even though in recent decades Crown prosecutors in most provinces have made public
the detailed charging guidelines or manuals to average citizens, they are not legally bound
to these guidelines or manuals. Even if the judiciary applies a ―reasonableness‖ standard
372
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of review, it is not clear that the noncompliance with the guidelines or manuals could
render the decision not to prosecute unreasonable given that the Crown prosecutors might
not intend to be bound by them in all circumstances.
Even though the prerogative power is ultimately subject to judicial review on the grounds
of ―flagrant impropriety‖, after years of debate, the judiciary is still extremely reluctant to
touch upon this type of power, partially because of the abovementioned nature of the
prerogative power. It is true that the Crown prosecutor‘s discretion in making charging
decisions is a necessary evil.373 While realizing the undue disposal of cases at the Crown
prosecutor‘s discretion has a negative impact on the system - such as creating secrecy in
administration - legislators still preserve the discretionary power because it also plays an
indispensable role in enforcing criminal law effectively. However, the exercise of such
discretion ought to be confined to limited situations. These situations should be clearly
specified to guide not only the Crown prosecutors but also the judiciary when they are
called upon to determine whether a decision is valid.
A statute providing the Crown prosecutor power to prosecute and not to prosecute should
codify the standards for whether to institute a prosecution used in the existing charging
guidelines, commentaries on charging standards, and Crown manuals. The statute should
not use unduly vague language, which would undermine the courts‘ ability to review the
decisions not to prosecute.

373

Logan, supra note 106 at 1721-1722.

157

5.3.2 The broader standard of review for other discretionary decisions
should be used in judicial review for the decision not to
prosecute
After exhausting all available remedies, victims may consider applying for judicial review
of the decision not to prosecute. However, as mentioned in section 3.2.4.2, the only
existing standard of review is ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the Crown prosecutor
in charging decision-making, which is very difficult for victims to prove with conclusive
evidence and therefore limits victims‘ effective access to the judicial review system. For
this reason, I recommend loosening the standard of review for the decision not to
prosecute.
In the context of administrative law, a court‘s power to review administrative action or
decisions in order to uphold and preserve the rule of law in the country is considered
essential and is provided in the Constitution.374 As well, it is a court‘s inherent power to
ensure the legality, reasonableness, and fairness of the administrative process and its
outcomes through judicial review so that public authorities will not abuse their power.375
Therefore, the Canadian system has developed comparatively flexible and low standards
to review the public authorities‘ exercise of discretion in making decisions, and those
standards are still evolving.
In my opinion, the use of those standards should be extended to the judicial review of the
decision not to prosecute. Peter Finkle and Duncan Cameron considered that problems
and outcomes resulting from uncontrolled prosecutorial discretion are similar to those
374
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caused by uncontrolled administrative discretion to pass and enforce regulations or
legislation. 376 Uncontrolled discretion may lead to the abuse of discretion, which will
cause unequal and unfair treatment to those subject to the law,377 including victims. They
also considered that a judicial standard of review should be consistent with the need to
prevent the authorities‘ abuse of such power.378
Traditionally, the court is not allowed to second-guess discretionary decisions through
judicial review by weighing contextual elements differently, making a decision for public
authorities at its own discretion, or coming up with a more reasonable decision than the
original one.379 Historically, the traditional grounds to challenge a discretionary decision
were limited to bad faith, consideration of irrelevant grounds or improper purpose, failure
to consider a relevant ground, patent unreasonableness, fettering discretion, 380 and
discrimination.381
Currently, only two standards of review existed: correctness and reasonableness. A
review for correctness is similar to examining the jurisdiction of the public officials to
exercise discretionary power in making corresponding decisions, including whether such
exercise of discretion is ultra vires and whether it is consistent with the objective and
purpose of the governing law. When a court reviews a discretionary decision for
correctness, it does not need to give deference to the decision makers and the way they
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make such decisions, which allows the court to make a judicial review decision based
totally on its own analysis.
The court in Dunsmuir defined the ―reasonableness‖ standard as follows:
A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities
that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of
articulating the reasons and to outcomes.

In judicial review,

reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it
is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law.382
The court agreed that, when applying the ―reasonableness‖ standard of review, due
deference should be given to judgments and choices made by the decision-maker because
of his or her expertise on making such decisions. Therefore, the court should not object to
a decision that falls with a range of possible, acceptable outcomes merely because it
believes a better decision is available. However, the court emphasized that to give
deference does not mean that ―the courts are subservient to the determinations of
decision-makers, or that courts must show blind reverence to their interpretations‖. 383
This requires the court to draw a conclusion independently, without being unduly
influenced by the judgement of the decision-maker.
A ―pragmatic and functional approach‖ was introduced to determine what level of
deference should be given to discretionary decisions in Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister
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of Citizenship and Immigration).384 The court in this case pointed out that the judiciary
should carefully determine whether the question at issue is about the law or the fact. If it
is a matter of the law, low deference will be given when the court is reviewing the
decision that is questioned.

5.3.3 Application of Various Standards of Review for Decisions not to
Prosecute
The standards of review used to examine administrative discretionary decisions, together
with the existing standard of review for the decision not to prosecute, should be used in
this proposed judicial review system. Different prerogative remedies impose different
levels of burden on the Crown prosecutor to act. The use of different standards of review
should match this level of burden. An order in the nature of a mandamus (a mandamus) to
compel a prosecution forces the Crown prosecutor to act in a particular way, which is
more intrusive to the prosecutorial discretion. The ―flagrant impropriety‖ standard of
review for this remedy should be applied. A mandamus to direct the Crown prosecutor to
reconsider its decision not to prosecute requests a Crown prosecutor to take, or to not take,
additional factors into account when making charging decisions. It gives the Crown
prosecutor leeway to re-exercise his discretionary power in making charging decisions,
which makes the remedy less intrusive. In this case, the ―correctness‖ and
―reasonableness‖ standards of review should be applied.
Similarly, an order in the nature of a certiorari (a certiorari) to quash a decision to stop a
private prosecution is used simply to stop the Crown prosecutor from interfering in a case.
In order to promote the effectiveness of individual exercising his or her right to a private
384
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prosecution, the Crown prosecutor cannot intervene into the private prosecution based on
the grounds of ―evidentiary sufficiency‖. When the intervention is based on the public
interest test, it should be subject to ―correctness‖ and ―reasonableness‖ standards of
review. The level of deference to the judgement of the Crown prosecution will be
determined by the nature of the issues in dispute.

5.3.3.1Definition of different standards of review
The standards of review used in this proposed judicial review system should be defined as
follows:
Flagrant Impropriety: I adopt the definition of ―flagrant impropriety‖ used in Kostuch v
Alberta (Attorney General). ―Flagrant impropriety‖ here refers to ―misconduct bordering
on corruption, violation of the law, bias against or for a particular individual or offence‖
on the part of Crown prosecutor.385 In addition, the grounds must be directly linked to the
Crown prosecutors‘ state of mind or actions when dropping cases instead of the
consequences of such a decision. Under the ―flagrant impropriety‖ standard of review, the
court can only review and reverse decisions not to prosecute when one or more of the
grounds has clearly been proven. In fact, what a court reviews under this standard is not
the reasonableness and correctness of the decision not to prosecute per se, but the
behavior of the Crown prosecutor during the decision-making process. This standard of
review will be used only in cases where compelling a prosecution is sought.
Reasonableness: A court can review and reverse a decision not to prosecute when the
decision only appears to be unreasonable. Under this standard of review, the court focuses
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on the reasons and rationality behind the decision per se. The ―patent unreasonableness‖
standard of review should be subsumed under this standard of review. A decision is
unreasonable no matter whether it is patently unreasonable or simply unreasonable, and
unreasonable decisions should be reversed. ―Flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the
Crown prosecutor can be one of factors that make a decision unreasonable, but the
unreasonableness of the decision can be attributable to other factors, such as
misinterpretation of law, failure to consider some essential elements, application of an
unlawful policy, and so on. Those flaws might not amount to illegal planning or
manipulation by the Crown prosecutor. The level of deference to the original decision
should depend on the nature of the issue in dispute. If the issue is a matter of fact, such as
re-evaluating existing evidence or re-identifying public interests in the case, the court
should not consider whether the institution of the prosecution could be more reasonable,
but whether the non-prosecution falls into the acceptable range of reasonableness. If the
issue is about legal considerations, such as interpretation of applicable law or legality of a
policy concerning public interests, the court can make a conclusion based on its own
judgement and analysis without deferring to the original decision. This type of review
will be used when directing reconsideration or quashing a decision to stop a private
prosecution is sought.
Correctness: This type of judicial review is limited to the Crown prosecutors‘
jurisdiction over a case. For example, a Crown prosecutor could stop a prosecution
claiming he or she has no jurisdiction to prosecute certain types of crime, such as a crime
taking place abroad, or over certain groups of people, such as foreign diplomats. Under
this standard of review, a court does not need to give deference to the judgement of the
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Crown prosecutor. This type of review will be used in such cases where directing a
reconsideration or quashing a decision to stop a private prosecution is sought.

5.3.3.2Compelling a prosecution
Victims may specifically ask for the extraordinary remedy of compelling a prosecution
when a Crown prosecutor stops a prosecution, either public or private. If a Crown
prosecutor withdraws or stays a charge, a mandamus to compel a prosecution should
remain available for victims to challenge the decision. The court should decide whether to
issue such remedy or whether other remedies are more appropriate, after conducting
judicial review of the decision not to prosecute. In the application for compelling a
prosecution, a comparatively stricter standard of review is necessary, and therefore
―flagrant impropriety‖ should be the sole ground for victims to seek compelling a
prosecution. As an extraordinary remedy, the compelling of a prosecution will not be
granted if directing a reconsideration is workable.
Compelling a prosecution can force a Crown prosecutor to perform his legal duty to the
public, including victims, to institute a prosecution against an alleged lawbreaker.
However, in theory, in the current Canadian system, even though the issuance of a
mandamus relies on the discretion of the reviewing judge, a mandamus is not used to
compel an exercise of discretionary power or to force a governmental official to act in a
particular way, 386 such as compelling a prosecution. This is because compelling the
performance of public officials by a court in a particular way is equivalent to depriving
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these officials of discretionary power to decide how an act should be performed, which is
too intrusive to the executive power, as well as to prerogative power.
However, in practice, it seems that Canadian courts are capable of compelling a
prosecution if the Crown prosecutor is proven to act flagrantly improperly. In most recent
cases where the decision not to prosecute was in dispute and the applicant sought a
compelling of prosecution, the court refused to issue an order of mandamus on the ground
of no finding of ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of Crown prosecutors.387 The courts
did not address the issue concerning the availability of a mandamus to compel a
prosecution or reject the application because of the unavailability of such a remedy.
In my opinion, compelling a prosecution is necessary in certain exceptional cases. For
example, in the US, a mandamus to compel a prosecution will be issued when the
termination of a public prosecution is so arbitrary or abusive that it cannot amount to the
actual exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 388 The reason behind this, as explained in
Tanenbaum v D'Ascenzo, is that compelling a prosecution under the abovementioned
conditions cannot be considered an unreasonable intervention into the public prosecutor‘s
exercise of discretion.389 Indeed, in the situation described above, the Crown prosecutors
are considered unable, or they just did not in the case at bar, to make just, fair, and
reasoned charging decisions at their discretion because their minds are contaminated.
Meanwhile, if the Crown prosecutors‘ decisions not to prosecute are motived by bad faith,
bias, or arbitrariness or result from a violation of law, which amounts to a breach of rule
387
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of law, the court has the responsibility to uphold the rule of law by granting effective
remedies.390 In that case, if the court finds flagrant impropriety and determines that the
ultimate decision was wrong, the court can make a decision for the Crown prosecutor.
Crown prosecutors exercising discretion in the abovementioned ways is equivalent to
acting ultra vires because exercising such power is not consistent with the duties of the
Crown prosecutor. In the Canadian administrative law context, no deference from the
judiciaries will be given to reviewing this type of decision not to prosecute because the
Crown prosecutor is not considered exercising discretion in determining the disputed
decision.
If a Crown prosecutor acts flagrantly improperly under the definition in section 6.3.3.1,
his or her state of mind or actions during the decision-making process is questionable. If
the Crown prosecutor‘s state of mind or the decision-making process is corrupt, malicious,
or biased, there is no expectation for the court to believe that the Crown prosecutor can
make a just and fair decision, even if the court directs reconsideration. In this case, the
court must force the Crown prosecutor to prosecute if it deems a prosecution necessary to
maintain the integrity of criminal justice system and uphold the rule of law.
A case where violation of the law and bias appear only as a result of non-prosecution has
not reached a level where a court has to compel a prosecution. The court in Wayte v
United States pointed out that a decision with discriminatory effect could come from a
non-discriminatory policy or decision-making process.391 The decision not to prosecute,
with negative impact on individuals‘ legal rights or the application of law, might merely
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come from one or more simple mistakes or negligence when the Crown prosecutor
decides to withdraw charges. In this situation, it is more appropriate for a court to point
out the mistakes or negligence and direct the Crown prosecutor to re-think the original
decision not to prosecute. For a similar reason, ―patent unreasonableness‖ of the decision
is not suitable grounds for a court to compel a prosecution. Not all factors that make a
decision patently unreasonable amount to ―flagrant impropriety‖. In cases other than
―flagrant impropriety‖ cases, directing reconsideration is more appropriate. The standards
of review applied in the issuance of directing reconsideration will be further explained in
the next section.

5.3.3.3Quashing a decision not to prosecute and directing
reconsideration
In most cases concerning public prosecutions, a court should be allowed to review a
decision not to prosecute with lower standards than the existing one. However, the
remedy it can issue based on those lower standards of review should be less powerful
than the compelling of a prosecution. In those cases, a court should be able to quash a
decision not to prosecute and direct the Crown prosecutor to reconsider his original
decision if it finds the original decision was rendered in an incorrect or unreasonable way.
In the UK, the common method for the court to deal with incorrect or irrational decisions
not to prosecute is to quash such decisions not to prosecute and at the same time direct the
DPP or CPS to reconsider the decisions.392 A comparatively low standard of review is
employed. The court in the Manning case reasoned that, compared to decisions to
prosecute, it was difficult to find that ―a decision not to prosecute is bad in law on which
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basis alone the court is entitled to interfere‖.393 It continued to point out that a citizen‘s
access to an effective remedy against a decision not to prosecute is denied if the standard
is too high, because judicial review is the sole remedy in such a situation. 394 Such an
approach is generally accepted in the UK courts.
The same approach could also be used in Canada because a mandamus to compel a
prosecution is not always necessary and the corresponding standard of review is too
exacting. The current standard leaves several types of problematic decisions not to
prosecute uncovered, which limits victims‘ ability to protect their interests. For example,
if a decision not to prosecute is unreasonable and caused by factors that are not
categorized as ―flagrant impropriety‖, victims‘ interests and recognized rights in a
criminal prosecution are at stake. It is similar if a violation of individual rights and
discrimination result from exercise of discretion in good faith. However, the court cannot
remedy such decisions because they do not meet the requirement for compelling a
prosecution. At the same time, it has no other available remedies, and as a result, such a
decision becomes non-justiciable.
Apart from compelling a prosecution, a mandamus can also be used to force the Crown
prosecutor to have additional factors properly considered.395 In Canada, a court should be
capable of quashing an original decision not to prosecute and directing the Crown
prosecutor to reconsider his original decision. This way is less intrusive to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion compared to compelling a prosecution, because the court has no
final say in the outcome of the Crown prosecutor‘s reconsideration. Even though the
393
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Crown prosecutor must follow the court‘s order to reconsider a decision not to prosecute,
he or she could decide to maintain the decision after re-assessing the relevant factors and
taking into account the court‘s recommendations. This remedy is aimed at reducing the
mistakes or negligence that might take place in charging decision-making. As well, it is
appropriate because the flaw in the original decision did not result from a corrupted state
of mind that would make it unlikely for a prosecutor to engage in an honest and fair
reconsideration.
As in the UK, the standard of review in this type of application is comparatively lower,
and therefore the ―reasonableness‖ standard of review in an administrative law context
should be made available for this type of review in this proposed system. For one reason,
the corresponding remedy is comparatively less intrusive into the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, and therefore ―flagrant impropriety‖ imposes an overly high
burden of proof for this type of remedy. A rigorous standard of review highlights the
extraordinary nature of compelling a prosecution as a remedy, and reminds victims that
the court will be extremely cautious in using it.
Furthermore, using the same standard of review for two different levels of remedies will
diminish the significance of the separation of this remedy and compelling a prosecution.
When applying for judicial review of the decision not to prosecute, victims will always
seek compelling a prosecution if only one standard of review is available. The outcome of
compelling a prosecution is more secure than directing reconsideration, which may or
may not end in prosecution. If a same standard of review equally applies to both remedies,
the court will have difficulty justifying its choice of different remedies. In addition, the

169

overly broad power of the court to compel a prosecution also risks the possibility of the
court manipulating the institution of prosecution.
For another reason, a lower standard of review allows more possibility to review, and to
find mistakes and negligence in making the decision not to prosecute. If the reviewing
court is not allowed to probe into the deeper cause of the decision not to prosecute, it can
hardly find any flaw in the decisions that was simply caused by procedural mistakes or
negligence. At the same time, a lower standard of review makes judicial review easier and
more effective for victims who wish to file complaints about a questionable decision not
to prosecute, which better guarantees their interests and individual rights.
Under the ―reasonableness‖ standard of review in the context of administrative law, the
court can examine whether the decision itself and reasons behind it are defensible and fall
into the range of possible outcomes that might result from the proper exercise of
discretion. More specifically, the court can examine whether the Crown prosecutor has
complied with the charging decision guidelines, whether a public policy is lawful, and
whether an international obligation has been fulfilled. Under this lower standard of
review, the court should first determine whether the issue is about an issue of fact or an
issue of law based on the approach adopted in Pushpanathan v Canada.396 Based on the
result, the court can decide how much deference should be given to a challenged decision
not to prosecute. If the issue is an issue of fact, high deference should be given. For
example, is it reasonable for a Crown prosecutor to weigh one factor over another when
deciding whether a prosecution should be instituted? Another example could be whether
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or not a prosecutor is correct in determining the credibility of a critical witness for a case
to go forward.

5.3.3.3.1

Deviance from published guideline

I have recommended in section 6.3.1 that the discretionary power should become a
statutory power. Standards for the Crown prosecutor to decide whether or not to prosecute
should be codified in the corresponding statutes and made publicly available. Deviation
from those statutory provisions will impair the legitimacy and correctness of decisions not
to prosecute because the exercise of discretionary power by the Crown prosecutors is not
consistent with the power the statute confers on them. In the UK, charging decisions
inconsistent with charging guidelines are considered unreasonable.397
In general, the issues are related to public interests and the reasonable prospect of
conviction. Different levels of deference apply in two different types of situations. In
cases concerning issues of fact, such as reasonableness of the application of public
interests by the Crown prosecutor, or evaluation of the existing evidence, a court can
review the decisions when they appear to be unreasonable. However, the court should
only interfere with the decision not to prosecute when the decision is so abnormal that no
reasonable Crown prosecutor would have reached such a conclusion. This allows
deference to the judgement of the Crown prosecutors. It would be inappropriate for the
court to second-guess how certain public interests criteria should be applied or whether
the available evidence creates a reasonable prospect of conviction.

397

See e.g. Chaudhary, supra note 250; Jones, supra note 252; R (on the application of B) v DPP, supra note
256; Manning, supra note 9; ex parte B, supra note 257; Joseph, supra note 257.

171

Factors that could make a decision patently unreasonable might include the failure to take
into account one or several critical elements in decision-making or technically applying
public policy to every case regardless of case diversity. For example, in an English case
of R v DPP, ex parte Chaudhary,398 the policy was deemed flawed because it had either
confused or conflated two separate and different offences listed in the Criminal Law Act.
A decision made based on this flawed policy would be unreasonable. In the Manning
case,399 additional critical factors concerning whether to prosecute were identified by the
court, and the decision would be patently unreasonable if those factors were not taken
into consideration in decision-making.
In contrast, when the court considers the issues in dispute are about legal considerations,
it can review the decision not to prosecute and base its conclusion on its analysis without
deferring to the judgement of the Crown prosecutor. These issues can be whether a
claimed policy concerning public interest is legally valid, or whether the standard of
evidential proof applied by the Crown prosecutor is appropriate according to the
guidelines. The policy itself, used by the Crown prosecutor, can be unlawful,
unconstitutional, or a violation of international law. For example, in the case of R v
Catagas,400 an Indian violated the terms of the Migratory Birds Convention Act 1994401
and was thereby charged. The charging decision was subsequently questioned in court
because it was inconsistent with the established policy not to prosecute Indians. 402 The
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court found the policy was unlawful given that the Crown had no authority to exempt a
particular group from following the law.
It is also possible that the standard of evidentiary sufficiency the Crown prosecutor relies
on to withdraw charges could be overly high. In this case, the issue in dispute is whether a
Crown prosecutor‘s interpretation of the term ―realistic prospect of conviction‖ is
appropriate rather than whether there are contestable opinions regarding the value of
pieces of evidence. In the US, this issue has been categorised as a legal issue that allows
the court to review a DA‘s disapproval of private prosecution.403 Consequently, a decision
that results from those legal considerations will not be one of the reasonable alternatives
made by the Crown prosecutor‘s correct exercise of discretion.

5.3.3.3.2

Misinterpretation of law

If a Crown prosecutor decides to drop a charge based on his misinterpretation of law, the
decision not to prosecute is irrational. In the US case of Seeton v Adams, 404 the DA
dropped the charge against the accused because it considered that the accused‘s act was
not a violation of the corresponding laws. The applicant sought to compel prosecution
claiming that the DA did not interpret the law correctly. The court agreed that the DA‘s
interpretation of the law was in error but regretted that it could not compel a prosecution
because the claim did not reach a level that permitted the court to compel a prosecutor to
press charges against the suspects. As explained in the section concerning compelling a
prosecution, it is true that if a Crown prosecutor does not deliberately misinterpret the law
in order to drop a case, a mandamus to compel a prosecution is inappropriate. However, a
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decision not to prosecute based on misinterpretation of law also causes a miscarriage of
justice and unjustifiably impairs the interests of the victims who suffered because of the
accused‘s acts. Furthermore, the court has jurisdiction and is more specialized in
interpreting the law than the Crown prosecutor. Therefore, it is proper for the court to
remind the Crown Prosecutor of his or her mistakes in the decision not to prosecute and
direct reconsideration.

5.3.3.3.3 Maintaining a decision not to prosecute after
reconsideration
In the situation where a prosecutor maintains a decision not to prosecute after
reconsideration, no second internal review will take place and the court will accept an
application for a second judicial review only on the grounds of ―flagrant impropriety‖. In
addition, the court should not be allowed to direct reconsideration in the second judicial
review process. First, if a decision not to prosecute in a case has been subject to a judicial
review once and has subsequently been quashed, any reasonable prosecutor will be more
cautious in reconsidering such a decision in the same case. If the reasonableness and
correctness of non-prosecution has been called into question once, any issues concerning
non-prosecution should be put under a microscope by any reasonable and responsible
Crown prosecutor reviewing the original decision. In addition, the flaws in the original
decision-making will have been identified and pointed out by the court, facilitating the
Crown prosecutor in making a correct and reasoned charging decision.
All of the abovementioned can minimize the possibility that the Crown prosecutor will
make the same mistakes again if he or she has carefully contemplated the flaws identified
by the court. Therefore, disallowing second internal review and employing a higher
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standard respects the principle of presuming that Crown prosecutors act in good faith and
function well. Concerning second judicial review, by redirecting reconsideration without
finding ―flagrant impropriety‖ on the part of the Crown prosecutor, the court disrespects
the judgement and capability of the Crown prosecutor to make a proper charging decision,
which is an inappropriate intervention into administrative decision-making.
Second, if victims prove that the Crown prosecutor acts flagrantly improperly in
reconsidering the original decision not to prosecute, the court can issue a mandamus to
force him or her to prosecute. If the Crown prosecutor deliberately disregards the
concerns pointed out by the reviewing court when reconsidering the decision not to
prosecute or refuses to re-assess such a decision, he or she is considered acting in bad
faith and in contempt of a court‘s order. These actions should be categorized as ―flagrant
impropriety‖. As explained in Section 6.3.3.2, if a Crown prosecutor acts flagrantly
improperly during the charging decision-making process, directing reconsideration is less
effective. In this case, a second judicial review would be more efficacious than a second
internal review given that the accused flagrantly improper acts involve the whole Crown
prosecutor‘s office. As a result, a second internal review seems to be redundant.
Third, this approach can avoid a victim‘s endless applications for reconsideration, or
internal review, of a decision not to prosecute. It is true that there might be situations
where a victim can identify a flaw in the second decision not to prosecute that is different
than the flaw that affected the first decision, which would not demonstrate flagrant
impropriety and would leave the victim without a remedy. However, as mentioned above,
the chance that the prosecutor will err twice, and differently, in a single case is very rare,
and such error is even harder for victims to prove than the first time. It increases the
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possibility that victims file unsustainable applications for either internal or judicial review,
which will definitely further prolong the review process and increase the anxiety and
stress of the accused. This would put the accused in a worse situation if the multiple
applications finally result in the re-institution of the prosecution. In addition, endless
applications may significantly increase the possibility of the Crown prosecutor finally
commencing a prosecution because he or she is tired of responding to the court
concerning a case. In this case, the decision to prosecute will be made under undue
influence from the court and victims, which will significantly impair the Crown
prosecutor‘s ability to act independently in charging decision-making. In addition, this
provides the accused ammunition to attack the decision to prosecute and seek a stay of
prosecution.405
If the trial judge stays the proceedings, victim‘s endless applications will not make the
situation better than the situation I proposed here. The costs of endless applications
clearly outweigh the benefits. Hence, no second internal review is allowed, and the
acceptable grounds to review a second decision not to prosecute in court are that the
Crown prosecutor deliberately maintains the decision not to prosecute by acting flagrantly
improperly, namely in bad faith, corruption, violation of the law, or bias against or for a
particular individual or offence.
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5.3.3.4Termination of a private prosecution: quash a decision to stay
a private prosecution
In both the UK and the US, extremely low standards of review are employed to review
the termination of a private prosecution based on evidential sufficiency as compared to a
public one. It seems that these two countries give high levels of respect to the individuals‘
exercise of the right to prosecute an alleged lawbreaker, and therefore strictly limit the
intervention of the public prosecutor into a private prosecution. In both countries,
different standards of review are applied when a public prosecutor bases his stay of
private prosecution on the reasonable prospect of conviction and on public interest.
In reference to these two countries, in this proposed judicial review system, the same
approach should be employed for reviewing the termination of private prosecution. The
Crown Prosecutor should not be allowed to stop a private prosecutor because of the lack
of a reasonable prospect of conviction. In contrast, if the Crown prosecutor stays a private
prosecution, claiming that such a prosecution is against public interest, the court should
apply the ―flagrant impropriety‖ standard of review used in section 6.3.3.2.

5.3.3.4.1

Evidential Sufficiency

The Crown prosecutor should not stop a private prosecution because it does not have a
realistic prospect of conviction, which is required for the institution of a public
prosecution. As well, failure to meet the evidentiary standard set in Crown prosecutor‘s
charging guidelines should not fall under the public interests test.406
Like in Canada, public prosecutors in the US and the UK have the power and
responsibility to stop a private prosecution in public interests. However, contrary to
406
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Canadian courts, 407 courts in these two countries are inclined to restrain the power in
order to protect an individual‘s right to institute a private prosecution when a public
prosecutor fails to act. In the UK, the prosecutor can only take over a private prosecution
and stop it on the grounds of evidential insufficiency when there is ―clearly no case to
answer‖.408 In the US, if the public prosecutor disapproves a private prosecution on these
grounds, the court can decide, once a complaint is lodged, to review and assess whether
the private prosecutor has established a prima facie case.409 The basic principle is that the
public prosecutor should not prevent an individual from bringing charges against the
potential lawbreaker merely on the grounds that, based on the same set of evidence, he or
she would not have prosecuted. A public prosecutor who does so is inappropriately
encroaching on and impairing citizens‘ right to institute a private prosecution.
Similarly, in Canada, both the individual‘s right to a private prosecution and the Attorney
General‘s power to supervise a private prosecution are fundamental parts of the criminal
justice system. 410 As well, the right to a private prosecution is also recognized as ―a
valuable constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on the part of authority‖.411
In other words, individuals can take actions to get justice done in situations where public
prosecutors fail or are reluctant to initiate a prosecution. However, the legislation does not
require private prosecutors to make charging decisions consistent with the charging
407
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standards used by the Crown prosecutor. In addition, ―realistic prospect of conviction‖ is
too high of an evidential standard with which a private prosecutor can comply. This
standard is mainly used to facilitate the Crown prosecutor‘s effective distribution of the
available prosecutorial resources. However, an average citizen is not a trained Crown
prosecutor. It is not fair to expect him or her to behave and think exactly like a Crown
prosecutor. As well, he or she has no duty to consider the procedural and economic
efficiency of the administration of justice when making a charging decision. Therefore, a
―prima facie case‖ is enough to avoid the situation where an accused is forced to stand
trial when there is clearly no case to answer. Plus, in the current Canadian system, the
existence of an initial review of a privately laid Information can avoid such situations.
According to the Criminal Code, any private citizen is eligible to submit an Information
to a justice if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed
by the accused person.412 The Code then leaves it to a Justice to decide whether to issue
process.413
While citizens have a right to institute a private prosecution, the Attorney General has a
duty to protect the public and honour and express the community‘s sense of justice. 414
However, this duty does not permit the Crown prosecutor to force a private prosecutor to
comply strictly with the evidentiary sufficiency standard applied by the Crown prosecutor.
It is even inappropriate to draw a conclusion that a private prosecution is against public
interests merely because, after re-examining the available evidence, the Crown prosecutor
believes such a prosecution does not meet his or her criteria of prospect of conviction.
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First, the initial review of the Information by the Justice can make sure that an allegation
is at least supported by some evidence. According to the Crown prosecutor, if the case
does not meet his or her ―reasonable prospect of conviction‖ standard, putting an
individual on the stand would be outrageous or arbitrary, which is inconsistent with
public interests. However, in order to commence a private prosecution, the private
prosecutor needs to have some evidence for each element of an alleged crime.415 After
that, a Justice is obliged to determine whether there is admissible evidence of all the
elements of the alleged offence and make a determination whether a process should be
issued. 416 Even though this process is very different from assessing the likelihood of
conviction, the Justice at least establishes the fact that there is some evidence for the
accused to answer. The Crown prosecutor cannot be one hundred percent sure that the
informant raises the allegation falsely or arbitrarily against the accused merely because
the information does not meet the requirement in the charging guidelines.
Second, if the Crown prosecutor can stop a private prosecution because the Information
does not meet the standards in his or her charging guidelines, this is equivalent to asking
the private prosecutor to comply with the charging guidelines. This is because the
Information may be taken over and stopped by the Crown prosecutor if the private
informant does not do that. This is similar to asking a private informant to think and act
like a Crown prosecutor when instituting a private prosecution, which further limits an
individual‘s right to a private prosecution.
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Third, if the Crown prosecutor can always stop a private prosecution based on the
evidential sufficiency test laid down in the charging guideline, the initial review of the
Information by the Justice will be meaningless. The Justice assesses the Information
based on a comparatively lower standard than the charging guidelines of the Crown
prosecutor, which means the Crown prosecutor can always use evidentiary sufficiency as
a legitimate reason to stop a private prosecution. An initial review by the Justice, in fact,
cannot determine whether a case can finally go on without the acquiescence of the Crown
prosecutor.
What, then, is the point of the initial review by the Justice? In that case, would it not be
better if the Justice of Peace applied the Crown prosecutor‘s evidentiary sufficiency
standard when determining whether to issue process? Or would it not be better if every
private information should receive consent from the Crown prosecutor before it was laid?
In addition, it is possible that, in cases where there are multiple cases that cannot meet the
evidentiary sufficiency standard applied by the Crown prosecutor, the Crown prosecutor
stays only the case that is particularly interesting to him or her. Would this selection be
unfair to the private prosecutor of that particular case? In conclusion, in my opinion, the
Crown prosecutor‘s unlimited power to intervene does not make the operation of private
prosecution system more coherent and fair, but turns some functions such as the existence
of Justice of Peace redundant.
Fourth, a private prosecutor normally acts when the Crown prosecutor or the police fail to
act. In this way, the interests of a private prosecutor can be well protected from the inertia
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or partiality of the Crown prosecutor. 417 If the Crown prosecutor can stop a private
prosecution merely because he or she would never have prosecuted the case based on the
same set of evidence, the effect of giving individual rights to a private prosecution is
undermined.
The current set up for an individual to commence a private prosecution is an appropriate
standard to provide a real guarantee against prosecutorial inaction caused by inertia or
partiality on the part of the Crown prosecutor. The Crown prosecutor should not always
have a final say on whether a case should be brought to trial based on the available
evidence. Otherwise, a private prosecutor may not exercise the right to bring charges
against lawbreakers effectively. Instead, he or she proceeds with a prosecution as if he or
she is an agent or subordinate of the Crown prosecutor. This makes the distinction
between private prosecution and public prosecution completely meaningless.
It would be, however, different if the Crown prosecutor could prove to the court that there
is ―clearly no case to answer‖. In this situation, the private life and reputation of the
accused person would be inappropriately impaired because of the ungrounded accusation.
Meanwhile, allowing an ungrounded accusation would compromise the integrity of the
criminal justice system. Citizens would live in fear of not knowing when and where they
might be put on a stand in court by others for no reason. Therefore, this type of private
prosecution is clearly against public interests. Nonetheless, this situation is not likely to
happen in the current Canadian system because an initial review made by a Justice can
guarantee that there is a case to answer.
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In the case where the stay of a private prosecution is based on evidentiary insufficiency,
should a court directly quash a decision to stop a private prosecution, or have a fresh
review of an Information laid by the informant to determine whether it meets the Crown
prosecutor‘s charging guideline? In both the UK and the US, the court limits the public
prosecutor to the use of ―evidential insufficiency‖ as grounds to strike down a private
prosecution to some extent. In contrast to the UK practice, a court in the US can conduct
a de novo review if the DA claims that the disapproval of a private prosecution is based
on evidential insufficiency, which I do not recommend.
First, as previously mentioned, it is overly rigorous to require a private informant to
comply with the charging guidelines of the Crown prosecutor. Second, when legislators
give average citizens the right to a private prosecution, they also allow them to exercise
that right at their discretion. Similar to public prosecution, the court should not instill its
own wisdom into the original charging decision made by the private prosecutor by
conducting a de novo review. A court can also easily reach an equally reasonable but
different conclusion contrary to that of the private prosecutor and a Justice of Peace.
Since both the court and the private prosecutor can reach equally reasonable decisions,
there is no reason for the court to override the decision. In addition, it is unfair to private
prosecutor if the court denies the possibility of a criminal prosecution because it believes
that the private prosecutor‘s decision is less reasonable than its own, not that the decision
is incorrect or unreasonable. As a result, a de novo review would undermine individuals‘
right and ability to institute a private prosecution.
In conclusion, the Crown prosecutor should not be allowed to strike down a private
prosecution based on evidentiary insufficiency. In the proposed review system, the court
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can only directly nullify a decision to stay a private prosecution if it finds that the nature
of the reasons behind such a stay is related to evidentiary insufficiency.

5.3.3.4.2

Public Interests

The ―reasonableness‖ standard is available for the applicant to seek quashing the decision
to stay a private prosecution. The ―public interests‖ threshold is more closely linked to the
Crown prosecutor‘s expertise and duty to protect the public. The Crown prosecutor has
better knowledge of the interests of the public. As a result, in general, the court should
respect the Crown prosecutors‘ judgement on whether a private prosecution takes place in
the interest of the public. Therefore, a corresponding level of deference to the original
decision not to prosecute should be back on the table in this case.
In general, the court should not interfere with the Crown prosecutor‘s exercise of
discretion in deciding when, how, and in which case a policy concerning public interests
should be applied. As well, the court needs to refrain from determining for the Crown
prosecutor what is to be public interest. If the stay of a private prosecution is so irregular
that no reasonable person will consider the institution of such a prosecution as against
public interests or relevant policies for public interests, the court can quash a decision to
stay based on the ―reasonableness‖ standard of review. An unreasonable decision to stay a
prosecution inappropriately impairs individuals‘ right to private prosecution rather than
protecting the interest of the public.
However, in cases where the issue in dispute is a matter of law, such as whether a policy
used in the public interests test is constitutional or lawful, lower deference should be
applied. The court can quash a decision to stay a private prosecution if the claimed policy
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with regards to public interests itself is not legally valid, such as when it is violations of
international obligations, constitutional rights, or legislation. This type of issue belongs to
legal issues rather than the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and the court has full
jurisdiction to decide on the matter in order to maintain the integrity of the criminal
justice system and uphold the rule of law.
Finally, lack of sufficient evidence and existence of adequate civil remedies cannot be
considered as a valid reason to justify a stay of private prosecution on the grounds of
public interests. Obviously, in this proposal, a rejection of a private prosecution based on
lack of sufficient evidence is impermissible. For one reason, if such grounds are
categorized as a part of the public interest test, the Crown prosecutor can always stop a
private prosecution based on the issue of evidential sufficiency and block the court from
effectively reviewing such a decision by disguising it with the public interests test.418 For
another reason, the distinction between these two grounds will be eliminated.
For the issue concerning the existence of civil remedies, they cannot always replace the
significance of criminal prosecution to the victims. In addition, the Crown prosecutors are
not in a position to determine whether civil remedies are adequate for the victims because
they are not the ones who suffer from the accused‘s act. Moreover, in most cases, civil
remedies are always available to the victims, and there is no fixed definition to determine
when and how such remedies are considered adequate. Does this mean a criminal
prosecution is in fact supplementary to the civil recourses? Does this mean a criminal
prosecution should only be instituted when civil recourses are not adequate? To allow the
Crown prosecutor to stay a private prosecution based on these grounds amounts to giving
418
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him or her unlimited power to stop a private prosecution concerning most types of
offences.

5.3.4 Potential Impact on the Accused
The proposed reform has a negative impact on the prospective accused but tries to
minimize the degree of possible negative impact. Notification about the possibility of the
reversal of a decision not to prosecute should be given to the accused. This can prevent
the accused from stopping the investigation or disposing his defence strategy and valuable
evidence. In most situations, the whole review process, including internal review and
judicial review, will not exceed a maximum of one year. This can shorten the period the
prospective accused would suffer from not knowing whether a prosecution will restart
and from other inconveniences in his or her normal life. In addition, this can reduce the
chance of losing evidence critical for the prospective accused‘s defence as the result of
time passing. If the delays in the judicial review process are caused by victims, as a part
of his participatory rights laid down in section 6.1.3.3, the accused can raise these issues
in court, both reviewing court and trial court, asking for corresponding remedies.
However, it is impossible to eliminate all negative impact. Some negative impact cannot
be avoided due to force majeure, some of which might be detrimental to the defence of
the prospective accused. In those cases, some remedies should be given to the accused.
For example, a critical witness may be not available because he or she dies, is in a coma,
or becomes unavailable for other reasons. As well, in some cases, the memory of the
critical witness may be called into question given that it has been a while since the alleged
crime was committed. A witness cannot always be expected to make an effort to
memorize an event merely for the defence of the prospective accused. In these cases, if
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the testimony of such witness is so critical to proving the innocence of the prospective
accused, a sworn and signed document, voice record, or video tape can be accepted as
evidence without being corroborated through cross-examination in court.
In other situations, a lawyer who originally handled the case may not be available or is
not willing to take the case anymore. It will take time for the accused to locate a new
lawyer and re-build his defence. In these cases, the court should grant an extra time for
the accused to prepare his defence. In any case, if the damage is irreparable and is so
detrimental that the accused is not able to receive a fair trial, the court can stay the
proceeding because continuing the case will cause fundamental injustice to the accused.
Of course, one year of review is not a short period, which, as previously mentioned, can
cause inconveniency to the prospective accused‘s daily life. For instance, the qualification
for a profession of the prospective accused might be kept on hold until the resolution of
the criminal charge, which makes him or her difficult to be employed, or maybe he or she
is not able to access his or her children or family because of the pending criminal charges,
or maybe the prospective accused suffers from extraordinary stress as a result of the
pending charges. In these situations, the court should be allowed, at its discretion based
on the severity of the suffering of the accused due to the judicial review, to order the
victim to pay the accused a certain amount of money in order to compensate his loss if the
court finds the victim does not have enough evidence to support his or her allegation. In
addition, this can prevent the victim from filing applications for judicial review that have
no prospect of success.
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With regards to the full disclosure of reasons behind the decision not to prosecute,
something in the disclosed reasons may place the accused‘s safety in danger. Therefore,
during the judicial review, in cases where it is necessary to verify information through an
oral hearing, a closed session should be held in order to keep the information classified.
In addition, in any case, victims should sign a confidentiality agreement to promise not to
release the relevant documents to third parties. If victims fail to keep the agreement, the
court can refuse to review the decision not to prosecute. I assume that, in normal
situations, victims would choose to keep the confidentiality agreement given that they do
not want to ruin the prospective criminal prosecution or to be sued in a civil suit.
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CHAPTER VI
6 Conclusion
The proposed reform of the review system for decisions not to prosecute can effectively
protect victims‘ interests in criminal prosecutions from unjust and unfair decisions not to
prosecute made by Crown prosecutors. In Canada, victims of crime are often in
vulnerable positions because they must passively wait in the charging decision-making
process. In principle, we all presume that Crown prosecutors make decisions of whether
or not to prosecute with due diligence, objectivity, integrity, and good motive. If the
Crown prosecutor is not trusted by the public, generally, he or she is unlikely to function
efficiently and effectively. However, in actuality, decisions not to prosecute are not
always just, fair, and rational due to the motives, attitudes, experience, or other factors
behind the Crown prosecutor‘s charging decisions.
For example, even though charging guidelines encourage the Crown prosecutor to
consider victims‘ interests in making charging decisions, the character or other features of
victims might still affect the degree of impartiality and dedication of the Crown
prosecutor on a case, which means he is not able to judge on a case in the professional
way he is supposed to. In cases where the decision is unjust and unfair to victims, they
can currently only accept the decision without protest. This is because they do not have
effective means to have such a decision overturned.
Judicial review is an available option for victims to overturn the problematic decision not
to prosecute in the competent court. However, judicial review was not originally designed
for victims to challenge decisions not to prosecute, and so the system does not adequately
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meet the victims‘ needs were they to challenge the decision. First of all, the court is
usually extremely reluctant to judge a discretionary decision not to prosecute made by the
Crown prosecutor. ―Flagrant impropriety‖ is still the sole ground for victims to challenge
such decisions. In addition, this term is strictly limited to three instances, corruption,
violation of the law, and bias against or for a particular individual or offence. 419 Second,
majority of the strongest jurisprudence concerning judicial review of charging decisions
centres around the challenges to the decision to prosecute.420 It seems that, in comparison
to the accused making cases against decisions to prosecute, victims are less likely to make
a strong case against a decision not to prosecute. Finally, it is difficult for victims to prove
misconduct on the part of the Crown prosecutor in the decision-making process given that
they only receive notification of non-prosecution and basic information about the decision
in most situations.
Legislators and scholars usually take less notice of the fact that victims will be personally
affected by the decision not to prosecute. For one reason, they believe that victims‘ main
interests and the significance of a trial proceeding for them are conditional on the
conviction of the accused. For another reason, they consider that the accused‘s right to be
presumed innocent and the independence of the Crown prosecutor to make charging
decisions should be primary concerns, which distracts attention from the interests of the
victims in charging decisions. However, it is also possible that the accused is convicted
through a criminal prosecution. In this case, victims are able to maintain these interests
and benefit from other emotional healing that is a part of the criminal proceedings. It is
important to emphasize that this chance is conditional on whether a criminal prosecution
419
420
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will be instituted in the first place. Therefore, an unjust and unfair decision not to
prosecute will improperly take away victims‘ chances to receive potential benefits from
criminal proceedings.
As well, some Crown prosecutors and scholars consider that civil recourses are enough
for the victims to get over decisions not to prosecute. They underestimate the importance
of, and several irreplaceable features of, the criminal prosecution for some victims and
some offences. For example, in some situations, a criminal prosecution better serves the
victims‘ psychological needs and healing. At some point, a public prosecution might
comfort victims because they feel that the state is protecting them by prosecuting their
violators.
Therefore, I suggest that the victims should have an effective remedy to overturn unjust
and unfair decisions not to prosecute. Apart from the abovementioned reasons, I also
believe that this remedy can give victims a certain level of control over the decision not to
prosecute, which might increase victims‘ satisfaction concerning the charging decisionmaking regardless of the outcome. Even if the decision not to prosecute remains, victims
are able to move on because they have made every effort to see justice done. As well, it is
also one method to protect victims‘ equal protections right from discriminatory decisions
not to prosecute.
The practices of reviewing decisions not to prosecute in the UK and in the US in recent
years have informed the proposed reform. The reform mainly includes three parts. The
first change is that an internal review system should be provided in Crown prosecutor‘s
office as it is in the UK. An internal review is effective and convenient for victims to
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challenge decisions not to prosecute. Through internal review, the reviewing unit will
identify the flaws, if any, in the decision not to prosecute, which is similar to what a court
does in a judicial review. However, the reviewing unit has fewer limitations than the court
when examining the decision that was complained about. A reviewing unit can conduct a
fresh review of a decision not to prosecute without giving any deference to the original
decision. Moreover, for victims, internal review is simpler in procedure, easily accessible
and less time-consuming. The most important thing is that it is free, which means indigent
victims can afford such a review. Furthermore, it will reduce the incidents of victims
applying a judicial review to a court, which can ease the workload of the court.
Then, some changes should also be made for judicial review of the decision not to
prosecute. First, the discretionary power of the Crown prosecutor and Attorney General
concerning whether to institute a prosecution should become statutory. If the scope of the
discretionary power is clearly written down, it will be easier for the court to determine
whether a decision is made consistent with the law. Then, the standards of review for
reviewing administrative discretionary decision-making should be extended to judicial
review of decisions not to prosecute. This reform does not apply to challenges to
decisions to prosecute.
For a ―compelling prosecution‖ type of review, I agree with the US‘s approach that the
highest standard of review should be employed. In Canada, ―flagrant impropriety‖ should
be the sole ground to allow the court to compel a prosecution. This is because, on these
grounds, it is probable that the Crown prosecutor is not genuinely willing to reconsider
the decision not to prosecute when a court directs reconsideration. Therefore, a court has
to compel the Crown prosecutor to act in that case.
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For a ―direct reconsideration‖ type of review, ―reasonableness‖ and ―correctness‖ as
standards of review should be allowed, which means that the court can dig up the deeper
reasons behind the decision not to prosecute. This follows the practice in the UK, which
upholds a position that lower standards of review for decisions should be employed
because it is the last remedy for victims to have such a decision reviewed and it is always
hard to find that a decision not to prosecute is flawed.421
For quashing a termination of private prosecution, a Crown prosecutor cannot use ―no
realistic prospect of conviction‖ or ―existence of civil remedies‖ as reasons to stop a
private prosecution. These two grounds cannot be categorised as reasons to reject a
private prosecution for public interests. I believe that, while it is the duty of the Attorney
General and its agent to protect the public, it is also important to respect the individual‘s
right to a private prosecution. Even though they employ different methods, courts in the
US and the UK also try to limit the power of the public prosecutor to stop a private
prosecution on the grounds of the lack of evidence. If the Crown prosecutor claims that a
stop of private prosecution is because such a prosecution is against public interests, the
decision can be subject to a ―reasonableness‖ standard of review. Whether or not a court
should give a level of deference to the Crown prosecutor‘s judgment on the original
decision depends on the nature of issue in dispute.
Finally, I recognize that the proposed reform might negatively affect the prospective
accused in many ways. Certain remedies, such as accepting exceptional evidential rules,
extra time for the accused preparing a defence, termination of a judicial review process
and signing confidentiality agreement by victims, should be given to the accused if the
421
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damage is critical. In extreme cases where the principles of justice cannot be upheld if the
prosecution is continued, a court can stop a proceeding.

6.1 Limitation of the study
I did not address several issues in this study:
any evidentiary issues (e.g., what sort of evidence would be admissible/used at a
review hearing) and the precise burden of proof by victims in challenging
decisions not to prosecute
issues concerning whether the reasons behind victims‘ opportunities to challenge
decisions not to prosecute will provide legitimate grounds for them to challenge
decisions to prosecute
issues about whether a government should pay the indigent victims, or at least
provide a free lawyer

6.2 Significance
In conclusion, even though currently victims‘ interests and rights in the charging stage
have not been fully recognized and given weight in Canada, they are receiving attention
gradually following the global victims‘ rights movement. The fact that victims will be
personally affected by decisions not to prosecute is already formally recognized in the EU
and some other countries. In order to protect victims‘ interests, the EU officially granted
victims a right to review a decision not to prosecute.422 EU Member States more or less
have provided a workable framework for victims to challenge decisions not to prosecute.
Eventually, the check on decisions not to prosecute will be a major concern to ensure

422
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victims‘ interests in the charging stage. The proposal I make in this thesis can provide a
direction or framework for future reform in this area in Canada.
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